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Sri Lanka's cohabitation politics and peace process move to the brink with President Chandrika Kumaratunga's assertion of her constitutional powers by taking away key portfolios from the Ranil Wickremesinghe government.....4

The Tamil Nadu Assembly Speaker's order to arrest the Publisher and senior journalists of *The Hindu* and the Editor of *Murasoli* attracts nationwide protests and brings to the fore the question of codification of legislative privileges.....121

Big fish get trapped in the net spread out for the culprits in the fake stamp paper scam in Maharashtra, even as investigations unravel its extent in several States.....108

Cover Story	Travel	Safdar Hashmi case verdict	104
A crisis in Sri Lanka	4	A trek to the Garhwal Himalayas	66
Interview: Chandrika Kumaratunga	6	Review Article	
The political deadlock	9	The truth about Kargil:	
The LTTE's response	11	by A.G. Noorani	73
Waiting and watching	12	Folk Arts	
On Tiger turf	13	Kalakars' struggle	81
Assembly Elections		Art	
Rajasthan: Caste calculations	16	Rhythms of marine life	84
M.P.: A Chief Minister's battle	20	Litigation	
Delhi: Advantage Congress(I)	23	India caucus help in Bhopal case	86
A test run in Chhattisgarh	27	Child Labour	
Mizoram: Uncertain prospects	31	Behind the looms: by Camilla Roman and Barbara Harris-White	88
Terrorism		ICHR	
The Kandahar plot	34	Row over a choice	89
The States		Conservation	
Death and distress in Karnataka	37	Jarawas at a crossroads	90
Assam: Territories of fear	39	Campaigns	
West Bengal: Trouble in a tea garden	42	MKSS at Pushkar fair	94
A blueprint for Mumbai	44	Education	
World Affairs		The trap of external dependency	97
Alone at the receiving end in Iraq	46	Issues in Focus	
Saudi Arabia's home-grown terror	48	A sanitation emergency	101
A victory of sorts in Japan	49	Crime	
The Guantanamo question	51	Debating the death sentence	103
The Bush plan for Cuba	52		
Afghanistan: Prospects of a Constitution	55		
The Kremlin strikes	57		
Reinventing Russia	59		
Towards people's mining in Indonesia	61		
The U.S. military-industrial complex	64		

On the cover: Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe during a meeting at the Queens House in Colombo on June 16 (Photograph: Sanyasha Waljuda).

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■ COVER STORY

A crisis in Sri Lanka

The island state's cohabitation politics and peace process move to the brink with President Chandrika Kumaratunga's assertion of her constitutional powers by taking away key portfolios including Defence from the Ranil Wickremesinghe government.

V.S. SAMBANDAN
in Colombo

*There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, when taken at the flood, leads on to
fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.*
— William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*.

ON November 4, Sri Lanka's first real cohabitation government and the Norwegian-facilitated peace process started facing their latest endurance test. Exercising her constitutional powers, the President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, took over the portfolios of Defence, Interior and Mass Communication, and pro-rogued Parliament. Constitutionally and

legally, Kumaratunga was on a firm footing in wresting the portfolios that were allocated by her to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front (UNF) coalition government.

Wickremesinghe, not one to roll over and play dead, and the UNF rallied their forces together and the next three days saw a high-decibel political battle, planned behind closed doors, fought through media briefings and put to demonstration on the roads leading to Colombo.

On November 7, when Wickremesinghe — he was on an official visit to the United States when his Cabinet colleagues lost their portfolios — returned to Sri Lanka, he had practically converted his constitutionally weak wicket to a politically strong one. The 10 days from November 4

to 14 saw the island in a frenzy, a heady upsurge of political emotions. Though the political tide has receded, the swift presidential move has left its impact which has serious connotations for the future of the island's cohabitation government and, more important, its latest attempt to find peace.

Four days after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had presented its first-ever blueprint for a solution to the island's separatist conflict, Sri Lanka was still weighing the consequences. Analysts, political leaders and commentators were reading — and re-reading — the fine print of the LTTE's demand for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). Phrases were put under the microscope to explore hidden meanings and connotations. The

nation was still to recover from the dazed stupor that it had sunk into after the LTTE at last made it clear what it wanted.

Then came the presidential move. And when it came, there was no resistance — constitutional or legal. Kumaratunga, who is also the head of the Cabinet, took over the portfolios of Defence, Interior and Mass Communication. A shocked Wickremesinghe administration had no cover, constitutionally or legally.

The November 4 action of the President has implications on two broad fronts — the peace process and the power struggle between the island's two largest and bitterly opposed political parties: Wickremesinghe's United National Party (UNP) and Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

On the peace process, over which there is considerable international concern, it means that for all practical purposes the Prime Minister is no longer in charge. The ceasefire agreement, signed separately by Wickremesinghe and LTTE supreme V. Prabhakaran, has been at the core of the current peace process. With the guns silent, territories frozen and, to use an oft-quoted phrase, the "balance of military forces" maintained, the peace process went from one phase of talks to another.

The key to this, as the UNF administration would highlight in the days following November 4, was that the sensitive Defence portfolio was under the control of Wickremesinghe, as Tilak Marapana, a UNP MP, held it. With the leverage over the military situation lost following the presidential move, the Prime Minister and his party were quick to emphasise that they could not be held responsible for the peace process any longer.

Hours after she took over power, Kumaratunga, for her part, went on national television and reiterated her commitment to peace. Her constitutional moves, she emphasised, were in the "larger interest of the nation". While the takeover of the Ministries of Defence and Interior was deemed necessary because they had to do with the security of the nation, the takeover of the Mass Communication Ministry was explained by presidential circles as a move to correct the "biases" that had crept into the state-run media during UNF rule.

The next day, on November 5, the President's move was further consolidated by former Foreign Affairs Minister and Se-



Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen with LTTE supreme V. Prabhakaran at an undisclosed location near Killinochchi on November 13.

nior Presidential Adviser Lakshman Kadirgamar, at a press conference.

Allaying a main immediate concern, Kadirgamar said that the President wanted to make it clear that "the ceasefire agreement stands and will stand. There is no question about that". The presidential moves, he said, were entirely constitutional and would not affect the peace process. There was "no intention whatsoever of a resumption, or provoking the resumption, of violence", he said.

In a clause-by-clause criticism of the LTTE's counter-proposals, Kadirgamar made the point that while the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka is not negotiable", some of the rebel proposals "can be talked about".

The issue appeared to be settled. The President, for all practical purposes, was fully in charge and there was little room for the UNF to wedge its way back. Or so it seemed.

In the next couple of hours, the political pendulum swung from the constitutional end to the political end. Defence attaches based in Colombo were called and told that the island was headed for a "short-term" emergency. Orders were sent to the Government Printer to print a "revised emergency regulations", and the political mood changed, yet again.

Confirmation of the state of emergency was late to come, but there were repeated assurances that it would only be a short-term one. Security forces started taking positions, of all places, in the state-run

media houses that had been taken over by the President a day earlier. International journalists from near and far converged on Colombo.

The President's office remained silent for two days. The proclamation was being reprinted, went one explanation, as there were "printing errors". It will be for a short period and will be back-dated, went another. For all practical purposes, the feel of the state of emergency filled the island's political sphere on November 5 and 6. With the President's move having been made and the UNF having raised a shrill protest that the act "went against all vestiges of democracy", the nation awaited the return of the other key player in this political opera — Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.

ON November 7, the roads leading to the Bandaranaike International Airport, some 30 km from Colombo, turned green — with the colours of the UNP headed by Wickremesinghe. Known for its organisational abilities, the party had ensured that its leader, who had just lost a constitutional battle, would be accorded a victor's return.

Streamers had been raised across the roads, groups of supporters milled around on roadsides, and there was a band playing music on top of a lorry. The road leading to the entrance of the airport, about a couple of kilometres from the highway, was filled with party supporters waiting for Wickremesinghe. Cabinet members and mediapersons headed for the tarmac of the



President Chandrika Kumaratunga addresses the nation in a live broadcast on national television on November 7.



Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at a meeting with the Norwegian peace mediators in Colombo on November 13.

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'I did it in the larger interest of the nation'

Interview with President Chandrika Kumaratunga.

As the constitutionally all-powerful head of state, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga took over the portfolios of Defence, Interior and Mass Communication on November 4. With this single move, the Sri Lankan peace process and also the bitter cohabitation government in Colombo have been jolted into a mid-course reality check.

In a 45-minute interview on the night of November 8-9, the President told V.S. Sambandan that her principle "very frankly, was that even the most unacceptable position of your adversary can be a basis to begin discussions".

The President asserted that the November 4 moves were "in the larger interest of the nation" and called for a coming together of the Sri Lankan polity to "strongly negotiate" with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

On a personal note, the 58-year-old Chandrika Kumaratunga, who completed nine years in office on November 12, said she would "dearly love to see peace" and "go home as fast as possible" from the "terrible life" of being Sri Lanka's 'head of state, head of the executive and of the government, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces' (Article 30, Constitution of Sri Lanka). Excerpts from the interview:

► *Madam President, Sri Lanka, you said, is now at a crossroads. How do you plan to take it forward from now?*

I would take responsibility for Defence while the Prime Minister (Ranil Wickremesinghe) will be called upon to continue the peace process. If he wants my participation, I am willing to consider it. I did offer it at the beginning, but now I have to think twice about it because they have, by their un-professionalism, created havoc in the peace process. The way I have been treated by the state-controlled media, the Prime Minister's family controlled-media and the lies that they have said about me. I would not want to put my hand into something which I see is beginning to go the wrong way and then be given the blame for it.

► *You said Sri Lanka is at a crossroads.*

How do you see it going specifically on the peace process?

When I said a crossroads I did not mean anything specifically. I meant Sri Lanka is at a crossroads of history, because we are between peace and destruction. Not total destruction but destroying ourselves as a nation, in a general sense of the word.

I feel that in Sri Lanka we had this very petty thing of two major parties. When the one in power wants to resolve the one major problem we face, the other party opposes it. And vice versa, it goes



can't talk all details about a sensitive thing like this.

(Now) when (the country) is not informed, they become suspicious about it. The violations of ceasefire, the recruitment of children – seven-year-old children – increasing the cadres from 6,000 to 18,000, attacking Muslim towns 16 or 20 times, killing, abducting, demanding ransom, harassments of Tamils and Muslims in the north and the east especially. Then the Sinhalese people and the others do get worried. So I could not hold them back.

And having watched for a long time I could not do so without being treacherous to the nation. I think it will be very unfair to say that I did this to get power, as some people are saying, or to sabotage the peace process. I did it only in the larger interest of the entire nation. The larger interest of the entire nation means the larger interest of the vast majority of civilians.

► *Your office and you have reiterated thrice in the past three days your commitment to peace. There is a perception that Opposition parties sabotage the peace process...*

If I had wanted to sabotage, Mr. Sambandan, I should have done it a hundred times in the last two years. There have been gross violations of the Constitution by the Prime Minister. For example, he signed the ceasefire agreement when he had absolutely no authority to sign it. Without telling me, without even my leave, he signs it and comes and gives it to me. That's the time I could have reacted.

Having told him this is what I can do, I said: But I am more committed than you to peace. You sabotaged my peace process consistently for seven and a half years, but I will not sabotage yours. I care for this country.

Therefore I waited and watched, while warning, of course. Which is my role.

► *After the LTTE's counter-proposals came, Madam President, three positions have been put on the table – the government's proposals, the LTTE's proposals and your draft Constitution. You have also strongly said that the Constitution*

has to be changed, has to be done away with. Where do you think is the starting point to move away from the constitutional lock?

In the first place, the 1997 draft Constitution, I would say, was much better than the 2000 one for the minorities as far as their rights and demands are concerned. The only reason why the proposals were slightly watered down was the strict insistence of Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe and his party (United National Party), when I discussed it with them for six long months.

The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) then walked out of the 2000 proposals – they were very happy with the 1997 proposals – saying that they were not willing to accept Ranil's suggestions for watering them down. But now they are willing to work with him. So I want to know how they reconciled with that. Politicians are opportunists, but this is the height of opportunism.

As for your main question, I still feel the 1997 proposals were the best and we could go back to them. Much, much, much, better than the UNP's proposals.

► *Do you see the LTTE's proposals as something that can be negotiated? Is there a starting point at all?*

You see, my principle – some people in my party don't agree with me – very frankly is that even the most unacceptable position of your adversary can be a basis to begin discussions. That does not mean that we can accept or pretend to accept the proposals. The LTTE's proposals as they are, unless they are willing to amend them during negotiations, cannot come within the Constitution of any country in the world because it is asking for another state. It can only come within the Constitution of a separate state.

► *If one may go back to Sri Lankan politics, one will find that fierce political rivalry has been a constant repetition. You have a challenge on that front as well. How do you see yourself changing that?*

I am hoping and praying that other partners, would-be partners, of that grand national alliance I am talking about would have the greatness of heart and mind to rise up to the challenge. If I could (do so), after all the abuse, I don't see why the Prime Minister cannot rise up to this great occasion that I am offering them.

► *Do you see it happening? Are you optimistic?*

I would say there is a 50-50 chance of

it happening at the moment, but the situation could get worse or better. The situation is politically volatile at the moment in Sri Lanka.

► *The LTTE says this has been the history of southern politics.*

Even if the LTTE has not said, I have been saying that for a long time. The Prime Minister has also been talking about the need for a government of alliance or whatever one may call it. The major political forces – whatever one may think of one another – have to get together and rise up above their personal, petty, or not petty, conflicts for us to resolve this issue.

► *If I may end with a political question, there has been talk about an alliance between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Don't you think there are fundamental differences between you and the JVP on what is closest to your heart – devolution of powers? Do you see it reconciling at all? How do you see it going from here?*

If we come to an alliance it will be on some agreement – whatever may be written down in documents – that the devolution process will go on, if we come into government some day.

► *Madam President. Thank you very much.*

I wish to say one other thing. There is a thread through all what we have been discussing. There is a feeling among many people that the actions I had taken a few days ago had caused political instability in Sri Lanka and also uncertainty about the peace process. I don't think it needs to cause any uncertainty. Even the stock market has not remained crashed. There is no crisis around. I don't think there is a political crisis.

The President has simply taken on the Defence powers as all other Presidents had. This President also had for seven and a half years. But she had temporarily given them away, unconstitutionally and illegally, according to two Supreme Court rulings, only because the Prime Minister came appealing that because he was going to undertake the peace process again, it would be more convenient. Which was true, practically speaking.

But I knew this was something very unconstitutional. Do you know, Mr. Sambandan, if some day the presidential immunity (goes) – I am always for the abolition of the executive presidency – if it happens say tomorrow or next year,

and I become an ordinary person, I could be jailed for life for treason against the state for some of the things that the recent Defence Minister had done.

So all I did was to take back this in order to prevent the degradation of the security situation. That is all. Full stop.

It is the hysterical running about, the constant rumour-mongering indulged in by some in the UNP, that has caused the instability. Not me. Because I did not participate in their hysteria, things have settled down in two days.

► *On a personal note, you just said one day you will have to step down.*

Even tomorrow. I even proposed it to the Cabinet. Mr. Wickremesinghe went on a very unruly march in mid-1999, asking me to abolish the executive presidency and get out. But now that he's a stone's throw away, he does not want to abolish it.

[A presidential aide: a heartbeat away, as they say in the U.S.]

Some say a heartbeat away; some say a bullet away. If the President gets killed or resigns, then the Prime Minister gets it.

► *You are in your second term of presidency, how do you see the future from now?*

► *For myself or for the country?*

► *Both.*

Well, for the country, one thing I would dearly love to see, obviously, is peace. And now that it has become more than evident that the only way to achieve that dream is for the two main parties and the JVP and the minority parties to get together and then strongly negotiate with the LTTE. I would very much like to achieve that. But I fear that many of the others, whose hands I need to clap, while mine is raised, may be a little too cussed and petty in their hearts and minds.

► *And on the personal front?*

To go home as fast as possible and indulge myself a little (I have suffered for a long time, 10 years) – read, write, play music, paint – all of which I do.

To spend more time with my friends, because friendship is very important to me, with those whom I love and of course, my children. Look at the trees, walk about the roads as a normal person.

► *Do you miss that a lot?*

Yes. This is a terrible life, personally.

► *Is that on the record?*

It is on record.

► *Thank you very much, Madam President.* ■



Troops guard the government press in Colombo on November 4, after the President took over the Defence, Interior and Communication portfolios.

airport, waiting for the Prime Minister's reaction.

Wickremesinghe, who read out a prepared text, avoided taking on the President. Rather, he said, he would stay by his mandate – to find peace – and would remain committed to it. His 19-month-old association with the peace process, clearly, was starting to pay political dividends.

After a rousing reception on the tarmac, Wickremesinghe's convoy wound its way through the packed crowd and hit the road leading to Colombo. Sri Lanka's highways are notorious for traffic jams even on a normal day. With such welcome being accorded to the Prime Minister, the traffic crept, inch by painful inch. It took Wickremesinghe a good eight hours to reach the city. Opposition front-benchers dismissed the event as an "organised" one, but the Prime Minister had made his political point.

Around the same time that the Prime Minister arrived, the President's Office termed the state of emergency a "non-event" as the proclamation, required to make it law, was not signed.

The next two days saw the

Prime Minister huddled in party discussions and the UNF's process getting shriller. But on one count both the President and the Prime Minister held on, patiently – on the ceasefire agreement and the peace process. Both emphasised that the peace process was on, that there would be no return to violence, and that the ceasefire agreement would hold.

The LTTE, for its part, said it was watching the situation. Smirking at the turn of events, its leaders dismissed it as a continuation of the differences in the south.



John Amararatunga, who lost his Interior portfolio.



Former Defence Minister Tisak Marapana.

With the UNF abdicating responsibility for the peace process, the latest attempt to find a negotiated settlement was rapidly moving to the hold mode. The President insisted that the Prime Minister should continue with it. Wickremesinghe, for his part, refused to have anything to do with it unless, as his Cabinet put it, "all portfolios are returned".

The peace process, simply put, had become the UNF's main leverage point at the time of the crisis. The President, when she took over the Defence Ministry on November 4, was bolstered by a Supreme

Court observation that the defence of the island was "inalienable" from the President. Her party spokesman, Sarah Amunugama, was to say later that "even if she wanted to", Kumaratunga could not part with the Defence portfolio.

Tamil commentators had, meanwhile, started to point out that without Wickremesinghe's hold over Defence, the "restraining force" over the military would not be there. The LTTE, for its part, had started giving orders to its cadres based in government-held areas to return to rebel-held territory.

The peace process was

heading towards a grey zone. The President's office kept reiterating her commitment to peace, while the UNF reinforced its point that it was not in control of the peace process, and the rebels continued to maintain that they were waiting and watching the situation.

COVER STORY

The political deadlock

There are only two ways out of the political crisis in Sri Lanka – dissolution of Parliament and fresh elections, and a forced attempt at cohabitation.

V.S. SAMBANDAN

... All that the President has done is to take back some of the powers that are unquestionably and rightfully accorded to the President by the Constitution from a Minister to whom these powers were handed over in good faith, after these powers were exercised with callous irresponsibility.

– Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga (in her November 7 address to the nation)

It was a thinly veiled power grab. Nothing else. There was no security threat.

– Sri Lanka's Constitutional Affairs Minister G.L. Peiris (November 11)

IT was in several ways a showdown in the making. The constitutional and political standoff since November 4 has sent Sri Lanka into a state of suspended animation.

From the day the Ranil Wickremesinghe-led United National Front (UNF) won the 2001 parliamentary elections, Sri Lanka's politics was set for change. With Wickremesinghe as the Prime Minister and his arch political rival Chandrika Kumaratunga as the head of state, Sri Lanka's first real cohabitation government started working.

One initial problem – that of holding the Defence portfolio – was to haunt the Wickremesinghe administration nearly two years after it won the parliamentary majority. Successive Sri Lankan Presidents have held the Defence portfolio, but in 2001 the UNF was given the portfolio as it had won a mandate for peace. But on November 4 this year, it lost that portfolio, and along with it effective control over the peace process.

The developments since November 4 have cast a spell of uncertainty over both the peace process and on issues of governance and could culminate either in forced cohabitation or in an extreme scenario – yet another general election.

From the signing of last year's ceasefire agreement to the recent presidential move, there was consistent, if controlled, friction between the President and the Prime Minister on both constitutional and political issues. The practical exclusion of Kumaratunga from the latest peace process, the

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assured by the President, the Prime Minister and the LTTE that each party would abide by the ceasefire, but visibly disappointed that the resumption of talks were put on hold, the facilitators decided to wait for the political situation to stabilise and returned to Oslo.

"Our options here have exhausted... we will go home and wait," said Helgesen, after meeting the Sri Lankan political leadership. On the ceasefire and the political impasse, Helgesen said that though the peace process was "in good shape", there was no ruling out a deterioration of the ground situation.

"We need to make clear that the ceasefire will be much more difficult to sustain in a political vacuum. If progress in the political negotiation is made impossible, the ceasefire will become increasingly fragile." With this note of caution, Helgesen left for Oslo. And on this ominous note, Sri Lanka enters its next phase of cohabitation politics. It is time Sri Lanka's two top political leaders – President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe – worked out a meaningful way of political cohabitation and ensured that the latest peace process, and along with it the political future of the country, is not weighed down by the historical baggage of bipartisan bickering. ■



Buddhist monks in an anti-Wickremesinghe, pro-Kumaratunga rally in Colombo on November 7.

her reservations about the manner in which the peace process was handled, and attempts to erode the powers of the Executive President indicated a clear build-up of tensions.

The Wickremesinghe administration, for its part, feared the dissolution of Parliament after it completed one year in office, and so directed much of its attention to thwart any such move. Even in 2002, there were talks in political circles of an impeachment move against the President, if not for anything else, just to clip her power to dissolve Parliament. It was argued that if a move to impeach the President was put on the Order Paper of Parliament, then she would be restrained from dissolving the House. No such thing happened, however, and the President constantly kept asserting that she had the constitutional powers to send the entire Cabinet packing.

The constitutional offensive between the two parties took a political turn earlier this year when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by Kumaratunga said that the main duty of an Opposition was to return to power. It was then that the power game started in earnest.

The SLFP had two broad strategies – either change the parliamentary configuration by encouraging defections or forge an alliance with the Sinhala hardline Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and face fresh polls. In the subsequent months, SLFP spokesmen made the point that there were “disgruntled” Members of Parliament in the UNF who would join the People’s Alliance (P.A.). On another front, there were repeated claims since March that an alliance with the JVP would be announced “shortly”.

As head of state, Kumaratunga was in a distinctly uncomfortable position. In her constitutional role, she was all-powerful. As a political entity, she was heading the main Opposition party. Pressure from her party started building up on her. A group within the SLFP mooted the idea of entering into an electoral alliance with the JVP, which, it said, would ensure victory in a parliamentary poll. It argued that the district-wise performance of the parties in the 2001 general elections showed that if the SLFP and



Supporters of Ranil Wickremesinghe around his motorcade on the road to Colombo on November 7, welcoming him upon his return from Washington.

the JVP were to join hands, it would be a formidable combination that could rout the UNF. The trouble with this arrangement was that Kumaratunga would have to make compromises on one of the pet projects in her political life – greater devolution of powers to the regions of Sri Lanka in order to solve the island’s decades-old separatist conflict.

On this issue, Kumaratunga and the JVP are chalk and cheese. The SLFP too has its share of hardliners who could take the JVP stand – that a solution to the island’s conflict can be effected only by a unitary constitution and by militarily defeating the LTTE. Added to this is her status as the Executive President – this is her second and final term in office.

Wickremesinghe, however, is in a more comfortable position. With nothing to lose and the presidency to gain, he would just have to bide his time until 2005, when the next presidential poll is due. His handling of the peace process, during this interregnum, could well earn him more brownie points.

In sharp contrast, the SLFP is still unsure who its presidential candidate will be. Kumaratunga’s brother, Anura Bandaranaike, has made it known that he wants to contest. His rival within the party is Mahinda Rajapakse, the Leader of the Opposition who hails from the southern Hambantota district.

An electoral deal with the JVP, it is felt

in political circles, would help Bandaranaike consolidate his hold on the party by easing out Rajapakse, who does not see eye to eye with the JVP. That the Marxist party has a strong hold in the south is one factor seen as working in Bandaranaike’s favour.

Beyond these internal political divides in the SLFP, the President’s move was probably triggered by failed expectations about defections from the UNP, according to some UNF Ministers. “Their intention was to induce our MPs to join them and have the issue wrapped and sealed when Parliament reconvened on November 19,” a Minister said. With 130 MPs supporting the UNF, the possibility of a changed line-up in the 225-member House has faded.

Forced cohabitation, therefore, is the next option. With the die now cast, the manner in which the next phase of the island’s volatile cohabitation politics moves would depend on how Wickremesinghe responds to the situation.

The UNF, with 114 MPs, depends largely on the support given to it by the 15-member Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The UNF also enjoys the support of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (12), the Ceylon Workers Congress (3), the Up Country People’s Front (2) and one more MP. The P.A., with 77 MPs, is the second largest party, followed by the Left-radical JVP with 16 MPs.

Sri Lanka’s elections is based on proportional representation and the list system. This makes ruling parties dependent on minority parties for a majority. In the weeks to follow, the stands taken by the Tamil and Muslim political parties would, therefore, be crucial in the numbers game.

A call for early elections will depend on the SLFP’s moves to forge an alliance with the JVP. As these two parties hold sharply contrasting views on the peace process, the way out from an election that the island can ill-afford would be a forced, but sincere attempt at cohabitation.

Although Parliament is scheduled to reconvene on November 19, there is still a sense of uncertainty whether it would meet or be prorogued yet again or, in the worst-case scenario, be dissolved and fresh general elections called. If a snap poll were to be held now, it is likely to witness extreme nationalist undercurrents. The major gainers would be the pro-LTTE TNA and the JVP.

For now, however, Sri Lanka’s politics is in a state of suspended animation. ■

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