

**CHANDRIKA
AND
THE ELECTORAL
REVOLUTION
IN
SRI LANKA**




**S. PIYASENA
and
PARMANAND**

About the book

Sri Lanka which enjoyed universal franchise since 1931, was known as a model democracy where the mature electorate voted out ruling governments at five general elections from 1950 to 1977. However, with the controversial referendum in 1982 to extend the existing parliament's term, the election malpractices and violent rigging became the rule rather than the exception. The people's attempts to restore democracy at every election since then failed as the disunited and leaderless opposition forces were proved ineffective in facing the government onslaught. In 1993, Chandrika Kumaratunga provided the requisite leadership to disparate opposition groups and in the general election of August 1994 managed to overthrow the government which was in power for more than 17 years. While this book was in press, she recorded a landslide victory in the November 1994 presidential election and received a clear mandate to, among other things, reinstate the Westminster system. This book is an account of how this revolution took place.

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**NAVRANG, NEW DELHI
1995**

19.07.96

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DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to the memory of my good friend Indrapala Abeyweera and the twelve other opposition candidates who laid down their lives between 5th January, 1989 (Nomination day) and 15th February (Election day) in order to safeguard the right of the people of Sri Lanka to go to the polling station peacefully and use the vote in the manner they like to the candidates of their choice.

S. Piyasena

INTRODUCTION

When I came to New Delhi from Australia on the 25th of August, several friends suggested that a book on the life of Chandrika B. Kumaratunga will be very appropriate at this time.

I told them that what is more important is for the world to know of the electoral revolution that took place in Sri Lanka and how Chandrika gave the leadership and guided it to success.

This was agreed.

In completing this task the co-operation of Dr. Parmanand of the Delhi University was invaluable. His contribution with a well researched chapter "Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga: A Meaningful and Positive Change" (Chapter 12) was very useful as also the other assistance received from him as co-author despite heavy work schedule is very much appreciated.

I have included several pages of extracts from the respective reports of the Commission of Elections. His reports on (A) Referendum of 1982, (b) The Elections in 1988, and (c) Parliamentary Elections 1989, are unique among official reports published in any part of the democratic world.

Reading them one can not dismiss lightly the claim made by many People's Alliance spokesmen on election platform in 1994 "that Sri Lanka had no lawfully elected Government from August 1993 (the month the 1977 Parliament was scheduled to be dissolved) for 11 long years".

S. Piyasena

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Australia.

10 October 1994.

PREFACE

The politics of the island state of Sri Lanka has become quite interesting and exciting after the August and November 1994 elections and the assumption of the offices of the president and the prime minister by the daughter and the mother. These developments have also given rise to several questions relating to the future and the past of the island's politics.

Whether there would be real and meaningful changes in the constitutional scheme making the state structure more participatory and accommodative? Would the two-party or the two-group system of the past become a reality once again? What was the legitimacy and credibility of the electoral system, especially after 1978? These are some of the important questions meriting focus and attention.

It was with a view to probing these problems that I agreed to collaborate with Mr. S. Piyasena, having rich experience about the country's politics, in writing this book. We discussed together various problems in the Island's politics. We have done our best to answer these important questions. My visit to Sri Lanka also helped me in understanding the state and the society in the beautiful, even if disturbed, land.

While writing my chapter on Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, I received a lot of help from Mr. S.P. Senadhira, Councillor in the High Commission of Sri Lanka in New Delhi. I take this opportunity to thank him immensely for his help and cooperation in a variety of ways.

PARMANAND

University of Delhi, Delhi
November 1994

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**FLASH BACK FEBRUARY 1988
FROM HIS ASHES WILL RISE COMMUNAL
HARMONY**

**BY
RUWAN SENADHEERA
DAILY NEWS, 1ST MARCH 1988**

People in Sri Lanka, especially during recent times, are not unused to assassinations and sudden deaths of prominent people. In the past, from time to time people assembled, on some occasions in hundreds of thousands, to mourn departed leaders—D.S. Senanayake, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Dudley Senanayake, Philip Gunawardene and Dr. N.M. Perera, just to name a few.

Many of their followers were grief-stricken at their funerals. Most people mourned their leaders partly because they had tasks yet to fulfil. But most of those leaders had left behind second-rung leaders, spouses or sons who could soon fill the void.

While D.S. Senanayake died in a horse-riding accident, all above mentioned leaders' deaths except that of Bandaranaike's took place due to natural causes. Even Bandaranaike was assassinated at a relatively peaceful time so that people could absorb the shock without feeling utterly helpless. But the grief which Sri Lankans experienced since the noon of February 16, was something unprecedented in the history of this once peaceful country.

It is not an exaggeration to say that an eerie and horrific gloom had suddenly descended over Sri Lanka soon after the noon of February 16. At no time in recent memory, people of Sri Lanka — irrespective of religion, caste, creed and specially those on both sides of the linguistic barrier — grieved for a man's death as that of Vijaya Kumaranatunga's.

Hundreds of thousands of people waited in queues for hours, not to see their idol leader's face for the last time, but to pay their last respects to a man who was close to their hearts. Masses followed the funeral procession, first to the Art Gallery and then to the Independence Square. The crowd already gathered at the funeral site too was formidable by any account.

When Vijaya Kumaranatunga broke away from the SLFP to form the SLMP, some political observers believed that some of the grassroots support of the SLFP went along with him. However, even after Vijaya pushed the SLFP candidate

into third place in the Minneriya by-election, the SLMP did not emerge as an alternative to the SLFP, let alone to the UNP. Though the SLFP meetings were by and large well-attended, sceptics felt that crowds came more to see Vijaya than to listen to his views.

But whatever the performance of the SLMP during the last few years, its leader knew where he stood. He was clearly not after short-term political gains. There are, of course, many who are deeply concerned about the state of affairs in the country today. But Vijaya was one of the very few leaders who did whatever he could to bring about peace and harmony between two warring communities, so that future generations could live in amity in Sri Lanka. His endeavours towards this most difficult task are too well-known to be recounted here.

Some of Vijaya's followers advised him against proceeding with "unpopular causes", such as meeting terrorist leaders and preaching communal harmony. It was also assumed that the public support for the SLFP had somewhat dwindled because of Vijaya's unconditional support for the Indo-Lanka Accord and his "pro-Tamil" and "pro-India" views. It was possible that a negligible amount of chauvinistic elements, whom Vijaya would never have expected to follow him may have left the party. But subsequent events proved that it did not make any impact.

Why does the whole nation continue to grieve over Vijaya's death? Few of those who do not agree with his views on politics of communalism try to explain it as a natural reaction to a sudden death of a film idol. It is true that many who went past Vijaya's body and gathered at the funeral site might have been film fans. Of course, deaths of filmstars are common. But do the fans of filmstars blindly follow them into the political arena?

Some filmstars with appeal and a mass following may become successful politicians but those who possess charisma, honesty and integrity can become true statesmen. The recent reports from neighbouring India about massive demonstrations in front of cinema halls in 20 cities demanding the withdrawal of the latest film starring Amitabh Bachchan, the most popular and successful star in the history of Indian cinema, proves beyond doubt that even the kings of cinema cannot automatically become leaders of men. Few years ago we witnessed the funeral of Rukmani Devi, the "queen of Sinhala cinema" and recently we saw considerable outpouring of grief at funerals of H. R. Jothipala, Ramani Bartholomeusz etc. But none of the deaths of entertainment personalities, social workers or politicians turned the whole country into one "funeral house" as it did in Vijaya's death.

No doubt, most, if not all, Sri Lankans grieved for Vijaya's death, first and foremost, because he died for his uncompromising principles. Every politically conscious Sri Lankan knew clearly that he was one of the very few leaders who tried

his best to bridge the Tamil-Sinhala divide. And there was no doubt in anyone's mind that he was murdered precisely for this reason. There was no one, not even among those who went on the rampage in July 1983, who did not feel outraged by this dastardly act.

If Vijaya, during his lifetime seemingly failed to inculcate communal harmony among his followers, his death sparked the love for fellow beings, irrespective of "racial" barriers, which almost every Lankan possessed but was not allowed to be demonstrated by the few chauvinistic power-hungry politicians.

The Government's decision to give live media coverage to the entire proceedings of the funeral was appreciated by one and all though some felt that the leaders of newly formed United Socialist Alliance (USA) exploited this solemn occasion to get the maximum political coverage while others argue that the Government's decision has an ulterior motive in that by allowing such wide publicity to the "third force" the SLFP could be relegated to the background.

Whatever the motive behind the Government's decision to give live coverage which by all accounts was the most widely watched relay in six years of television in Sri Lanka, it certainly did an immense service to the nation.

Millions of people, most moist-eyed, watched as estimated 500,000 people of all ages and races gathered to pay their last respects to a man who was murdered, like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, for his earnest attempts to foster communal harmony.

Millions of people saw that there was no hatred in the eyes of the people who gathered there when leaders of the PLOTE and EPRLF spoke. In fact they received the same kind of ovation that other speakers got.

Of course, the Election Commissioner's decision to grant recognition as political parties to movements which have been fighting for a separate state has been a subject of heated debate for sometime now. But most people, who believe in Vijaya's principles, hope that these matters would be resolved to everyone's satisfaction and a truly national alternative party which, more than anything else would strive to re-establish communal harmony would emerge from Vijaya's ashes.

If nothing else, the people's reaction to Vijaya's brutal murder disproved the hitherto widely held belief that seemingly deep-rooted "hatred" between Sinhala and Tamil communities is beyond redemption. The yet unidentified killer of Vijaya Kumarantunga has pushed V. Pirbhakaran to the background to become the most despised man in Sri Lanka today.

Anyone who visits the city of Colombo cannot fail to notice white flags, posters and massive banners proclaiming the peoples' sorrow over the loss of their dearest comrade with a "golden heart". They are equally visible in localities where Tamil or Muslim inhabitants outnumber the Sinhalese.

The grief over Vijaya's death has cut across all barriers and it has clearly demonstrated that if the remaining "hard core" Tamil terrorist groups in the north and east and the Sinhala terrorists of the south could somehow be brought under control there is an immense hope for the generation of Vijaya's children to live in a violence-free society which could once again deservedly be called the "Dharmadvipa".

1945: ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

The month of Poson (June) and its full moon day is very sacred to the Sinhala Buddhists in the Island of Sri Lanka.

It was on this full moon day that Arahat Mahinda, son of Ashoka The Great, introduced Buddhism to the Island. Every year thousands and thousands of pilgrims flock to the ancient capital of the Island for over one thousand years.

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a very powerful young politician, was having the Annual General Meeting of his Political Party every year on this full moon day of Poson at the city of Anuradhapura.

X X X

It was 1945 June. The war had already ended in Europe and the war in the East also was coming to an end. As such, travelling facilities for pilgrims which were restricted for five years from 1940 had been eased. Till then the railways advised people not to travel. They did so with colourful advertisements. One of the advertisements was in poem -

“From unnecessary travel please refrain,
Your country’s needs fill every train,
When this war is fought and won,
There will be trains for every one.

Despite these advertisements, thousands of people used to travel to the sacred places.

So when Bandaranaike addressed the public rally after the party conference there were thousands and thousands to listen to his oratory.

X X X

When Bandaranaike was leaving home for this political conference at Anuradhapura, his wife was on the verge of giving birth to his second child.

Her husband, who was famous for his sense of humour as much as his oratory, quipped: "Sirima don't allow it to come during my absence and let it wait".

X X X

Bandaranaike's address at the Political rally was very significant. He dealt with two main subjects. One was the war which was coming to an end. The second was the amendments which were proposed to the electoral system of the Island.

Sri Lanka was the first Asian country to enjoy universal adult franchise. It was introduced in 1931 during the time of British rule. The Sri Lankans enjoyed this right even before many countries in Europe did so. Extracts from Bandaranaike's Speech at this Conference is of interest. Here are a few:

"The war in the West is over. In our neighbourhood also it may not last for more than two or three months. We supported this war effort not because we had any particular love for the British Imperialists but we have understood the fate of this world at large if fascism was allowed to be victorious. Even great leaders like Mahatama Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru who while refusing to support the British and their allies in this war effort did not hesitate to condemn the German, Italian and Japanese Fascists as enemies of humanity."

"I am certain that after the end of the war that all existing empires will have to fold up gradually. The colonial countries like ours will be free one after another. We will have to be prepared for the future. We must strengthen the democratic set up that prevails among our people for the last 15 years due to universal franchise. You have been electing your own representative to the State Council since 1931. Now from 1940 onwards I, as the Minister of Local Government and my colleagues in the Executive Committee of Local Government had extended this voting pattern for the elections of Members to various local bodies like Municipalities, Urban Councils and village Committees."

"However, we have recently found that some people with too much money adopting corrupt methods to abuse the vote. In 1943 Municipal Elections in Colombo and Kandy and also in some urban Council areas a new method of corruption has been detected. You are aware that under the present system of voting the voter goes into a room and put the ballot into a coloured box of his choice. The colours "green, red, yellow or anything else belong to the candidates."

“The money bags” I mentioned earlier found a new method of duping the innocent voters. They, through their agents advise the voters to bring back the ballot paper without putting it into a box promising to purchase it from the poor voters. These agents collect hundreds of such ballots and later in the day when they go to vote themselves take them and stuff them into the box belonging to their masters.”

“Our Committee has devised a new system to overcome this fraud. The system is already worked out and will be finalised by the end of the month.”

“Under this new system the voter will have to go to the booth and mark the ballot paper against the symbol allotted to each candidate. Then the voter will put the ballot paper into a box which is kept on the table occupied by the presiding officer so it will not be possible to take away the ballot paper and sell it.”

“However I would like to mention that a large majority of the voters were not selling the votes in this manner. Owing to poverty there are about 15 or 20% of innocent people who become victims of this fraud. But 15 to 20 % is a considerable number that could decide the result in an election. That is why this new system was thought of and will be adopted from the next local Government election due in 1946.”

X X X

On June 29, 1945 a few days after this conference Bandaranaike’s wife Sirimavo gave birth to her second daughter. She was named Chandrika.

X X X

Three days later the Executive Committee of the Ministry of Local Government met to finalise the amendments to the election system of the Island. All its Members, including the Minister Bandaranaike were present. When the Minister entered the room all Members congratulated him on the new arrival to the family.

“What is the name you gave her”? Asked R.S.S Gunawardane.

“Chandrika” replied the proud father.

A.P. Jayasurya asked: “Are you unhappy that the second is also a daughter?”

Bandaranaike replied, “You know when Jawaharlal Nehru’s wife Kamala gave birth to his daughter Indira, many members of the family were not very happy but

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Jawaharlal's father Motilal Nehru said: 'You wait and see this girl will be better than thousand boys', and Bandaranaike added, "see what a great girl she has been. How she had joined the freedom struggle from childhood and earned the love and respect of a nation.'

After these pleasantries the Members sat down to finalise the draft of the Island's first amendment of the election law.

THE FIRST ELECTION BOYCOTT

Sri Lanka - CEYLON as it was known then - was the first country in Asia to enjoy universal adult franchise, granted by the British rulers barely three years after Britain itself introduced universal suffrage. The first election to the Ceylon State Council was held in 1931. Every man and woman over the age 21 years entitled to be registered as voters to elect 50 representatives to the State Council.

The first signs of trouble came with a call to boycott this election on the grounds that the powers given to the elected representatives fell far below the nation's aspirations. The call did not gain momentum for a nation-wide boycott except in the Jaffna Peninsula. The left wing Jaffna Youth Congress, influenced by the Indian freedom movement and inspired by the visit of Mahatma Gandhi and Srimathi Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya to the island in 1930, successfully persuaded politicians of the Peninsula to refrain from submitting nominations for the electorates of Jaffna, Kankesanthurai, Point Pedro and Kayts. So that elections could be held only for 46 remaining constituencies. However, Indian Tamils on the plantations and the Ceylon Tamils outside the Jaffna Peninsula did not boycott the elections. Three Ceylon Tamils and two Indian Tamils were elected. One of the Indian Tamils was elected for the post of Minister for Labour, Industries and Commerce (Perisundram, Member for Hatton electorate) together with 5 Sinhala Ministers and one Muslim Minister.

In 1934, politicians of the Jaffna Peninsula were persuaded by their southern colleagues to give up the boycott and seek election to the State Council. The Jaffna Youth Congress did not support this decision but were influenced by the radical groups in Colombo to refrain from campaigning against the hustings.

At the second general election of 1936, eight Ceylon Tamils and two Indian Tamils were elected while a veteran Jaffna politician W. Doraisamy was elected to the post of Speaker of the Council defeating Francis de Zoysa, a senior Sinhala politician. However, no Tamil was elected as a minister.

In 1942, the undisputed Sinhala Leader Sir D. B. Jayatilleke, Who was the Minister of Home Affairs and the Leader of the House and was 77 year old, decided to retire from active politics and accepted the post of Ceylon Government Representative in New Delhi. D.S. Senanayake, who succeeded Sir D.B. Jayatilleke was able to manipulate the election of Arunachalam Mahadeva, a

Tamil to the post of Home Minister in order to mobilise support of all ethnic groups for more effective constitutional reforms.

When first parliamentary elections were held in 1947, three out of the five sitting members from the Tamil majority Northern province were from United National Party led by D.S. Senanayake (A. Mahadeva, S. Natesan and J. Thyagaraja). The former Speaker contested as an independent and was defeated by another independent. G. G. Ponnambalam, who meanwhile had formed the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, fielded candidates for seven constituencies in the Northern province and captured six of them. Two more Tamils were elected from Mannar and Vavuniya in the Northern province as independents.

D.S. Senanayake was able to persuade both of them to join his government as ministers. Within one year of elections and five months after independence in February 1948 Prime Minister Senanayake was able to recruit all the members of the Tamil Congress to his government and G.G. Ponnambalam was offered the portfolio of Industries and Fisheries. C. Suntheralingam resented his long time political adversary Ponnambalam joining the cabinet but did not take any action immediately. In November 1949, the Government passed the controversial Bill titled "The Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949" in the House of Representatives. The Tamil Congress split on this issue. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam and Vanniyingham resigned from the Tamil Congress and opposed the Bill. C. Suntheralingam also resigned from the Cabinet and voted against the bill at the final reading.

Nevertheless, nine out of twelve Ceylon Tamil Members of Parliament voted for the bill while other 20 Sinhala left wing and independent members voted against it together with seven members of Indian origin who were elected from the plantation area on the Ceylon Indian Congress ticket [S. Thondaman, who was the President of the Ceylon Indian Congress at that time, continued to lead the Congress through the next four decades during which time it has been renamed "Ceylon Workers Congress, (C.W. C.)].

At the second parliamentary elections in 1952, the newly formed Federal Party led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, called upon the Tamil voters in the Northern and Eastern provinces to defeat the United National Party and Tamil Congress Coalition government for betraying the self respect of the Tamils by defranchising the Indian Tamil plantation workers. The Ceylon Tamil voters rejected this plea overwhelmingly. Chelvanayakam himself was defeated by a United National Party candidate who was supported by the Tamil Congress which won in five out of seven constituencies in the Jaffna peninsula. Vanniyasingham was able to retain his seat with a "razor-thin" margin of 200 votes. Ponnambalam continued as a minister and the Tamil Congress remained in the Government under the premierships of Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala during the term of second Parliament upto 1955.

EXPERIMENTS FOR PERMANENT "POWER"

Sri Lanka's elections were by and large clean and systematic up to December 22, 1982.

The annual voter registration lists were completed as accurately as possible. Election laws were respected by most of the candidates who were not taking the risk of getting unseated by election petitions.

Bandaranaike, who changed the system of voting even before independence as the Minister of Local Government in 1945, took many more steps to strengthen the democratic nature of the electoral network. After he assumed the Prime Ministership in 1956, it was he who reduced the voting age from 21 to 18.

He also reduced the size of electorates thereby increasing the number from 95 to 151. The whole purpose of doing this was to enable popular candidates with less resources to be able to run a smooth election campaign. That is not all. He brought in regulations banning the use of vehicles to transport voters. Furthermore, pasting of posters in public places was made illegal. Only the candidate was permitted to have a flag with an election symbol in a vehicle when he is travelling in it.

These reforms were very helpful to many candidates coming from poorer families against rich rivals with abundant resources.

These regulations were observed by most candidates even at the 1977 General Elections. In this election, Sri Lanka recorded a polling percentage of 87 which is more than the average in most countries except where voting is compulsory.

It was only after 1977 changes were experimented in the electoral system. First of all, the Westminster Parliamentary system was changed into an Executive Presidency. Under this system, the whole country became one electorate and the Parliament became completely devalued. Even though it was claimed that the new Presidential system of Sri Lanka is a combination of the French and American (U.S.) systems, it had many unique clauses which are not found in any of the

Constitutions elsewhere. The President under this Constitution was “Almighty” and he was the “Monarch of all he survey”.

After making the whole Island a single electorate to elect the President, the Parliamentary election law was also amended in a manner to ensure that only resourceful individuals of any Political party would have a chance to get elected. Each of Sri Lanka’s 22 districts was made an electorate. Each district was allotted with a number of Members to be elected. Political parties as well as independent groups could submit lists of candidates for election. The Party or an independent group which poll the highest number of votes in the district will get a minimum of half the seats allotted or more according to the proportion of votes received by it. The undemocratic nature of this system was clearly seen in the district of Digamadulla in both general elections of 1989 and in 1994.

In 1989 general elections, the United National Party polled 62,600 votes in Digamadulla district. It was only 29.29%. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress was the runner up polling 61,325 votes which amounted to 28.69% votes. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s share was 45,400 (21.24%). The Tamil United Liberation Front was very close polling 43,424 (21.32%) votes. Now in the allocation of seats, the United National Party was given three out of the six seats. Other three parties were given one each. Thus the Party polling only 29.29% was fortunate to get three out of the six seats, while a party which polled 28.69% could get only a solitary seat.

In this district the unreasonable election was not limited to the United National Party getting three out of six seats. Up to 1977, under the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system the Muslims in Sri Lanka got the maximum number of seats from this particular district. In 1977 the district elected three Muslims, one Tamil and one Sinhales from the five electorates. In 1989 there were four Sinhalese, one Muslim and one Tamil after the number of seats were increased to six. The Muslims are the numerical majority in this district. Actually, Digamadulla is the only district where Muslims are in a majority but were able to get only two seats. In the 1994 elections, while the Sinhalese share was four and the Muslims could get only two the Tamils were completely out.

Even though it was claimed that the proportional voting system is introduced to make reasonable allocations to various parties its unreasonable nature is demonstrated by this very example. Furthermore, the Muslim community who were winning a parliamentary seat comfortably from 1947 to 1977 in the Puttalam district were also deprived of this privilege after new electoral system came into existence. The United National Party which was returned to power in the 1977 general elections winning 140 out of 168 seats (5/6th) in Parliament, after introducing the new Presidential Constitution went on to elect their leader, J.R. Jayewardene, as President by a Parliamentary vote and declare his tenure for six

years up to February 4, 1984.

Former Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka Freedom Party was brought before a Commission on allegations of misuse of power. She boycotted this Commission and alleged that the Commissioners were picked up by her main political rival.

However the Commission held Mrs. Bandaranaike guilty of several charges and recommended to the Parliament that her civic rights be suspended for a period of seven years. As she was the only popular rival of national stature to the President, this was a great blow to the political Opposition.

The Government was confident that they can remain in power for a very very long time as there was no sign of an emergence of a powerful recognised opposition leader.

With all this optimism, the Government launched colourful plans claiming that revival of the economy is taken for granted.

A Free Economic Zone was created. The name of the republic was changed to be called "the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka". It was claimed that the free trade zone was the only small area which is exempted from socialism in a socialist democracy. Television was introduced with German and Japanese assistance. A super national airways system was founded which was expected to compete with the best international airlines in the world.

However, the most of these hopes were belied while rich got richer and the poor become poorer and the cost of living was reaching unbearable heights. In early 1982, a confidential report from the Special Bureau of Investigations, submitted to the Presidential Secretariat, pointed out that the Government is fast losing ground and may face an electoral defeat even without a powerful personality to lead the opposition.

Corruption has taken roots in the Government ranks and atleast one Minister had to be removed on serious allegations.

The President's advisers said after careful consideration, that it is better to have another Parliamentary election before the end of 1982. However both the President and the Prime Minister were not in favour of this proposal. Then one of the advisers, G.V.P. Samarasinghe suggested a new method. His proposal was to amend the Constitution to go for a Presidential Election as the popularity of the President had not diminished beyond recovery. He pointed out that resources available to the ruling party and weakness of the opposition should be exploited to the maximum at this juncture. This proposal was accepted.

A quick amendment was presented to Parliament to enable the incumbent President to ask for a mandate for a second term after he had completed at least four years of the first term for which he had been elected. The amendment was passed urgently and on September 17, 1982 which was 76th birthday of President Jayewardene was fixed as the nomination day. The election day was fixed for October 20 which is only 33 days after the nomination. In all previous Parliamentary elections the time given from the nomination day to the election day was at least five weeks but in the Presidential election where the whole country votes as one electorate the number of days between nomination and elections was reduced to 33.

The Opposition was taken by surprise. They were in disarray. The main Opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party finally decided to put forward Hector Kobbekaduwa as its candidate. This proposal was not favoured by some in the party. Many of them were lethargic in their support to the party candidate.

The strongest supporters for Hector Kobbekaduwa were Chandrika, the daughter of Mr. Bandaranikea founder of the Party and her husband the popular Filmstar politician Vijay Kumarantunga.

1982 — AN UNEQUAL RACE

On September 17, 1982 six candidates including the incumbent President J.R. Jayewardene submitted nomination papers for the presidential election scheduled for October 20.

The candidates were:

1. J.R. Jayewardene (United National Party)
2. Hector Kobbekaduwa (Sri Lanka Freedom Party)
3. Rohana Wijeweera (Janata Vimukti Peramuna)
4. Colvin R. De Silva (Lanka Sama Samaja Party)
5. Vasudeva Nanayakkara (Nava Sama Samaja Party)
6. G.G (Kumar) Ponnambalam (All Ceylon Tamil Congress)

The total of registered voters in the whole Island numbered 8.1 millions. In the 1977 General Election, three of the above candidates namely, Kobbekaduwa, De Silva and Nanayakkara lost (Kobbekaduwa - Yatinuwara, De Silva - Agalawatta and Nanayakkara - Dehiowita) to the United National Party. Ponnambalam also unsuccessfully contested the 1977 election for the Jaffna seat. As such they were at a disadvantage. The UNP propaganda machinery kept on with the propaganda that candidates who could not keep their own Parliament seats would finish up sad losers in an all Island Presidential election.

However, this boomeranged on the UNP. The Opposition with limited resources of publicity at their disposal reminded the voters that Jayewardene himself was defeated in the 1956 General Election by a majority of over 22000 votes in his electorate (Kelaniya) which he represented for 13 years.

Not to be outdone, Wijeweera said that he was the only undefeated candidate in the field.

From the beginning, the incumbent President was far ahead of his rivals in resources and organisation. As many as 144 Members of Parliament out of a total of 168 parliamentarians were his polling agents. Out of them, 20 were District Ministers. Another 25 were Cabinet Ministers and over 30 others were Project and

Deputy Ministers. He had 18 Chairmen of District Development Councils with executive powers from his party.

The United National Party and its candidate J.R. Jayewardene himself had enough money and other resources. Hence, hiring several helicopters to go round the country during the election campaign was not a problem.

It must be mentioned here that upto 1977 every candidate who contested for a seat in Parliament had to submit a declaration of his election expenses to the Commissioner of Elections. It is mandatory by law to file election expenses whether the candidate is elected or defeated. This regulation was a safeguard against money power being used to abuse the electoral system. Number of candidates who had failed to submit a declaration certifying their election expenses had been jailed or fined from 1931 to 1977.

However after 1978 this declaration was not made compulsory. As there was no compulsion for the candidates contesting in the Parliamentary election to limit the expenditure there were no compulsion for the Presidential Candidates either.

So the unequal battle with a wide gap between the incumbent President and his five rivals began from September 18 itself.

President Jayewardene, Prime Minister Premadasa and atleast three other ministers took off for the campaign trail in helicopters hired from the Sri Lanka Airforce. The other five candidates started their journey in search of votes in motor vehicles.

Apart from the radio and television, owned by the Government, it also controlled the powerful Associated Newspapers Limited and the Times of Ceylon, which was taken over by the Government in 1977.

The Independent Group of Newspapers had played a key role to defeat the Governments both in 1970 and 1977 General Elections. This establishment was sealed from 1973 to 1977 by the United Front Government (1970—77). However, after supporting the UNP at the 1977 elections the Company managed to get a considerable amount as damages and compensation from the Government for the period it was suspended. This group of newspapers came all out in support of President Jayewardene. A newspaper group launched by Upali Wijeyawardene also backed Jayewardene's campaigns.

On the contrary, the resourceless Opposition could only muster the support of the daily paper of the Communist Party and the publication of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, both of which were handicapped by printing difficulties as

they were not properly equipped.

Nevertheless, the reports reaching the UNP headquarters indicated that Kobbekaduwa was gaining ground not only in the Southern Province but in the Northern Province as well.

In the Northern Province, the Tamil United Liberation Front had called for a boycott of the Presidential Election. Despite this call Ponnambalam was going ahead with his organisation. The bad news for the UNP was that Kobbekaduwa was getting unexpected support from the Northern farmers for the services he had done to them prior to 1977 as Minister of Agriculture. It was believed that after the UNP Government opened the market for imports of items such as chillis and onions the Jaffna farmers had lost the market considerably.

To win over the Jaffna votes, Jayewardene got long articles published in the English and Tamil Newspapers recalling how his father's younger brother Hector Jayewardene campaigned for the veteran Tamil leader Sir Ponnambalam Ramnathan against a Sinhalese, Dr. M. Fernando, during the 1911 Election Campaign for the Legislative Council. The UNP was careful not to publish this in Sinhala papers. If it was done, the rivals could have come out to reveal the fact that Jayewardene opposed the candidature of Fernando on caste ground. This had been mentioned in a book on Jayewardene family published in 1920. If those incidents were revealed Jayewardene would have run the risk of losing a large number of votes among the Sinhalese of a particular caste.

However, Jayewardene's "scoop" of playing the "Ramnathan Card" in Jaffna did not click. News reaching Colombo clearly gave the picture in Jaffna. Jaffna was getting into a polling mood despite the boycott called by the TULF. According to these reports Ponnambalam and Kobbekaduwa are sharing the bulk of the votes, Jayewardene was running a poor third. Even those who sympathised with De Silva and Nanayakkara were inclined to vote for Kobbekaduwa because these two particular candidates have no chance of winning. It also came to the knowledge of the UNP headquarters that Ponnambalam's supporters are advising the voters to mark their second preference in favour of Hector Kobbekaduwa. This came as a shock to Jayewardene.

Despite calling for a boycott, it was not a secret that TULF leader Amrithalingam was doing all what was possible to ensure Jayewardene's victory. When Jayewardene came to know his predicament in the North, he requested Amrithalingam to make the boycott call stronger so that less and less Jaffna voters will go to the poll. In spite of all this, Jaffna was the only district where Jayewardene was defeated by Kobbekaduwa.

One morning before leaving for the Election Campaign in the North Western province, Jayewardene called his Press Secretary and informed him that Anura Bandaranaike, Member of Parliament belonging to the SLFP group, would make a very important statement at a public rally.

Jayewardene said “Anura will say that Kobbekaduwa has been given only a contract to restore the civic rights of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike after the election.”

The President advised his Press Secretary that once the statement was made it should be given the maximum publicity in the newspapers. He also wanted the news conveyed to him personally wherever he was.

When the report of Bandaranaike’s speech was received in the newsroom, the Press Secretary rushed to Galgamuwa in the North-western province where the President was scheduled to speak at 4 P.M. However, when the Press Secretary arrived at the meeting the President was addressing the crowd. Therefore he could give the news to the President only after the meeting.

The next meeting was at Polgahawela. There was a massive crowd. The Minister of Education Wijeratana was addressing when the President reached and was cheered by the crowd.

Jayewardene in his speech said:

“Mr. Anura Bandaranaike has said that the SLFP has only given a contract to Kobbekaduwa to restore the civic rights of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. That means he is a contractor. Mr. Kobbekaduwa is just like a Public Works Department contractor who is maintaining the roads. The Presidency is not a contract. It is the highest executive post in the country. The person who is elected to serve you and the country and not to fulfil any contract”.

From next day, onwards this was the main theme of Jayewardene’s speeches. The Radio and all other media gave the maximum publicity to this issue. Furthermore, the UNP organised several people to be at their meetings and to shout “contractor contractor” whenever Kobbekaduwa’s name was mentioned by any Speaker.

How much this statement by Anura Bandaranaike damaged Kobbekaduwa’s election campaign could be understood when one reads a statement by Mrs. Kobbekaduwa after the death of her husband.

She said: “My husband was deeply hurt by the unfortunate ‘contractor’ episode and suffered a lot mentally because it was done by his own party men.”

During the last days of the campaign the reports were getting better for Jayewardene. It looked as if he was passing the 50% mark and avoiding a second count.

President Jayewardene was re-elected on the October 21 polling 3,450,811 votes. Kobbekaduwa polled 2,548,438, Rohana Wijeweera (JVP) 273,428, Colvin R. de Silva (LSSP) 173,934, G.G. (Kumar) Ponnambalam (ACTC) 58,531 and Vasudeva Nanayakkara (NSSP) 17,005.

Even though jubilant at this victory, the UNP was not very optimistic that they can perform in the same manner in a Parliamentary election.

The SLFP polled only 29% in 1977 but increased its vote to 39%. The total poll was only 80.075% which is more than 6% below the polling average in 1977. The UNP could collect all votes that it could muster. The Opposition lacked resources.

In a Parliamentary election, there can be a bigger poll which will be disadvantageous to the UNP. Therefore, the UNP decided to avoid a General Election which was due before August 1993.

It was Prime Minister R. Premadasa who advocated that it is essential for the UNP to find some method of postponing the election mainly to keep the present 5/6th majority intact.

Finally, it was decided that a referendum should be held to extend the life of Parliament for 6 more years from August 1983.

However, on what grounds such a referendum would be called?.

FIRST "RAPE" OF THE BALLOT

Several members of the Jayewardene Cabinet were against the proposal to extend the life of Parliament by a referendum. Among them was a former Prime Minister W. Dhanayaka who was the Minister of Co-operatives under President Jayewardene, and Lalith Athulathmudali, the popular Minister of Trade. Among those who had reservations were Nissanka Wijayarathna, Minister of Education and D.W. Devanayagam, who was the Minister of Home Affairs.

Prime Minister R. Premadasa led the group which insisted on a referendum. Finally, President Jayewardene agreed to hold the referendum.

Within three days the plan for the referendum was finalised and a fabricated story was prepared on a so-called *coup* attempt involving some of the leading members of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The Government claimed that it had reliable and very strong evidence of a plan to launch a violent attack on the President and the Government if the Opposition was successful in winning the Presidential election.

It was alleged that a group of Naxalites in the Opposition had already taken control of the SLFP. According to the statement of the Government it had satisfactory evidence to show that these Naxalites were planning to attack the Presidential Secretariat after declaration of the election result if Kubbekaduwa was elected and murder the incumbent President. The Government also said that some of the former officers of the armed forces also were among the conspirators. It, however, did not reveal as to who the informants were. Nevertheless, the Government came out with some names whom it alleged, were members of the Naxalite Group.

The names of the suspects released included Ratnasiri Wikranaiyake who was General Secretary of the SLFP, Vijaya Kumaratunga, a Joint Secretary of the SLFP and also the son-in-law of Party Leader and former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Karunasena Jayalatha, a very popular and outstanding Sinhala novelist.

The Government said it had decided to prevent Naxalites in the SLFP

from entering Parliament in large numbers, which is possible under the proportional voting system. To avoid that it was suggested that a referendum should be held to extend the life of the Parliament for six more years from August 1983.

A large number of SLFP supporters, including the three above named leaders, were taken into custody and were remanded.

A proclamation was issued from the Presidential Secretariat that a referendum will be held for this purpose on December 22, 1982 which was only barely 2 months after President Jayewardene was elected for the second term.

However, there were wide protests from many groups, both national and international, against the method adopted for the extension of the life of Parliament. Whatever said and done the people knew this was only an attempt by the Government to avoid the General Election and to keep its 5/6th majority for six more long years.

By the time the campaign started, the Government faced a situation of being unable to convince even some of the intelligent UNP supporters to accept this proposal. So it had to find out new methods to win this battle.

Under the referendum law the proposal should not only be passed by a majority of the voters who cast their vote but also should be approved by at least 1/3rd of the total number of registered voters in the Island. When the matter was discussed at a high level meeting of the UNP one Minister said: "We will have no problem if the people do not come to vote. We can manage that". This clearly meant that massive impersonation network had already been planned.

The public meetings organised by the UNP and addressed even by President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Premadasa were significant by the poor crowds attending them. There were no massive rallies. Even in Colombo it was difficult to muster even a crowd of 2 to 3 thousands for a rally addressed even by the top UNP leaders.

President Jayewardene made statements which were inconsistent and contradictory in explaining the purpose of the referendum.

In the same speech he said that there was a Naxalite conspiracy and the Government was extending the life of Parliament as a precaution to prevent undemocratic forces from creating disturbance in the country. On the other hand, he said the Government needed a smooth majority in Parliament to implement the development programmes that were launched from 1977 to 1982.

He said: "Give us another 6 years with the present Parliamentary strength and we shall ensure that at the end of that period every house in this country will possess a television set."

By December 20, all reports reaching the Presidential Secretariat predicted that the proposal will be defeated. But Jayewardene and his supporters had the last laugh by the mid night of December 22.

On the Election day the first news to reach the Election Commissioner's Office was that the defeated Presidential candidate Hector Kubbekaduwa found to his dismay that his vote was impersonated by the time he had reached the polling booth to cast his vote. This followed with the report that the vote of Pieter Keunaman, leader of the Communist Party and who was a minister for seven years, too had suffered the same fate as his vote was also cast by some one else.

There were hundreds and hundreds of such reports, and it was reported that in one polling station all the registered voters were said to have cast their votes by 2.30 P.M.

The most astonishing news reached the Election Commissioner's Office as well as the Presidential Secretariat by 1 A.M. on December 23. This news came from the counting centres in the Gampaha District.

Attanagalla is the home and traditional stronghold of the Bandaranaike family. From 1931 to October 1982 the Bandaranaiques retained this seat with very large majority. It was known not only in Sri Lanka but throughout the democratic world that the Bandaranaiques and the SLFP could not be defeated at Attanagalla whatever the results were in the other parts of the Island. Even in the 1977 General Election, where the SLFP won only 8 out of 168 seats in Parliament, the SLFP candidate Sirimavo Bandaranaike was elected by the voters of Attanagalla by a very large majority.

On October 20, in this particular electorate 31,495 voters voted for Hector Kubbekaduwa, the SLFP candidate, while J.R. Jayewardene, the incumbent President got only 22,531 votes. The three other Presidential candidates who were also opposing the proposal to extend the life of Parliament polled 2,320 votes in this particular electorate.

Taking this record into consideration, everyone in the country including ardent UNP supporters were 100% certain that at Attanagala the Government proposal would be defeated by atleast 10,000 votes.

The whole country was shocked when the Radio announced the result

from the Attanagala Electorate. A massive 35,747 have voted in support of the proposal to extend the life of Parliament by six years. While less than half of that number i.e. 17,442 had voted against.

The United National Party election machinery had performed a miracle.

The next miracle was reported from another SLFP stronghold. Dompe was part of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's electorate prior to the demarcation of electorates in 1960. From 1960, in every election to 1977 it was held by the SLFP. In 1977 the UNP captured this seat after a neck and neck race. However, at the Presidential election in October 1982 the SLFP defeated the UNP. But at the referendum it was a different story. 30,138 voted in support of the Government proposal while only 19,439 were against it.

With these two results and reports reaching of massive impersonation, there was no doubt that Government had won the day. However, some of the Government Ministers and Parliamentarians were not happy with the whole episode. For example, Lalith Athulathmudali confided with some of his friends that he did not take a keen interest to canvass support in his electorate for this proposal. In his electorate of Ratmalana, the UNP polled 21,280 votes while SLFP could get only 14,111 votes in the October Presidential election. But 2 months later at the referendum only 15,740 voted in favour of the proposal while 15,631 voters rejected it - a margin of only 109 votes.

Athulathmudali told a friend later: "Ratmalana is a middle class, intelligent electorate. The people there will not tolerate anyone interfering with their right to vote."

Another miracle was recorded from the remote Laggala electorate in the Matale District. On December 22, almost all parts of this electorate were under heavy floods. It was raining cats and dogs throughout the day. The Polling Officers had reached the polling booths with the ballot boxes by makeshift boats in many places. But the result showed that a record 87.19 of 35,129 voters have reached the polling stations. Out of them 26,115 had voted for the proposal while only 4,454 had voted against.

Even with these amazing events or miracles the Government could only poll 3.1 million votes for the proposal to extend the life of Parliament which is 10% less than what J.R. Jayewardene polled in October 1982.

REFERENDUM RESULTS IN SOME DISTRICTS FOR COMPARISON
Electoral District No.2- Gampaha
TABLE - I

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Polling Division and No. of registered voters	Number of Votes cast in favour of the lamp	Number of Votes cast in favour of the pot	Total Number of Valid votes	Number of rejected votes	Total number of votes including rejected	Votes cast expressed as a percentage of the total number of registered voters
1. Wattala 58,015	22,908 39,486 60,003	15,270 26,321 39,997	38,170 65,807	112 0.193	38,290	66.00
2. Negombo 59,884	19,021 31,763 59,657	12,863 21,480 40,343	31,994 53,243	159 0.226	32,043	53.508
3. Katana 60,560	22,322 36,859 55,299	18,044 29,795 44,701	40,366 66,655	127 0.210	40,493	66.864
4. Divulapitiya 61,494	23,430 38,101 55,959	18,440 29,987 44,041	41,870 68,088	104 0.169	41,974	68.257
5. Mirigama 70,695	33,031 46,723 64,721	18,005 25,463 35,279	51,036 72,192	129 0.182	51,165	72.374

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
6. Minuwangoda 69,566	25,539 36,712 54,629	21,211 30,490 45,371	46,750 67,702	175 0.252	46,925	67,454
7. Attanagalla 67,061	35,747 53,305 67,208	17,442 26,009 32,792	53,189 79,314	215 0.321	53,404	79,635
8. Gampaha 72,371	22,112 30,554 49,674	22,402 30,954 50,326	44,514 61,508	146 0.202	44,660	61,710
9. Ja-Ela 69,624	25,688 36,895 57,143	19,266 26,671 42,857	44,954 69,567	114 0.164	45,068	64,731
10. Mahara 65,660	20,773 31,637 48,994	21,626 32,936 51,006	42,399 64,574	113 0.172	42,512	64,746
11. Dompe 66,207	30,138 45,521 60,790	19,439 29,361 39,210	49,577 74,882	142 0.214	49,719	75,096
12. Biyagama 55,457	22,559 40,678 58,513	15,995 28,842 41,487	38,554 69,521	116 0.209	38,670	69,730
13. Kelaniya 58,671	19,337 32,958 51,130	18,482 31,501 48,870	37,819 64,459	83 0.141	37,902	64,601

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.3 KALUTARA

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Panadura 57,549	19,459 28,807 43,215	25,569 37,853 56,785	45,028 66,660	131 0.194	45,159	66.854
2. Bandaragama 65,013	24,062 37,011 51,356	22,755 35,001 48,644	46,817 72,012	116 0.178	46,933	72.190
3. Horana 61,356	26,883 43,815	18,236 29,722	45,119 73,536	115 0.187	45,234	73.724
4. Bulathsinhala 51,297	59,582 16,549 32,261	40,418 16,492 32,150	33,041 64,411	131 0.255	33,172	64.667
5. Matugama 61,809	50,086 18,592 30,080	49,914 21,341 34,527	39,933 64,607	130 0.210	40,063	64.817
6. Kalutara 64,944	46,558 19,800 30,488	53,442 23,857 36,735	43,657 67,223	85 0.131	43,742	67.353
7. Beruwala 64,357	45,354 21,047 32,704	54,696 21,971 34,139	43,018 66,843	71 0.110	43,089	66.953
8. Agalawatta 62,890	48,926 18,870 30,005	51,074 20,897 33,228	39,767 63,233	130 0.207	39,897	63,439
	47,451	52,549				

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.5 MATALE

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Dambulla 60,536	33,776 55,795 71,803	13,264 21,911 28,197	47,040 77,706	155 0.256	47,195	77,962
2. Laggala 35,129	26,115 74,340 85,430	4,454 12,679 14,570	30,564 87,019	132 0.376	30,701	87,395
3. Matala 43,705	22,994 52,612 69,502	10,090 23,087 30,498	33,084 75,698	116 0.265	33,200	75,964
4. Rattota 47,906	26,050 54,377 70,524	10,888 22,728 29,476	36,938 77,105	217 0.453	37,155	77,558

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.6 NUWARA ELIYA

1. Nuwara Eliya- Maskeliya 86,487	52,556 60,768 76,818	15,860 18,338 23,182	68,416 79,106	324 0.375	68,740	79,480
2. Kotmale 37,124	20,240 54,520 69,618	8,833 23,793 30,382	29,073 78,313	117 0.315	29,190	78,628
3. Hanguranketa 39,853	20,993 52,676 68,670	9,578 24,033 31,330	30,571 76,709	190 0.477	30,761	77,186
4. Walapane 38,414	22,300 58,052 72,417	8,494 22,112 27,538	30,794 80,164	102 0.266	30,896	80,429

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.7 Galle						
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Balapitiya 37,444	8,216 21,942 36,572	14,249 38,054 63,428	22,469 59,996	79 0.211	22,544	60,207
2. Ambalangoda 45,086	14,063 31,192 45,306	16,977 37,655 54,694	31,040 68,846	53 0.118	31,093	68,964
3. Karadeniya 41,355	13,154 31,808 51,052	12,612 30,497 48,948	25,766 62,305	51 0.123	25,817	62,428
4. Bentara-Elpitiya 58,596	20,547 35,066 51,247	19,547 33,359 48,753	40,694 68,424	91 0.155	40,185	68,580
5. Hiniduma 57,075	30,457 53,363 67,907	14,394 25,219 32,093	44,851 78,583	107 0.187	44,954	78,770
6. Beddegama 59,040	17,535 29,700 44,429	21,766 36,850 66,571	39,291 66,550	145 0.246	39,436	66,795
7. Ratgama 55,193	16,941 30,694 44,663	20,990 38,030 55,337	37,931 68,724	146 0.265	38,077	68,989
8. Galle 51,574	12,566 24,365 45,340	15,149 29,373 54,660	27,715 53,738	94 0.182	27,809	53,921
9. Akmeemana 51,073	16,360 32,033 47,864	17,820 34,891 52,136	34,180 66,924	76 0.149	34,256	67,073
10. Habaraduwa 56,053	8,687 15,498 26,019	24,700 44,065 73,981	33,387 59,563	119 0.212	33,506	59,776

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO. 8 - MATARA

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Deniyaya 49,817	20,241 40,631 56,125	15,823 31,762 43,875	36,064 72,393	83 0.167	36,147	72,560
2. Hakmana 57,203	20,193 35,301 47,688	22,151 38,723 52,312	42,344 74,024	153 0.267	42,497	74,292
3. Akuressa 59,798	21,748 36,369 51,448	20,524 34,322 48,552	42,344 70,691	123 0.206	42,395	70,897
4. Kamburupitiya 57,798	16,998 29,613 44,858	20,895 36,402 55,192	37,893 66,016	106 0.185	37,999	66,200
5. Devinuwara 56,693	19,225 33,911 46,723	21,922 38,668 53,277	41,147 72,579	130 0.229	41,277	72,808
6. Matara 56,252	18,091 32,161 47,749	19,797 35,193 52,251	37,888 67,354	118 0.210	38,006	67,564
7. Weligama 62,725	26,266 41,875 57,881	19,133 30,471 42,119	45,679 72,346	121 0.193	45,500	72,539

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.9- HAMBANTOTA

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Mulkirigala 57,491	13,720 23,865 37,824	22,553 39,229 62,176	36,272 63,093	124 0.216	36,397	63,309
2. Beliatta 56,254	16,778 29,825 44,106	21,262 37,796 55,894	38,040 67,622	108 0.192	38,148	67,814
3. Tangalle 58,690	19,701 33,568 47,141	22,091 37,640 52,859	41,792 71,208	108 0.184	41,900	71,342
4. Tissamaharama 69,521	21,373 30,743 48,969	22,273 32,038 51,031	43,646 62,781	93 0.134	43,739	62,915
5. Kayts 42,563	1,927 4,527 8,365	21,109 49,595 91,635	23,036 54,122	206 0.484	23,242	54,606
6. Vaddukoddai 46,206	2,156 4,666 8,120	24,397 52,801 91,880	26,553 57,467	114 0.247	26,667	57,713
7. Kankesanturai 51,681	1,937 3,748 6,177	29,419 56,924 93,823	31,356 60,672	235 0.455	31,591	61,127
8. Manipay 48,930	2,333 4,768 8,381	25,505 52,125 91,619	27,838 56,894	224 0.458	28,062	57,351
9. Kopay 49,577	1,796 3,623 5,767	29,347 59,195 94,233	31,143 62,817	216 0.436	31,359	63,253

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
10 Udupiddy 43,990	1,109 2,521 4,197	25,312 57,540 95,803	26,421 60,061	202 0.459	26,663	60,521
11 Point Pedro 34,859	1,374 3,942 6,938	18,429 52,867 93,062	19,803 56,809	48 0.138	19,851	56,947
12 Chavakachcheri 44,597	2,294 5,144 8,741	23,951 57,705 91,259	26,245 58,869	156 0.350	26,401	59,199
13 Nallur 49,233	2,469 5,015 8,157	27,800 56,466 91,843	30,269 61,522	114 0.232	30,393	61,713
14 Jaffna 42,296	3,479 8,225 13,926	21,503 50,839 86,074	24,982 59,065	112 0.265	25,094	59,329
15 Kilinochchi 39,773	3,257 8,189 17,701	15,143 38,074 82,299	18,400 46,263	139 0.265	18,539	46,612

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.19-BADULLA

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Mahiyangana 33,514	21,399 63,851 82,546	4,519 13,484 17,436	25,918 77,335	137 0.409	26,055	77,744
2. Wiyaluwa 27,455	13,899 50,625 69,263	6,168 22,466 30,737	20,067 73,091	150 0.546	20,217	73,637
3. Passara 28,077	15,807 56,299 73,049	5,832 20,771 26,951	21,639 70,070	168 0.598	21,807	77,669
4. Badulla 27,419	13,232 48,259 64,755	7,202 26,266 35,245	20,434 74,525	82 0.299	20,516	74,824
5. Hali-ela 30,598	14,983 48,967 65,305	7,959 26,012 34,639	22,942 74,979	87 0.284	23,029	75,263
6. Uva-Paranagama 33,670	19,451 57,770 74,459	6,672 19,816 25,541	26,123 77,585	136 0.404	26,259	77,989
7. Welimada 36,128	20,159 55,799 70,021	8,631 23,890 29,979	28,790 79,689	109 0.302	28,899	79,991
8. Bandaravela 35,570	16,480 46,331 62,323	9,963 28,010 37,677	26,443 74,341	127 0.357	26,570	74,698
9. Haputale 27,756	14,368 51,765 70,259	6,082 21,912 29,741	20,450 73,678	111 0.400	20,561	74,078

ELECTORAL DISTRICT NO.20-MONARAGALA

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Bible	20,656	6,847	27,503	170	27,673	77,094
35,895	57,546	19,075	76,621	0.474		
	75,105	24,859				
2. Monaragala	20,970	10,973	31,943	192	32,135	77,109
41,675	50,318	26,330	76,948	0.461		
	65,648	34,352				
3. Wellawaya	15,960	13,872	29,742	213	29,955	61,148
48,988	32,579	28,052	60,703	0.435		
	53,661	46,339				

AFTER THE REFERENDUM FLASCO

The “Shock waves” that followed the referendum result were powerful enough to put the nation into a deep lethargic slumber.

The rape of the ballot was done so openly that it had convinced many peaceful citizens that there could be no more free, fair and peaceful elections in the Island.

“We can vote in our thousands against the UNP, but when the boxes are opened and votes counted the UNP will win by thousands”, was the general lament heard in many parts of the country.

On the other hand, the JVP that opposed the participation in elections expounded the theory “that the only alternative is an armed struggle.”

The UNP also realised that the public mood was changing from one of dislike to that of hatred towards the government. It decided to have a few by-elections in some of the electorates where the UNP was defeated at both the Presidential election and the referendum.

For this an amendment to the constitution had to be passed because the by-elections were done away with by the 1978 Constitution. Accordingly, when a seat becomes vacant the Secretary of the political party that was holding the seat nominates a member by a letter to the Commissioner of Elections. The Opposition press labelled them “Chit M.Ps.”

The new amendment said: “When a seat in Parliament become vacant and if the Secretary of the party which was holding the seat fails to nominate a replacement within 30 days a by-election will be held to fill the vacancy.”

The UNP high command ordered 18 of it’s Parliamentarians who were among the losers to resign. However they were careful not to remove several “good boys” among the losers. Thus, members such as Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel managed to retain their seats.

Instructions were issued to trusted party organisers handling the election machinery that the "Attanagalla experiment" of stuffing ballots into boxes should be executed very carefully and only in selected polling stations during these by-elections.

The leaderless SLFP, which was in disarray, decided to fight the by-elections together with some other smaller parties. It was Vijaya Kumarantunga who came forward once again to rescue the party from complete inactivity. He knew that the government is getting unpopular day by day and that it can win elections only through malpractices. He himself decided to contest the Mahara seat.

The by-elections held in May 1983 took the shape of a "mini civil war" rather than an election campaign.

Once again the entire government machinery was mobilised. The conducting of the election work in the Mahara electorate from which Vijaya Kumarantunga was contesting, was put in charge of the "inventor" of the "Attanagalla stuffing" system.

Despite all resources available, the UNP was compelled to use guns in number of places, including Mahara and Mulkirigala, to frighten the voters.

After a brave fight back, the Opposition was able to win back four of the seats (three by the SLFP and one by the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna). Vijaya Kumarantunga lost the Mahara seat only by 45 votes.

In six or seven more electorates, the UNP had to use all "tricks in the book" to avoid defeat and win them by "razor-thin" majority.

The Opposition in Parliament was strengthened by the addition of four more members to its ranks.

Even though the ruling party won 14 out of 18 by-elections, it found that they cannot keep the public with them for long unless some new diversion of attention was experimented.

A "golden opportunity" for such strategy came with an ambush in the North when 13 soldiers were killed by the Tamil separatists. The remains of these victims were brought to Colombo for public cremation.

The extremists within the UNP, who had "tasted blood" in 1981 by burning the Jaffna Public Library, sprang into action.

On July 23, a communal violence of unprecedented magnitude and ferocity was let loose. Hundreds of innocent Tamils were killed in Colombo alone. Hundreds and hundreds of motor vehicles and other property belonging to Tamil residents were burned. Thousands were made homeless. Arson and looting became the order of the day. The police and the army looked on as silent spectators and even active participants in some places. The Government of Sri Lanka earned the contempt of the whole world.

But the Government decided to fight back. Now they had created the necessary atmosphere to re-establish violent Sinhala-Tamil hatred to look after the vested interest of the UNP at least for another decade. The country could be placed on a war footing. "Teaching a lesson to the Tamils" would get priority in public. The unemployed Sinhalese could be recruited to the army.

However, a "scape goat" had to be found. As done in 1982, where a Naxalite bogey was created to have a referendum the Government accused three leftist political parties of creating the July violence. It banned the 3 parties even though there were no evidence to prove their hand in the riots. After some time it ordered the ban to be lifted.

The UNP was not worried of this decision. The rule by emergency was, by then established. The full scale civil war had started and some of the unemployed youth could be accommodated in the armed forces.

So the war continued. The Government did not take a single step towards a political settlement. On the other hand, they removed the 18 Tamil Opposition members of Parliament through a flimsy constitution amendment, which added the clause 61 to the Constitution.

Quoted below are the relevant constitutional provisions:

Clause 61 of Chapter IX

A person appointed to any office referred to in this Chapter shall not enter upon the duties of his office until he takes and subscribes the oath or makes the subscribes the affirmation set out in the Fourth Schedule.

Fourth Schedule

"I do that I will faithfully perform the duties and discharge the functions of the office of in accordance with the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the law, and that I will be faithful to the Republic of Sri Lanka and that I will to

the best of my ability uphold and defend the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.”

When the above amendment was introduced, 18 members belonging to the Tamil United Liberation Front, including the leader of the Opposition A. Amirthalingham, refused to take the oath in the Fourth Schedule in the Constitution. Thus they were unseated from Parliament making the House unrepresented by 12.6 per cent of the population.

Things went on for five more years until the later part of 1988.

By the latter part of 1987, the Government being aware that it will have to face a Presidential election in 1988 reluctantly surrendered to Indian pressure and signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 29, 1987.

Only the left parties led by Vijaya Kumaratunga supported the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The majority in the UNP were openly against the accord but meekly voted for the bill to create Provincial Councils because they were frightened of their party leader. The SLFP too opposed the accord and vowed to boycott Provincial Council elections.

In February 1988, Vijaya Kumaratunga was brutally assassinated outside his own residence. That was the time he was leading the movement to mobilise the left to face the provincial councils election to fight for devolution of power to settle the ethnic issue.

This assassination put the progressive forces once again in disarray. They were facing violence from two sides, from the Government and the extremist forces who were opposed to the Provincial Councils. The major Opposition party, the SLFP, made another political blunder by deciding to boycott the Provincial Council elections.

Barely two months after the assassination of her husband, Chandrika Kumaratunga came forward to lead the fight against UNP at the Provincial Council elections.

She was successful in mobilising the people in several districts effectively. Massive crowds gathered to listen to her at meetings.

Then came the threats. This time it was to the lives of her two children. The threats were many and they were quite serious. She had to listen to the friends and relatives who were advising her to leave the country for sometime.

Chandrika reluctantly left the country after completing less than half the campaign.

At the Provincial Council election, that was noted for violence and violation of election laws, in the districts where Chandrika had campaigned the UNP was able to win only in a “photo finish”.

This followed the Presidential election.

The ‘secrets’ of UNP victory at the elections in 1988 and 1989 were revealed by the Commissioner of Election in his report published very much later.

1988 - GAME OF "STUFFING BALLOT"

How the United National Party in power misused it during the 1988 election was revealed to the world (even partly) by the Commissioner of Elections in his report which was submitted much much later. These extracts will show that all election malpractices of the past have been found obsolete by the United National Party election machinery and they have found new method by which it could prevent the people from using their right to vote.

Here are some of the extracts from the report of the Commissioner of Elections:

243.2 At the polling station number 14

In the Borella electorate at 10 A.M. A group entered the polling station threatened the Opposition polling agents and destroyed their papers. The police had to interfere.

243.3 Polling Station No. 20 in Colombo East electorate.

Eight armed persons entered the polling station threatened the staff and took several books of ballot papers by force and stuffed them into the ballot box after marking.

The officers could not get the assistance of the police to remove these intruders.

243.4 In Colombo West electorate at the Methodist School polling station.

A person who called himself a candidate entered the polling station with 25 others. The Senior Presiding Officer requested the police to remove them. Some time later the same man and the same group entered with two armed policemen and kidnapped one polling agent of the Opposition.

243.6 In Colombo West polling station number 5 St. Anthony's Girls School

A man who claimed to be the candidate entered the polling station by force with

a group of men and attacked the polling agent and dragged him out of the premises.

243.7 Lindesay Girls School polling station number 7.

When an armed group entered the polling station the police had left the place.

Then they started impersonating at will. Presiding Officer could not get police assistance to prevent this intimidation.

243.8 Polling Station number 18 in Dehiwala school.

Some persons were arrested for impersonating and handed over to the police. However they were freed and taken away by some others.

243.11 At polling station number 7

In Kesbewa Village Headman (Grama Sevaka) was assisting a political party openly inside the booth. Report had been made.

243.13 Polling station number 43 of Moratuwa electorate.

Two buses belonging to the Transport Board were transporting voters to the polling station and complaint was made to the mobile police.

These are several instances mentioned by the Commissioner of Election with regard to the Colombo district where polling percentage was not satisfactory.

However, the Commissioner's observations on the Southern Province electorates were shocking. He had described how "the rape of the ballot" had taken place openly in the Southern Province.

244.5 In Colombo West polling station number 4 St. Michael's School.

An armed group entered the police station and removed the agents of the other party by force.

Here are some of the extracts:

246.1 Polling Station No. 36

Sometime before the closing of the polling station about 15 armed man entered the polling station and they pointed guns at the polling officer and took several ballot papers, marked them and stuffed them into ballot box. None of the police officers

on duty helped the polling officer and prevented the intruders from this criminal act.

247.3 Polling Station No. 8 in Hakmana Electorate.

When some polling officers came to the police station to make arrangements for the next day's poll, several people came to meet them with a police officer and told them that the next day (Polling Day), several people will enter the polling station and they will want to vote as they like and the officers should not prevent them from doing so. The officers protested and said this is against the law and they will not permit.

However next day at 3.15 p.m. the group of people entered the polling station, only 700 votes were cast by this time. The crowd was led by several men who looked like security officers armed with revolvers. They threatened staff and marked 700 ballot papers and stuffed them into the ballot box.

The report continues

247.6 At Polling Station no. 44 in Akuressa-electorate. GALPAMUNUWA

At about 3.15 in the afternoon about 50 men led by a person who was identified as a candidate invaded the polling station. They came in two lorries. He demanded the unused ballot papers to be given to him. The Senior Presiding Officer refused to do so. He said that he had no such objection in the two previous polling stations. He demanded for the ballot papers intimidating the officers. The candidate pointed a revolver at a Presiding Officer but at this time some soldiers appeared and the crowd left the place threatening to murder the Presiding Officer later.

247.8 At Polling station no. 49 in the same electorate at Senani Junior School.

There too a similar incident took place at about 11.45 A.M. the same group forced themselves into the polling station and marked 33 ballots and stuffed them into the ballot box.

247.9 At Sulthanagoda Polling Station in the same Electorate.

In this polling station no. 50 at about 12.40 in the noon a group of about 20 drunken men entered the polling station. They said that the party leadership had ordered that all the unused ballot papers were to be collected. He used force and marked over 900 ballot papers and stuffed them into the box.

247.10 In the same electorate at No. 51 Polling Station.

There too a similar group entered the Polling Station and took over 1300 ballot papers by force, marked them and stuffed them into the ballot box. There were 10 Police Officers and 4 Soldiers on duty but none of them tried to prevent this political thuggary.

247.11 In the Devinuwara electorate Polling Station No. 9 Gandara.

About 11.30 A.M. a group entered the polling station and disturbed the voting. There were no agents present.

247.12 Devinuwara electrorate Polling Station No. 11 at the Junior School.

Man claiming to be a candidate came with 25 others, entered the polling station and said that some people were coming. Some more people entered with a candidate who had a gun in hand and ordered the Presiding Officer to allow the crowd to impersonate. The officers were helpless.

247.14 Devinuwara electrorate Polling Station No. 47

A man who was identified as a senior police officer in the area entered the polling station and said some people were not registered as voters, were on their way and that they should be accommodated. A large group came a little while later and they were heavily armed. They marked ballot papers and put them into the box and the polling officers had no protection from any quarter to prevent this.

247.15 Devinuwara Electorate Polling Station No. 49

At 2.30 P.M. a group of 14 entered the polling station. They were armed. They intimidated the polling officers at gun point. The officers were helpless. The gang marked and stuffed more than 1300 ballot papers into the box.

247.16 Devinuwara Electorate Polling Station No. 51

A group of 25 men forced themselves into the polling station and said the leaders of their party had instructed them to vote at their please. They plundered over 900 ballot papers, marked them and stuffed them into the box. At that time only 308 voters had cast their vote. All the Polling Officers had signed the report on this matter written by the presiding officer. The Police Officers presented were just silent spectators.

248.3 Mulkirigala Electorate Polling Station No. 34

At about 4 P.M. a man who identified himself as a candidate entered with a large group. Took the ballot papers by force and marked them before stuffing them into the ballot box while the helpless police officers also looked on.

248.5 Beliattha Electorate Polling Station No. 25 at Alutwewe.

Two candidates came with a group of 80 people in two buses. These buses of 29 SRI registration numbers belonged to some transport depot outside the Southern Province. They took ballot papers by force and marked them in favour of one party and put them in the ballot box. The Polling Officers requested the police to prevent this illegal act but there was no response.

248.6 Beliattha Electorate Polling Station No. 51.

Upto 1.15 P.M. only one voter had voted. Then 40 people came in a gang by a Government owned bus. They collected 300 ballot papers and stuffed them into the ballot box after marking. Later it was revealed that the leader of this gang was a candidate.

248.7 Beliattha Electorate Polling Station No. 52

Upto 2.30 P.M not a single voter came in. Then the same group referred to in the previous incident forced themselves into the polling station and stuffed over 500 ballot papers.

248.8 Tangalle Electorate Polling Station No. 15

No votes were cast till noon. A man who was identified as the brother of a politician in the area came in with a gang of men. They threatened the Polling Officer and started impersonating at will. The Police Officers were as helpless as the Polling Officers themselves.

248.9 Tangalle Electorate Polling Station No. 32

At about 2.30 P.M. a large group forced themselves into the polling station. Some of them had guns. They demanded to be allowed to vote as they like. The Presiding Officer said, "You may kill me but I will not allow you to break the law". The brave stand taken by the Presiding Officer seems to have frightened the gang. They left the place threatening that they would murder the Presiding Officer later.

248.10 Tangalle Electorate Polling Station No. 49

At about 3.30 P.M. a well-dressed man, together with 15 other entered the polling station. He was a former member of the District Development Council. He intimidated the Presiding Officer and ordered his men to take ballot papers one by one, mark them and put into the ballot box. The police officers did not interfere at all despite repeated request by the Polling Officers.

(The District Development Council Members belong only to the UNP because the opposition parties did not participate in the District Development Council Election.)

248.11 Tissamaharama Electorate Polling Station No. 40 Hambantota

A bus belong to the Panadura Government Transport Board with the registration No. of 23SR1 2871 was used by an armed gang who entered the polling station with guns and started impersonating and no one could protest as the intruders were heavily armed.

248.12 Tissamaharama Electorate Polling Station No. 46

Upto 10 A.M. only three voters came to cast their votes. At 10.30 a group came in a Government-owned bus led by a candidate. He had a revolver in his hand. About 25 people who came with him started impersonating. Two more groups forced into the polling station at 11 A.M. & 3.15 P.M. All of them came in Government-owned buses. Total number of impersonation in this booth was 140.

After giving details of many such incidents in his report, the Election Commissioner continues to express his concern regarding the failure to take necessary steps in advance to prevent such occurrences. The following are extracts from the report:

385 I regret very much that the Police Department had delayed taking any action on many complaints that I had made. In the southern province the complaints were made without any delay. Even the President himself assured me that suitable action will be taken immediately.

386 When the legal machinery is out of action all regulations in the Constitution will be meaningless and also will be ineffective. This will result in the public losing confidence in the electoral system. For those who have experienced these incidents and those who had seen them with their own eyes will not need any proof established in a court of law to know who the culprits were. Legal procedure is necessary only to bring the offenders before the courts and punish them so that the

confidence in the electoral system could be re-established. If the voters become convinced that those who use intimidation to prevent the genuine voters from using their rights through outside influence, the confidence in the system will be severely eroded.

394 The number arrested on the charges of impersonation were much less than the number who had actually impersonated. However in many places those who had been taken in to custody for attempted impersonation were released when powerful politicians and their supporters came and interfered with the police.

394.3 Since the beginning of a new system where armed gangs entered the polling stations and threatened the Polling Officers and obtained ballot papers by force to stuff them in to the ballot boxes, the old system of casual impersonation had changed. This is an effective method of "raping the vote". These men who came heavily armed need not give their names. They need not produce a poll card. It is not necessary for them to go through the process of getting the fingers marked with ink. What they have to do is only to point a gun at the Election Officers and collect the unused ballot papers by force, mark them and stuff them into the ballot box. A very easy and a short way of impersonation has been discovered.

399 Some leaders who came armed with the gangs and stuffed ballot papers into the box by force went on to make speeches to the Polling Officers adding insult to injury. They said that there is a violent boycott of the election. It will be a disgrace for the local leadership if the ballot boxes were sent back empty. "What we are doing", they said "is to safeguard democracy by stuffing ballot papers into the ballot box so that those who are trying to prevent elections by violence will not succeed in destroying democracy." However, the election officers who listened to these Sermon knew that the motive of these political thugs could not be minimised by these colourful words.

400 Who were the armed gangs accompanying these leaders? It was well-known that because of the threat of violent boycott, candidates were provided with several armed security officers. They were even allowed to select some of their own trusted people for this security purpose. However, it is not clear whether every candidate was provided with this facility.

401 These armed security officers were used for the purpose of using force at the polling stations. The Police Officer who is in charge of the security of the candidate is senior in position than the police officer who is appointed to look after the polling station. In such cases the ordinary policemen will not be able to prevent a superior officer from breaking the law. On the other hand what the senior officer should have done was to explain to the candidates that forceful entry to the polling station was illegal.

402 Under these circumstances serious doubt arise as to the role played by these security officers. Guns were aimed at the Presiding Officers and other polling staff. Ballots were stuffed into the boxes. The weapons which are supplied for security had been grossly misused.

(These extracts were translated from the Commissioner's Sinhala Report.)

SAARC OBSERVERS' COMMENT

OBSERVER GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS FROM SAARC COUNTRIES

Presidential Elections of Sri Lanka December 1988

INTERIM STATEMENT

The 10-member non-governmental Observer Group from four of the seven member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) arrived in Sri Lanka on December 16, 1988, and proceeded on the following day to meet the three candidates, the Commissioner of Elections and a number of human rights and non-governmental organisations concerned with the conduct of the Presidential Election.

The Group at the conclusion of its observation mission had to address the question whether the electoral process that it had observed was free and fair. At the outset, it became clear that there were three general matters which concerned many Sri Lankans with regard to the conduct of the Presidential Election. The first related to the question of the adequacy of the administrative and security arrangements relating to the organization and conduct of the election, considering the prevailing situation in the country. The second related to the problem of general intimidation and its impact on the exercise of the franchise, and the distortions that such a climate of intimidation could have on the electoral outcome. The third was the possibility, in these abnormal circumstances, of interference or commission of irregularities by or on behalf of the ruling party affecting the electoral process..

The Group had received several written and oral representations from contesting and other political parties, and a number of non-governmental bodies and individuals with regard to incidents of violence and complaints touching on the fairness of the electoral process. The group explained to those who had made representations that it had no supervisory or executive power, and could not intervene in the administration of the election.

On December 18, 1988, the Group divided into 5 sub-groups and left Colombo to observe the election, one each to Matara, Kandy, Anuradhapura and Jaffna, leaving a sub-group to observe the election in Colombo district. The

members continued to have extensive discussions with persons representing a wide spectrum of political and public opinion in Colombo and in some of the provincial capitals. The members of the Observer Group appreciated the facilities extended to them by the Commissioner of Elections and the logistical arrangements made available to them for visiting the outlying provinces to enable them to observe the election in polling stations of their choice. They were also greatly assisted by the District Returning Officers who extended necessary facilities to enable them to observe the administrative and security arrangements with regard to the conduct of the poll within their districts.

On the day of the polling, members of the Observer Group, between them, were able personally observing the voting process in some 131 polling stations. Following the conclusion of the poll, they observed counting in 5 of the 21 counting centres.

In most of the polling stations visited by the Group, election officials were generally in place and functioned effectively. They, however, observed that the fact that polling cards, giving the Registration Number of a voter in the voters' register and the location of his polling station where he had to cast his vote, were not distributed in a number of districts was one of the main factor which may have contributed towards reducing voter turnout.

Polling agents appointed by the candidates performed an indispensable role in the conduct of a fair poll. It is they who are to exercise vigilance to see that voter impersonation and other malpractices do not occur and that counting is carried out properly. The members of the Group noted that in many of the polling stations polling agents of only one or two parties were present. In certain districts, such as Jaffna, no polling agents presented themselves on behalf of any candidate, and in Vavuniya, Galle, Matale and Matara in a number of polling stations there were only one or two, polling agents.

There were many incidents of violence, threats and other acts of coercion directed against election officials and voters. These incidents prevented 49 of the 215 polling stations in the Moneragala district affecting 45,000 registered voters, and some polling stations in other districts from functioning at all. Similarly polling stations located in the southern and certain central districts were also affected. The Group wishes to express its sorrow that two Presiding Officers - S.S. Abeysondera in Welimpda, and M. Goonewardene in Moneragala - and some others engaged in election duty were killed. The Group was impressed by the courage and fortitude shown by public officials in almost the area visited and by their determination to conduct the election in a fair and efficient manner under difficult conditions.

The problem of general intimidation during the election campaign was unprecedented. It was clear to the group particularly in the North-Eastern Province, the Southern province and in parts of the Central province where its members had visited that the general climate of intimidation resulted in significant sections of the population, particularly in the rural areas, not being able to exercise their franchise. On the other hand, in most of the urban centres visited by the group, voter turnout was relatively high, even in areas where incidents of violence or bomb threats had taken place. While the overall voter turnout was clearly and significantly less than the voter turnout during the previous Presidential and Parliamentary elections, a turnout of around 55.3%, nonetheless, reflected the importance that the people of Sri Lanka continue to attach to the electoral process.

The Group received several representations relating to irregularities in the electoral registers, the late opening of polling stations, unequal access to state facilities during the conduct of the election campaign, arrest of party members engaged in election work, abnormally high polling in areas where the occurrence of violence together with the absence of polling agents should have resulted in low polling, and ministerial interference in the election process. Questions were also posed before the Group as to whether acts of omission and commission on the part of the Government materially contributed towards reducing the turnout. Such acts referred to ranged from non-dissolution of Parliament to non-distribution of polling cards. The Group, given its terms of reference and its limitations, while noting the questions raised, felt that they will have to be dealt with in accordance with the law of the land.

The Group has been impressed by the strong commitment of the people of Sri Lanka to the electoral process as demonstrated by their participation in an election held in conditions which were far from normal. It is for that very reason that the inability of a large number of voters to participate in the election regardless of its causes is a matter of disappointment to many within the country who had hoped for an election with wider participation and a larger turnout of the order of 80-90% registered in previous elections.

The Group believes that the fact that in the face of threats of intimidation and actual violence, the electoral process, even though it may have been flawed in the perception of some, did in fact take its course, should be viewed positively. The Group expresses the hope that this would help to promote peace, harmony and reconciliation and to strengthen the democratic process.

A concluding tribute must be paid to the people of Sri Lanka, who true to their strong democratic traditions, courageously asserted their right to vote in the face of fear and difficulties presented by the prevailing situation.

THE "COMMISSIONER LAMENTS"

464. Commencing with the elections to the Provincial Councils, armed intervention in polling stations had continued during this period. There were twenty-five (25) reported cases of such intervention at this election. Compared with the elections to the Provincial Councils with thirty (30) such instances, it reflected a downward trend at this Presidential Election. But it increased to thirty-two (32) instances at the Parliamentary General Elections of February, 1989. Polling Stations are established at elections to enable to vote. In the proper conduct of a Poll, it is necessary to safeguard the liberty of officers to perform their duties and the freedom of the electors to cast their votes. Hence this tendency for armed intervention in polling stations had to be stopped, if an election is to be considered as free and fair.

465. This tendency cannot be altogether disassociated from the Law and Order situation which prevailed in the country. With increasing insecurity and the threats on the lives of politicians, public servants and security officers, there was need to take precautionary measures. One such measure was the issue of permits to selected persons to possess fire arms, and the other was the provision of armed bodyguards. Fears were expressed even at the time of the Provincial Councils Elections whether such facilities meant for the protection of persons would be used in the opposite direction of an attack on persons. The more pessimistic groups observed then that the most dangerous development would be the use of arms to invade and attack polling stations.

466. Succeeding immediately after the elections to the Provincial Councils, the security coverage to be provided at this Presidential Election should have taken note of the experience at that election. There were 36 reported cases of such intervention at the elections to the Provincial Councils, particularly in the Southern Province. There was a public outcry immediately after that election. The former President, in response to these demands, requested the aggrieved parties to make representations to the Commissioner of Elections.

The Commissioner of Elections himself met the former President as well as the Presidential candidate of the United National Party R. Premadasa, who was the then Prime Minister and expressed his concern over these incidents, the person

alleged to have been instrumental in them and the pathetic manner in which the security personnel comprising as many as ten guards of the Police and the Army at some of the polling station failed to prevent the invasion of polling stations by such groups. The Commissioner took a very serious view of these developments which has occurred for the first time in our elections, specially in view of the then pending Second Presidential Elections of 1988 and the Parliamentary General Elections in early 1989. Both of them advised the Commissioner to obtain details of such incidents and direct the Inspector General of Police to investigate all these complaints and prosecute the alleged offenders.

467. By letters dated June 28 and July 22, 1988, the Commissioner referred a total of 34 incidents for investigation and prosecution. Most of these incidents had taken place in the Districts of Matara and Hambantota and a few in Colombo. As far as the incidents in the Southern Province were concerned there were reports of some inquiries only. While in respect of Colombo District and more specifically in Colombo City, the Police Department completed inquiries and forwarded the papers to the Attorney-General for advice to enter prosecution. Nothing had been heard thereafter.

468. Attention has to be drawn to two incidents which surfaced at this election where it would appear that those responsible were different from those who merely resisted the conduct of the election by violent means.

- (i) In Gampaha District, the staff of a Polling Station located at a temple were mercilessly assaulted on the night of December 18. The Returning Officer replaced this staff and ensured that the poll was conducted on schedule. In this incident the armed gang was alleged to have arrived in a double-cab and a van which belonged to a business establishment. Ownership of this establishment was well-known. The Police Department failed to inquire into this incident in spite of repeated requests and the reason for this failure is suspected to be the connection of these persons and the vehicles to some politician of the area.

An officer who was assaulted by the gang ended up in hospital in a critical condition. He recovered but with permanent damage. In spite of grievous injury and consequent hospitalisation, the officers refrained from lodging a complaint through fear of their lives. In the context of subsequent incidents their fears appear to have been justified.

They cannot be blamed for their failure to lodge a complaint.

- (ii) An incident took place at the Beliatta Technical College on the night of December 18, the day before the poll. There is a reference to this incident in para 5.10 of pages 50 and 51 of the Final Report of the International

Observer Group. It is a clear instance of the misuse of armed bodyguards provided for the protection of politicians. As to whether this incident had taken place with the knowledge and consent of the politician under reference is not relevant, but that such an event took place at all, is alarming and serious. If, however, it had taken place with the knowledge and consent of politician concerned, it is catastrophic for elections. It focuses attention sharply on the main issue raised earlier. A direct responsibility is cast on such persons to ensure that such bodyguards or arms issued to them are not abused in a manner to deny the freedom of the electors or the liberty and the independence of the elections staff.

469. Elimination of such behaviour at times of elections is not a question of mere procedure in the conduct of elections. Nor are they incidents for which individual police officer who provide security at polling stations can be totally blamed when persons behind such incidents might have been those occupying higher levels of political or bureaucratic authority. Far from it the entire question evolves round the moral responsibility and accountability of politicians. One method to correct this situation would be to minimise the availability of fire-arms in general and in the hands of politicians in particular. The other method would be to initiate disciplinary action from within parties and publicly demonstrate the commitment of the political parties to free and fair elections. However, it does not absolve the Police Department from the responsibility of conducting inquiries and prosecuting the offenders. A future Select Committee has to pay serious attention to these vital problems if the situation is not to deteriorate any further.

1989: ANOTHER FRAUD

After the very, very narrow “win” in the Presidential election, the UNP election machinery was jubilant but yet frustrated because it was aware that despite vast resources used, and the very word “edge” it had against the Opposition it was able to show only a photo finish.

Now they had to face the Parliamentary election.

It was very clear that if the voting pattern did not change at Parliamentary election the UNP will not be able to get an absolute majority in the House. There will be at least 20 Tamil members from the North and the East who are not likely to support the UNP. As such under the proportionate voting system itself an Opposition majority could not be ruled out.

Such a scenario could lead to the election of an Opposition member as Speaker. This will be a tremendous disadvantage to the President if an impeachment motion against him is signed even by half the members of the House and handed over to the Speaker under the provisions of the constitution. (It may be recalled here that such an impeachment motion was sponsored by a section of Government M.Ps. with the support of the Opposition in 1991 but President Premadasa was successful in “convincing” the Speaker who first accepted it to reject it later.)

Under these circumstances getting absolute majority in Parliament was priority No.1 for President Premadasa. When the election was held there were 125 members of Parliament to campaign for the UNP. The majority of them held ministerial posts. In addition there were 35 Ministers including 7 Chief Ministers in the seven provinces (excluding the North and East) to participate in the UNP campaign. All of them had armed security personnel and vehicles at their disposal owing to their official capacity. The number of Opposition members were less than a dozen.

With the dissolution of Parliament on December 31, 1988, few of the UNP members lost their special privileges. But for all Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Project Ministers, Provincial Chief Ministers and the Members of the Provincial

Councils the situation was unchanged.

So as in the Presidential election, during the Parliamentary election also the UNP had a massive "personnel security force" attached to their "VIP's" while the Opposition candidates were provided with only four security personnel each. On the other hand the security personnel attached to the "VIP's" were armed with the most sophisticated weapons such as AK47 or T.56 rifles while the security men attached to 'Ordinary' candidates were shotguns and some repeaters.

During the elections held in Sri Lanka from 1931 to 1982, no such security for candidate were required. As the elections were by and large peaceful, no security guards or fire arms were needed by the candidates.

The violent boycott of elections was started by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (J.V.P) after they were deprived from entering Parliament by the fraudulent referendum held in December 1982.

The J.V.P. came into the democratic political mainstream in 1981 by contesting the District Development Council elections. They followed it by contesting the Presidential election in 1982.

The number of votes polled by the J.V.P. candidate, Rohana Wijeweera at the Presidential election showed that in some districts the party would obtain some seats in Parliament under the proportional voting system. Also it was very well known that those who voted for the J.V.P. candidate at the Presidential election were aware that their candidate would definitely lose.

In a Parliamentary election when a voter is convinced that his vote is not wasted "he will vote for a party of his choice as some of its candidate's could be winners". Under such circumstances, the J.V.P. was optimistic of getting around 10 Parliamentary seats in the general election which was due in 1983. "After all" one J.V.P. leader in Colombo said: "S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike could only win 9 seats for his SLFP in 1952 and four years later he became the Prime Minister."

These hopes were destroyed by the "Referendum fraud" of December 12, 1982. The J.V.P. with the other Opposition Political Parties went all out to defeat the Government at the referendum. One SLFP member of Parliament (elected later) said that it was the militancy of the J.V.P. that prevented the UNP from stuffing in bundles of ballot papers in the southern electorates where the Government suffered a defeat while succeeding in places like Attanagalla and Dompe.

After the referendum it was the J.V.P. that challenged the result in the Courts. But the Party was banned before the petition was taken up for hearing.

The only reason given for banning the J.V.P. together with the LSSP and the Communist Party was that these organisations were responsible for the communal violence in July 1983. Later the ban on the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party were lifted as there was no proof of any involvement. The J.V.P. had gone underground by this time.

Later it came to light that those responsible for the 1983 July violence and also for the burning down of the Jaffna Public Library in 1981 were men connected to the UNP.

The decision of the J.V.P. to boycott the election was a golden opportunity to the UNP which was limping with no popular support by 1987.

In any Election, anywhere in the world, if there is a boycott of the hustings - violent or non-violent - it is a well-known fact that the group with more resources and a stronger propaganda machinery will have the advantage.

The UNP election machinery had all this in abundance. Even then they were not very optimistic of victory. That is why they equipped their candidate with all the security (mentioned above) for their candidates before the "battle" was launched.

A large number of Opposition supporters were gunned down during the Presidential election. All those murders were attributed to the "unknown gunmen" and was finally credited (or debited) to the J.V.P. account."

But the fact remains that only those who belonged to a 'suicide squad' could come close to a UNP candidate who was surrounded by tight security.

Therefore, those who were vulnerable and easy target for the "unknown gun men" were the candidates of the Opposition.

The Commissioner of Elections in his report (page 323 Sinhala report) gives the names of 13 candidates who were assassinated between the nomination day and the election day. He has given the date of assassination and the district. As none of the assassins was brought to book by the law we have to go by other circumstances to come to any conclusion. This will lead one to suspect as to who would have benefited by these deaths.

At the Presidential election in December 1988, inspite of the so-called violent boycott, more districts recorded clear majority for the SLFP. The southern province and the Kalutara districts were some areas where the UNP had been trailing behind in many elections. It was proved even at the 1982 Presidential election, at the referendum and also at the recent elections.

Despite the violence, Matara district gave a complete backing to the SLFP in December 1988. It is true that only 23.84% of the 4,51,934 voters of this district cast their votes. But 54.30% of them voted for the SLFP while the UNP share was only 42.93%. By a strange coincidence, the first assassination of a candidate was at Matara. On January 6, 1989 the day after the nomination of Sarath Sepala Ratnaike, a popular SLFP candidate for the Matara district was gunned down. The police attributed the murder to the "unknown gunman".

The Kalutara district was another area where the UNP suffered a defeat in December 1988. Here the polling was much better. 64.76% of the voters polled out of a total of 5,70,118. The SLFP defeated the UNP by a comfortable margin polling 49.57% to UNP's 46.74%.

On January 10, 1989, just 5 days after the nomination, a double tragedy took place at Kalutara. Two SLFP candidates including its All Island Joint Secretary were brutally murdered.

Two SLFP candidates, Indrapala Abeyweera, a highly respected educationist, and Wijayalal Mendis, were shot dead.

Even though the police attributed this crime to the "unknown gunmen" of the JVP, the latter quickly issued a statement denying any non-involvement. In a widely circulated underground leaflet it praised Abeyweera as a great teacher whose students are found all over the country. "We mourn his death and we curse the criminals who were responsible for it" the leaflet said.

The next assassination was also at Matara. Abdees Mohamed Hussain, the SLFP candidate, was killed in broad day light on January 21.

Three days later on January 24, 1989, two SLFP candidates were assassinated at Polonnaruwa and Monaragala districts respectively. R.R.G. Jayaweera of Polonnaruwa and B. Sumedha Jayasena of Monaragala were the victims.

Sumedha Jayasena was a very popular young politician. His widow was elected to Parliament both in 1989 and 1994 getting the highest number of votes in the district at both elections.

Two more SLFP candidates were killed on January 27 and February 3 at Badulla and Kegalle respectively. They were P.B. Ratnayke (Badulla) and Hector Jayaratane (Kegalle).

When the election day (February 15, 1989) was approaching all reports indicated that in Galle district the prospects for the UNP were not very good.



This is the outer cover of Sinhala Book "Chanda Gathanaya"
(Rape of the Ballot) by S. Piyasena in 1992.

The cartoon recalls the British High Commissioner, Colombo
exposing how the UNP organised mass impersonations during
the Provincial Election in 1991.

Three days before the poll, one of the most popular candidates of the SLFP in the whole Island, Somapala Amaraakeerti, was brutally murdered in Galle.

Apart from these nine SLFP candidates, three United Socialist Alliance candidates - Nimal Kularatne of Kandy, R.A. Jayaweera of Kurunegale and Somadasa of Kalutara were assassinated on January 25, 27 and February 5 respectively.

In addition to these a candidate of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, N.P. Sivagurunathan, was killed in Jaffna on January 27. However, this was attributed to the Tamil militants fighting for a separate state.

The Parliamentary election was held to elect only 196 members. The nomination were closed on January 5, 1989. The election was fixed for February 15.

As many as 13 Candidates were assassinated during this short period. All of them were from the Opposition and 9 victims belonged to the leading Opposition party, the SLFP.

The police functioning under the new President (Premadasa) who assumed office only on January 2, 1989 could not trace a single person responsible for these political killings.

PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS OF MAY 1993 AND THE RESURGENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S POWER

It is a fact that in Sri Lanka, there are more people who vote against the United National Party (People's UNP) than from those who regularly vote for the UNP. However, whenever the anti-UNP parties were divided, the UNP could win Homagama.

One clear example was the electoral division of Homagama. At the Pradeshiya Saba (local Government) election in 1991 the Independent front (P.A. at that time) polled 36,000 votes while UNP lost polling just by 29,000 votes. At the Provincial Council poll, the P.A. won polling 29,000 votes with the UNP getting 23,000. The DUNF share was 10,000. It was clear that a considerable section of the anti-UNP vote went to the DUNF with a small percentage of the traditional UNP votes.

By the time the second Provincial Council election were scheduled in April- May 1993, some sort of opposition unity had been achieved, but the disputes within the Opposition parties were causing a lot of damage.

The participation of the group led by Anura Bandaranaike was very indifferent and lethargic.

The Democratic United National Front (DUNF) led by Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake was getting considerable support. But it was evident that its support came more from the anti-UNP groups and non-committed voters.

In all provinces the P.A. and the DUNF contested separately, but it was a complimentary confrontation.

After the tragic assassination of DUNF leader Lalith Athulathmudali on April 23, 1993 and President Premadasa's assassination a week later, the election campaign of most of the political parties were handicapped.

Despite this the polling on May 17, 1993 saw the percentage of voting reaching 72. This was the best after 1982 though 15% below 1977.

In the Western Province, the P.A. captured 45 seats out of 104 while the UNP which had 60 seats was reduced to 41. The DUNF won 17 seats and the Muslim Congress got 1 seat.

In the North Western Province the UNP won 25 seats while the P.A. captured 18 and the DUNF 9.

The Southern province elected 27 UNP Councillers against 22 by P.A. and 6 by the DUNF.

The Governor of the Western Province, former Chief Justice Sharvananda, had no hesitation in calling Chandrika B. Kumaratunga, the leader of the P.A. to form a Government with the DUNF.

However the Governors of the Southern and North Western provinces refused to recognise the combined opposition majority and appointed UNP Chief Ministers.

While the Opposition went to Courts, claiming the right to form Governments in these two provinces, the UNP started 'horse trading' to win over DUNF - and if possible even P.A. members of all these Councils in order not only to retain the power in the two provinces but also to oust the Chief Minister of the Western province Kumaratunga.

It was at this time that Anura Bandaranaike crossed over to the UNP and was sworn in as a minister.

In the meantime, the Supreme Court ruled against the Government for the decision on Southern and North Western Provincial Councils and ordered that P.A. & DUNF leaders to be sworn in as Chief Ministers.

The Government accepted the Court decision reluctantly but started plotting to somehow or other win back power in all three Councils.

Finally, with the help of Anura Bandaranaike the Government executed the lowest trick in the book by kidnapping a Anura loyalist P.A. member in the South and preventing the Provincial Council from passing the annual budget.

This undemocratic conspiracy by the Government boomeranged when fresh elections were called for the Southern Provincial Council.

Under the new charismatic leader Chandrika Kumaratunga, the P.A. launched the campaign in the South. President Wijetunga himself led the UNP campaign with Anura Bandaranaike, Gamini Dissanayake (who had re-joined the UNP) and more than one hundred M.Ps., including 65 Ministers.

But all the resources, disgustingly low propaganda and character assassination and the power of the UNP Regime, the power could not match the power of the people.

The P.A. defeated the UNP in 20 out of 21 electoral divisions in the Southern Province and came to power in the council with a comfortable majority. The UNP had met its Waterloo in Southern Sri Lanka and a new people's movement has taken firm roots under the dynamic leadership of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.



Hon. Prime Minister Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga addressing the media representatives at the first Press Conference.

CHANDRIKA BANDARANAIKE KUMARATUNGA: A REPRESENTATIVE OF MEANINGFUL AND POSITIVE CHANGE

WITH the assumption of the offices of the president of Sri Lanka by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on November 13, and that of the prime minister of the country by Srimavo Bandaranaike on November 14, 1994, the island's politics has achieved something unprecedented in the entire world. The duo of the mother and the daughter, both widows, seems determined to create a new and vibrant Sri Lanka, notwithstanding all doubts and suspicions that have started surfacing. Both of them have shown that patience and perseverance can overcome mountains. Needless to state, of the two, the daughter has played a much more serious role having far-reaching significance in the island's recent politics. In terms of service and sacrifice, the 49-year-old daughter has left the 78-year-old mother far far behind. Coincidentally, that is also reflected in the offices they hold under the present political scheme in the country.

The present chapter endeavours to analyse Chandrika's role in various walks of her own life as well as that of the country. It also tries to visualize the emerging political and economic scenarios under her leadership.

CHANDRIKA BANDARANAIKE KUMARATUNGA, who assumed the prime ministership of Sri Lanka on August 19, 1994, as a result of a mini ballot revolution of August 16, has attracted considerable interest not only among political analysts and social scientists but also among the people in the Indian sub-continent and elsewhere. Indeed, for a variety of reasons, she would continue to be the subject matter of interest both for political analysts and laypersons in the island state of Sri Lanka, in particular, and in the whole of the South Asian region, in general. Chandrika, who became the 11th Prime minister of the beautiful island, has, without doubt proved that politics is the art of the possible and the saleable.

What appeared well-nigh impossible, or at least, a very difficult proposition till the evening of August 18, 1994, not only became possible and acceptable on August 19, but indeed became something that came to be welcomed by a vast, enlightened, well-intentioned and politically-conscious segment of Sri Lankan society. Even Chandrika had not expected power coming to her so smoothly. It was not for nothing that as the star campaigner for the People's Alliance (PA), then


in Opposition, Chandrika had said on August 11 that the United National Party(UNP) government was contemplating the imposition of martial law if it lost the August 16 general elections. Indeed, she expressed her fear that the UNP government would not transfer power in such a situation. As a matter of fact, she had stated that she intended to go into hiding, notwithstanding the fact that she was tipped to be the Prime Minister in the event of the PA winning the polls.

Addressing a hurriedly convened Press conference on August 11, she had said there "is a serious threat that martial law will be declared and leading opposition leaders will be placed under house arrest". Significantly, Chandrika had stopped addressing public meetings on August 9 after death threats that she blamed on allies of the then ruling UNP. Moreover, under the existing Sri Lankan Constitution, the winning party can form a government only after the President invites it to do so.

Many cynics, even if sympathetic to the PA and its leader, might have awfully remembered the phenomenon of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's embracing a self-imposed exile in London in 1988, when she received death threats, while campaigning for the Left Front in the Provincial Council elections.

On the other hand, those watching the *modus operandi, modus vivendi* and the special knack of being in power on the part of the UNP leaders had thought that the UNP would not give in so easily and quickly. In fact, there were several stories surfacing as to how some top leaders of the UNP wanted to wean away the leadership of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress(SLMC) from the PA by offering the Party several significant spoils. There were reports that Gamini Dissanayake, who was later declared the Presidential candidate from the UNP for the November 1994 Poll, and who as an influential UNP leader and close ally of the then president, J.R.Jayewardene, was instrumental in getting the Rajiv Jayewardene Accord of July 29, 1987, signed, wanted to form a minority government with the support of the SLMC.

In the end, however, saner counsel prevailed among the leaders of the UNP—because of the righteous and detached attitude of President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe— and they opted for a peaceful, smooth and constitutional transfer of political power to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party(SLFP) -led PA. It is altogether a different matter that President Wijetunga chose to retain some important portfolios, including Defence and Buddha Sasana—which he is entitled to under the well-nigh Gaullist Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978. By not addressing the first session of the newly elected Parliament, he merely indicated that it was not possible for a UNP President to talk about the policies of a PA Government. In fact, many political observers had apprehended political clashes between the two from the outset, thanks to the constitutional provisions.



New Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Mrs. Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga addressing the Parliament for the
first time after her appointment as Prime Minister.

Significantly, Prime Minister Kumaratunga on August 22, 1994— only 3 days after being sworn in —fired the first salvo against President Wijetunga blaming him for hardships caused by the people because of continuation of curfew in the island. “Emergency and curfew are entirely in the hands of the President”, the Prime Minister pointed out and added that she had written to the latter asking him to withdraw the curfew which was imposed throughout the island immediately after the polling ended on August 16 and had continued with relaxation thereafter.

It is also worth mentioning in the context of the President-Prime Minister relationship that the former refused to sign an ordinance for the establishment of a commission to inquire into bribery charges against high ups in Sri Lankan politics and administration. As a matter of fact, the PA had promised to take this step in its election manifesto, and had tried to act rather quickly after the formation of its government.

Few days after Chandrika assumed Premiership, Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had stated, albeit in a different context, that if India was able to have a lady Prime Minister most of the problems between India and Pakistan would be solved. Though it has not happened in India after Benazir Bhutto’s statement, the lady President in Sri Lanka is, indeed, making every endeavour to solve problems in her country. It is becoming obvious after the passage of every day that Sri Lanka is moving in the direction of solving some of her insuperable problems. In any case, Chandrika represents a change in the socio-politico- economic structure of Sri Lanka: a tangible change, a meaningful change, a positive change and, therefore a change to be aided, abetted and welcomed.

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has several firsts to her credit. She became the first Prime Minister on the globe whose both parents were Prime Ministers at two points of time— both having distinguished themselves in ways more than one. Her father, Solomon West Ridgeway Dias (SWRD) Bandaranaike, the founder of the SLFP in 1951, was the Prime Minister of the country between 1956 and 1959. Her mother, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike, popularly known as “Mrs B.” was the Prime Minister of the island between July 1960 and March 1965 and again between May 1970 and July 1977. She became the country’s prime minister for the third time in 1994.

Besides, she became the first Prime Minister in the whole South Asian region to have been educated at the University of Paris, France. Other foreign educated Prime Ministers in South Asia had their education at places like Oxford and Cambridge. It is no coincidence that she picked up the lessons on socialism very early and is at times called by her political detractors a “Champagne Socialist”.

Moreover, she became the first Prime Minister in this region to have risen from the office of the Chief Minister of a province. She had performed remarkably

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Moreover, she became the first Prime Minister in this region to have risen from the office of the Chief Minister of a province. She had performed remarkably

well as the Chief Minister of the Western Province. Western Province occupies a significant place in Sri Lanka's history inasmuch as it is the most populated province in the island and contains, inter alia, the capital city of Colombo. Not less importantly, Chandrika had captured power in that province by campaigning personally with full vigour and vitality. Palpably, she showed her vote-gathering and heart-winning capacity during that campaign. Quite significantly, Chandrika was the first woman Chief Minister of any Sri Lankan Province.

On the other hand, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was the first Prime Minister in the island Republic, who was widowed because of her late husband's, Vijaya Kumaratunga, a noted matinee idol, belief that the urges and aspirations of the Tamils should be accommodated by the state structure in Sri Lanka. Her father was killed by a Buddhist monk for other reasons. In any case, her father's "Sinhala Only" policy is, in a way, at the root of the great Sinhalese-Tamil divide, which has continued since then with more and more devastating tendencies.

Childhood and education

It is now time to analyse the family and educational circumstances of the new President of Sri Lanka.

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga is the second issue as also the second daughter of SWRD Bandaranaike and Srimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike. She is the younger sister of Sunetra, who has mostly kept away from country's politics. Time was when Sunetra too was active in politics, thanks to her husband's involvement therein. Chandrika is elder to her brother, Anura Bandaranaike, now a leader of the UNP and the only son of the Bandaranaiques. Anura, a forceful speaker, contested for the post of the Speaker of Sri Lankan Parliament on behalf of the UNP, but lost to the PA candidate, Kiri Banda Ratnayake.

Anura had moved away to the UNP from the SLFP, when it became crystal clear that Mrs. B. preferred Chandrika and not Anura to succeed her as the SLFP leader. The UNP rewarded him with ministership.

Chandrika was born on June 29, 1945 in Colombo. At that point of time, her father was a Minister under the Donoughmore Constitution. As children, Chandrika and her elder sister, Sunetra and younger brother Anura certainly did not live the simple life advocated by their father for the people. The sisters attended the elite St. Bridget's Convent in Colombo and lived in their palatial ancestral home in the posh area of Colombo.

It palpably proves that the new Sri Lankan President had a comfortable childhood. She was fortunate enough not to have a disturbed childhood like Indira Gandhi, whose parents were fighting the British in the National Movement

launched by the Indian National Congress. In Sri Lanka, political parties did not have to fight for freedom, it being a British gift to the islanders. It is because of this that it is often said that nationalism in Sri Lanka was a post-independence rather than a pre-independence phenomenon.

One observer of the Sri Lankan political scene has also gone to the extent of stating that the transfer of power from the British to the natives was a "tea-party transaction".

Subsequently, Chandrika majored in Political Science at the University of Paris, while Anura went to Oxford. She also read for a Ph. D. in Development Economics at the University of Paris.

Chandrika's academic background, without doubt, makes her an unusual politician. She is not only highly educated but a practising academic as well. While her educational qualifications include a degree in Political Science from the University of Paris, as we saw, she is fluent in three languages: native Sinhala, English, and French. Besides, she can understand three other languages: Russian, German and Hindi. Her published papers include: "Cooperative Movement In Sri Lanka", "Land and Agrarian Reforms in Sri Lanka", "Food Policies and Strategies in Sri Lanka from 1984" and "The State and Social Structures in Sri Lanka". These papers are quite valuable in the understanding of the various facets of Sri Lankan life. Significantly, a research paper entitled "Political Violence in Sri Lanka" is under preparation.

Chandrika is rightly credited with learning her fundamentals under Charles Bettelheim, a noted Marxist scholar at Sorbonne.

It is, indeed, a great coincidence that having educated in an university under the French political system, she had to show her political skill as a political actor under a political system modelled on that pattern. And, it is a paradox that now she is charged with the duty of dismantling that system by trying to reach its apex. In the academic field, Chandrika is credited with being a guest lecturer at the Centre of South and South East Asian Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal nehru University, New Delhi. Chandrika still feels proud of having personal friend at the Centre and the School. Many at the School and the Centre also feel proud of having been privileged to have interacted with Chandrika. They found her quite suave, analytical and articulate. One hopes she would not only maintain relations with the Institutions where she lectured once as a guest but would also enlarge her horizon and try to interact with students and intellectuals in other parts of our country, who are no less enamoured of her.

There is no denying the fact that the intellectual exercises that Chandrika had undergone over the years would stand her in good stead. In fact, she needs such

a weapon in the present-day Sri Lanka. A Sri Lankan newspaper had rightly written at the time of her becoming Prime Minister:

“There is no doubt that Prime Minister Kumaratunga is entirely equipped for her work. The intellectual baggage she carries is formidable. In a political world where debate is either an exchange of platitudinous inanities or vulgar abuse she stands heads and shoulders over the pygmies. She is above the din of the political market place but now her challenge as Prime Minister would be to get down into dust and game of the arena and come to grips with the real problems both of statecraft as well as day-to-day administration which have so far only been distant textbook theories”.

It would not be out of place to point out that because of education and interactions with intellectuals of all hues, Chandrika has come to possess so many virtues, which might be described as her assets. Such virtues and assets are badly needed for a President in the island. An Indian journalist, having watched Sri Lankan politics quite closely and having been privileged to meet Mrs Kumaratunga after her assumption of the premiership wrote the following:

“Mrs Kumaratunga’s greatest assets are her transparent sincerity, disarming frankness, ability to articulate her views in a convincing manner, lack of airs, innate confidence in herself and natural charm. She handles journalists’ tricky questions with patience. She smiles her way out of trouble, does some quick thinking and comes with one-liners that are a reporter’s delight. Her credentials are impeccable and qualities endearing. Surely, a leader endowed with such qualities should go a long way”.

Political Training

It is now time to analyse Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandranaike’s political training. Needless to say, politics comes to the offsprings of politicians and it is for them to treat it the way they wish and want. Chandrika’s case, in any case, was unique.

At the time of her birth, her father had already completed six years of his ministership in the pre-independence Sri Lanka under the Donoughmore Constitution. His was a charismatic personality and was privileged to have been educated at Oxford. Born a Christian, he was converted to Buddhism. When political parties were not able to play any significant role in the island’s politics, SWRD Bandranaike had formed an organisation called the Sinhala Maha Sabha (the Great Council of the Sinhalese) in 1937. This step was seen as giving birth to Sinhalese nationalism before Independence, and the Tamils with their growing political consciousness had responded by forming the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1944.

Nevertheless, what is of important is that her father had formed a political party at the age of 38 and had become a Minister at the age of 37 — something not quite common among the politicians of South Asia at that point of time. It is worthwhile to recall here that Jawaharlal Nehru, a prominent leader of India's Nationalist Movement as also a former President of the Indian National Congress, came to occupy ministerial status at the age of 47. On the other hand, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, known as the Father of Pakistan, became the head of the new state at the age of 71. It is worth mentioning that Jinnah had played an active part first in the politics of the Indian National Congress and subsequently, in that of the Muslim League. Liaquat Ali Khan, first Pakistan Prime Minister had been able to achieve ministerial status in India only at the age of 51 and that of the prime minister at the age of 52. In the latter phase, too Indira Gandhi, with her political background, could assume ministerial status only at the age of 47 and became Prime Minister only at the age of 49. By a queer coincidence, Indira Gandhi assumed the premiership with the same marital status and at the same age as that of Chandrika.

Needless to say, Chandrika's father was streets ahead of these politicians in terms of achieving political office. But it should also not be forgotten that assumption of political offices came much more quickly and easily to Sri Lankans than Indians and Pakistanis. Focusing on Chandrika, one could say that she could see her father occupying a political office at a relatively young age. Paradoxically, she also lost her father at a very early age in life—she was only 14 then. Indira Gandhi lost her father at the age of 47. Rajiv Gandhi lost his mother at the age of 40. Benazir Bhutto saw her father being executed at the age of 26. Thus Chandrika became fatherless at much earlier age in comparison with other South Asian politicians.

On the other hand, Chandrika saw her mother, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike (born 1916) widowed at the age of 43. By a curious coincidence Chandrika was also widowed at the age of 43, when some Sinhalese chauvinists did her popular Sinhala actor-turned politician husband, Vijaya Kumaratunga, in. Unlike her father, Vijaya was assassinated at a very young age.

It was against this background that Chandrika was receiving her political training and seeing how strangely and yet naturally deaths were coming in her family. Nevertheless, these queer coincidences were playing their parts in making the new Prime Minister and subsequently the President of Sri Lanka brave and daring. On the death of General Zia-ul-huq in a plane crash, Benazir Bhutto, then a leader in the Opposition, had said that life and death are in the hands of God. Chandrika, too, has by now realized and stated several times that death can come to anybody at any time. Braved, she had said several times that death does not scare her.

While in her parents' party, the SLFP, Chandrika had tried her level best to strengthen it by contributing her best thereto. Her husband, Vijaya, had also been trying to put in his best for the strength of the SLFP. Vijaya Kumaratunga contested the election of 1977 on the ticket of the SLFP but lost. With the passage of time, it became obvious that Anura, who was stronger politically at that point of time, did not like the ideology of his brother-in-law and his sister. The two were moving towards the left and wanted the SLFP to become a broadly left party. When the Kumaratungas—Vijaya and Chandrika—were convinced that the SLFP could not be converted into a broad left organisation because of the insistence of Anura Bandaranaike, they decided to quit the party. To make the matters worse for Chandrika and her husband, there was no love lost between Vijaya and Anura. Anura did not like Vijaya, inter alia, because of his socio-economic background. This became all the more evident later when Anura did not even attend Vijaya's funeral. The estranged relationship between the brother and sister finally led to the parting of ways.

The Kumaratungas decided to form their own party in 1984: the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP). They tried their level best to make the new party broadly left. Chandrika's political acculturation in France stood her in good stead. Vijaya had been quite popular among the young and progressive Sinhalese masses. Not being content only with a broad left platform, the couple also viewed the problem of national integration with all seriousness. Vijaya was of the opinion that some of the urges and aspirations of the Tamils were genuine and the state structure had to show its broadness to incorporate such urges and aspirations. Believing genuinely in the cause of the Tamils, Vijaya went to meet the Tamil Tigers in Jaffna - a fact of which Chandrika is immensely proud even today. Indeed, she herself went to Madras to meet various leaders of Tamil Tigers. It was against this background that Vijaya Kumaratunga was assassinated by Sinhalese chauvinists on February 16, 1988.

Chandrika, it is true, was widowed at a relatively young age of 43 only after 10 married years, but in the preceding years her political training was quite efficient. She was able to meet various segments of Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka and was able to have a broader perspective of the political scenario. She also learnt that meaningful political demands its own cost: she had to pay price by losing her husband.

After her husband's assassination, Chandrika encountered more difficulties in the SLMP. In fact, the JVP had sent a loud and clear message to Chandrika: Quit the scene. Chandrika responded by moving to London and commencing research at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies - this being another phase of political - intellectual training of an honest and efficient politician in the island. It is also significant to mention here that Chandrika's political party did not perform well in the Provincial Council polls of 1988: death threats circumscribed

her political activities at that point of time.

While Chandrika was receiving her political training in London, President Ranasinghe Premadasa was leaving no stone unturned in annihilating the Janata Vimukti Perammuna (JVP) insurgents. Even if unwittingly, Premadasa's success facilitated the return of Chandrika to the island. This time she returned with a fresh political agenda based on the new training. She established her own party, the Bahujana Nidahas Pakshaya (BNP). Unfortunately, it never really took off. Nevertheless, through this new organization she could analyse the Sri Lankan political scenario afresh.

While Chandrika's new adventure, the BNP, was not picking up, Srimavo was facing a bigger challenge in her own SLEP - from none else but her own son, Anura. She was having trouble taming her ambitious son. She turned to Chandrika for help. Chandrika, too, realised that the SLFP base was hers for taking. Mother and daughter patched up and Srimavo began to promote and abate Chandrika against Anura. A significantly new phase had begun in the SLFP's politics, which had to have serious impact subsequently.

While receiving all kinds of political trainings at all kinds of places, Chandrika was also wittingly or unwittingly incorporating the virtues of her father, mother and husband, a fact of no mean significance. Of course she imbibed socialism in Paris that most resplendent of European cities famous for its cuisine and fashions - both sartorial and political. In the Left Bank cafes of Paris, existentialists engaged in debate with Marxists while Chandrika rubbed shoulders with Nihilists. Indeed, those were stirring times.

It will be relevant to mention that Chandrika came to love ideas as a result of her father. On the other hand, her initiation into political action came through her mother. Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike had sometimes been described as the only man in her Cabinet and not flippantly either and this was no mean tribute when her Cabinet comprised giants such as Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Dr N.M. Perera, Dr Colvin R. de Silva, Pieter Keuneman, T.B. Ilangaratne, Maithripala Senanayake and T.B. Subasinghe. Mrs B. was not one to flinch in the face of challenges. She had in her time faced up to American pressures over the nationalization of oil companies, pressures from the Catholic Church over the take-over of the schools, the incipient rebellion in the North in the Sixties when the Federal Party printed its own postage stamp, and most importantly, the *coup d'etat* by top military officers against her first government. Chandrika sounds like Srimavo when she speaks and her training thus far makes one feel that she would prove to be firm and decisive when the circumstances so warrant. In any case, she has proved her mettle on this front so far.

Her inheritance from her husband, Vijaya Kumaratunga, was by no

means less significant. She inherited from him a simple humanism, a love for the common man, which Vijaya epitomized in his film roles. Vijaya an archetypal hero, of the good-hearted and well-intentioned man of the people, and the people loved him immensely for that. In return, Vijaya loved the common man with no less abundance of affection. With no intellectual pretensions, he was the perfect foil for Chandrika. Indeed he knew from the bottom of his heart what was right and what was wrong. His loss and sacrifice in politics, particularly because of his conviction of the righteousness of the Tamil cause, were tremendous. And finally, he was killed almost in front of her eyes on his own doorstep where a statue now stands in his memory.

The impact of the *modus operandi* and *modus vivendi* of these three personalities on the personality of the new Sri Lankan President is bound to last. What should not, however, be forgotten is the fact that notwithstanding the impact of their personalities, Chandrika has got a personality of her own. The safest thing to say about her probably would be: Chandrika is like Chandrika herself. She has the determination of her own, which always stands her in good stead. During the campaigning of August 16, 1994 polls, she never tried to project herself either as the widow of a charismatic film actor or as the daughter of two efficient politicians on the Sri Lankan scene. She always tried to prove, and with a great deal of success, that she was Chandrika: not more and not less. The same *modus operandi* saw her through in the November 1994 presidential poll.

Political Offices

It is now time and place to enumerate political offices held by Chandrika Kumaratunga. Talking to an Indian journalist after assuming premiership, Chandrika said:

“Unlike Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir, I have had some experience. I have served in top administrative jobs for five years as a government official. I have administered various other institutions as their chairman. I’ve run our party newspaper *Dinakara* for eight years, during which it created a record as the only political newspaper in the country which has made a profit. During the past year and a half, I’ve had some experience as Chief Minister of the Western Province. It was tightrope-walking. I walked on the tight rope without falling. I’m very confident that I can run this country. Experience is not everything. We have talented people, who are experienced politicians and are honest. There are lots of people in various fields of activity I want to bring into important positions. I’m very confident that we’ll have a good government in place in a short time”.

By stating that experience was not everything, Chandrika has rather hinted how people with wrong experiences, and making other’s life miserable by

boasting about them. Nevertheless, she had good experience of holding political offices and everywhere she proved her mettle. Chandrika was the Additional Principal Director of the Land Reform Commission between 1972 and 1976. By occupying that post at the age of mere 25, even if bequeathed by her own mother, she proved her capability. In the event, the Commission gave a good account of itself. It was during her stewardship of that commission that formulas were worked out as to how could landless peasants get some land. There were state lands that were not economical to the state, and those were given to landless peasants.

Apart from giving a good account of herself as the Additional Principal Director, Land Reform Commission, Chandrika held the leadership of two political parties in succession: the SLMP and the BNP. She came to occupy the leadership of the SLMP after the assassination of her husband Vijaya in 1988. Besides, she had remained the leader of the BNP since its inception. However, neither of these parties could make any mark in Sri Lankan politics. The political environment in the island was not congenial to the existence of such parties. Whereas the JVP was fighting the then government tooth and nail, the Premadasa administration was giving every indication of growing authoritarian in the midst of the ideologically and politically pluralistic island. Nevertheless, by holding the posts in these parties, Chandrika could understand the nitty-gritty of the island's politics much better, feeling eventually the necessity of going back to the SLFP.

The most important political post Chandrika had held before assuming premiership of the island was the Chief Minister of the Western Province. As Western Province contains capital Colombo and as it is the most populated province in the island, she could claim much better political experience than others. Indeed, Chandrika became the first woman Chief Minister in the history of Sri Lanka. She gave a good account of herself as the Chief Minister of the Province from May 1993 till the time she became the island's Prime Minister in August 1994. In her capacity as the Chief Minister of the Western Province she succeeded in bringing to light the mass graves of those who were supposed to have been annihilated during the administration of President Ranasinghe Premadasa. She also brought to light various charges of corruption against political high ups.

By editing a political journal, Chandrika held a responsible post in the party. Generally, political parties' mouthpieces start with the assumption that a significant chunk of parties' funds are to be spent on them. The parties' journals, thus, become a forum for propaganda. By making profit out of the journal, Chandrika showed that serious people subscribed to it and they did not mind buying it. Writing seriously also leads to clarity of thought. One can say with some amount of certainty that the editing of the journal, inter alia, has contributed to the clarity of her thought and articulation.

Needless to stress, by holding various important posts in the country's and

party's politics, Chandrika developed her political maturity and skill. Holding of such posts and responsibilities have obviously stood her in good stead. George Bernard Shaw once wrote about experience: "If we could learn from mere experience, the stones of London would be wiser than its wisest men". And Chandrika has rightly said, as we saw, experience "is not everything". She has always tried to match her experience with her knowledge and wisdom. The combination of the three has stood her in good stead. It is bound to stand her in good stead in future, too.

Exhibiting Political Skill

We will now do well to analyse Chandrika's political skill which has emerged again and again in the recent and in the remote past. In the recent past, Chandrika has shown her politically consummate skill on occasions more than one.

After Anura moved out of the SLFP to become a minister in the UNP Cabinet led by President D.B. Wijetunga, Chandrika got greater opportunities to show her consummate political skill. The first test came soon. She campaigned extensively for the PA in the southern and other provinces. By exposing the weaknesses of and corrupt practices under the UNP administration, Chandrika showed her skill in imparting political education to the voters of various provinces. In the modern world, a political party is expected to be an agency of interest articulation and interest aggregation within a political system. Quite aware of this responsibility, generally because of the understanding of things on the domestic front and particularly because of interactions with all houses of intellectuals abroad, Chandrika performed her task quite skilfully and endeared herself to the voters. The young and energetic voters—seventy percent of Sri Lanka's population is under 35 years of age—saw in Chandrika a viable alternative. They saw in her an alternative that could bring meaningful and positive changes in the island state. This, without doubt, led to an overwhelming victory for the PA in the Western Province, where she successfully trounced the UNP. The Sinhalese chauvinists have often raised their ugly heads in the south. By manipulating—of course in the positive sense—the voters of the South, Chandrika shocked politicians of all hues. Her political legitimacy increased tremendously: her political credibility stood unquestioned. Indeed, it was the defeat of the UNP in the South in March 1994 that led to the advancement of the Parliamentary poll by the incumbent government of the UNP. The UNP did not want to delay the electoral process lest its credibility and legitimacy were further eroded.

The announcement of the Parliamentary poll provided another opportunity to Chandrika to show her political skill. Apart from the drubbing that the UNP received in the South, the failing health of the SLFP supremo, Sirimavo Ratwatte

Dias Bandaranaike, was another factor impelling the UNP government to seek fresh mandate. Over the years - during the 17 years of its unprecedented rule — the UNP had built up a very strong vote catching machinery based on a great deal of fraud and muscle power. Once it captured 4/5th of seats in 1977, it got politically intoxicated and thought it could never be unseated. The legitimacy of the 1982 referendum, 1988 Presidential and 1989 parliamentary polls was questioned by several analysts and political actors, but the UNP thought electoral success alone mattered and; all else were false. It was under these circumstances that the UNP had thought that it could once again show its muscle and fraudulent skill at the hustings. But things boomeranged on the UNP this time.

Between 1956 and 1977, Sri Lankan voters had always changed the government through the ballot box. The rule of one party for 17 long years was something incongruous in Sri Lankan politics. A large number of voters this time were such who did not remember anything good of the UNP. There were a large number of voters, on the other hand, who were born just before the 1977 polls and did not have any idea of the SLFP rule. Both kinds of voters were determined to effect a change. They saw in Chandrika a determined leader. And Chandrika was quick to prove her political mettle and to show her political skill.

She was quick in getting the manifesto of the PA - an alliance of some political parties - drafted. By a curious coincidence she had been privileged to have the services of the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Colombo who resigned after the dissolution of Parliament to join the SLEP. Some observers point out that she got the manifesto drafted while her mother was in Singapore in connection with her medical treatment. She hastened the process, according to observers, so that she could tell the voters exactly what she wanted. Her political skill stood her in good stead. The manifesto of the PA makes good and balanced reading. It promises the things the young voters had wanted and dreamt of.

Chandrika's political skill was palpably visible in her speeches during the electioneering. While she proved that not only organizational ability but also oratory was her forte, she left none in doubt that she was not willing to have any sympathy, which comes rather easily to the politicians of the Third World—especially to ladies. Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, Khaleda Zia, who assumed political power at different points in South Asia, and Sheikh Hasina Wajed, who may get to political power one day, all initially thrived on the sympathy waves existing in their favour.

Chandrika's case was quite different. Her record as the Chief Minister of the most important province was transparent enough proving her political skill. Obviously, she did not have to beg votes in the name of sympathy. Being the Chief Minister of the Western province, she was able to have the first-hand information of the capital's politics. The capital, Colombo, as we saw, is part of the Western

province. On this front, too, her political skill was fully exhibited.

Chandrika showed her political skill on yet another front during the electioneering. She knew people were eager to listen to her. She knew the people would not mind waiting for her for quite some time in the process increasing the interest. She would, therefore, reach most of the meetings late, in the process getting the prefix "Late" added to her name. In any case, Sri Lankan society is fond of humour and satire. She took full advantage of being late for most of the meetings, and did not become "the Late". Therein lies the crux, her political skill coming into sharp focus once again.

Besides, Chandrika showed her political skill in no uncertain terms by preempting any hanky-panky about the power-transfer that the UNP ruling elite might have contemplated. As electioneering progressed, it became very clear that the PA, under the leadership of Chandrika Bandrananaike Kumaratunga, would emerge victorious. But thanks to the complicated electoral process based on the principle of proportional representation, a system introduced by UNP leader J.R. Jayewardene to ensure that no party won overwhelmingly, it was becoming quite clear that the PA would not be able to sweep overwhelmingly. This situation would have given an opportunity to the manipulative leadership of the UNP to indulge in horse-trading to form a government of its own. Constitutional provisions, too, do not make it mandatory upon the President to accept the leader of the single largest party or group as Prime Minister. It was under these circumstances that Chandrika thought it was time to attract national and international media and public opinion's attention. She said she feared the imposition of the martial law in the island state in the event of the UNP losing its power in the hustings. This preemptive measure, without doubt, had its impact. Not only did the President desist from playing any mischief, Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe also decided to honour the people's verdict by quitting gracefully. In the event, UNP leader Gamini Dissanayake, exposed himself. But power still eluded him. Chandrika's political skill was proved once again.

Chandrika, like her mother Sirimavo, has the political skill and ability to see straight into any problem. Like her mother, Chandrika has an uncanny ability to define her agenda and stick to it. They do not believe in quick compromise in order to stay on in the club. Chandrika has the unique skill of imposing her own agenda rather than have it dictated to her. Chandrika once said: "I don't run away from challenges". Similarly, her mother also did not run away from challenges. Srimavo not only took over the leadership of the SLFP on her husband's death, but entered the political fray to become the country's and the world's first woman prime minister. A few years ago, Sirimavo Bandaranaike was asked by an interviewer whether Chandrika would take over from her some day. Sirimavo replied: "I hope she does. She is a hard-working girl".

In sum, then, Chandrika has always been rising to the occasion. She has almost always exhibited her political skill with success. She has taken risks. She left the SLFP to form the SLMP. She left the SLMP to form the BNP. And she did rejoin the SLFP without any problem or hesitation. All these virtues and assets stood her in good stead. She, thus, became the first politician not only in the South Asian region but perhaps in the entire world to have made her way from the Chief Ministership of a province to the Prime Ministership of the country. Finally, she reached the highest and the strongest office in the island.

A loving and caring mother and daughter

If Chandrika has achieved so much success in her province's, country's and party's politics, she has not for a moment forgotten her role as a mother. She knows full well that destiny has entrusted her with the special responsibility of looking after her two children—daughter Yasodara (14) and son Vimukti (12)—as well as she can. A commentator has written rightly about her commitment to her two children: "...She is so committed to her 14-year-old daughter and 12-year-old son that she can cancel official appointments or be endlessly late if they need her attention or fall sick".

Another commentator on the current Sri Lankan scene wrote about Chandrika's role as a mother:

"Widowed after 10 years of marriage and mother of Yasodhara (14 years) and Vimukti (12 years), Chandrika had struck a fine balance between being a single parent and a leading politician. She cancelled a luncheon meeting with the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Sri Lanka one day during the campaign because she had to take her daughter suddenly to hospital".

Chandrika has consistently shown her concern about the safety and future of her children. She took them to England in 1988 during her self-imposed exile after the assassination of her husband. The two offsprings of Vijaya and Chandrika were educated there and had a new exposure. Her new role might give her less time to look after her children, but those who know about her anxiety for her children and her determination to do anything she wants have little doubt that she would play her role as mother as well as that of the President.

If she has bothered so much about her children thus far, she has not forgotten her role as the daughter of her aged and widowed mother. Political power as the Chief Minister of a province and subsequently as the Prime minister of the island had not intoxicated her. She remembered the importance of a mother in Sri Lankan society and immediately after being sworn in as the 11th Prime Minister, she rushed to her mother to pay her respects in the true Buddhist traditions. Tears came out from Mrs. Bandaranaike's eyes. A truly emotional scene worthy of being

treasured was seen created. Mrs. Bandaranaike was sworn in as a Minister without Portfolio after this emotional scene. Mrs. B. Became the island's prime minister on November 14, 1994.

Chandrika's performance

In most of the Third World states today, politics is generally based on rhetorics and convenience on the powers that be rather than on performance and conviction. Forgetting the contents of manifestos quite conveniently and then trying to be as indecisive as possible while performing is the rule rather than the exception. One Deputy Prime Minister in India once said manifestos are "made and not read". The very assumption leaves much to be desired if politics was to be made meaningful. Even in the case of Sri Lanka so many hopes were aroused by UNP, in general, and President D.B. Wijetunga, in particular, to make the island's politics more meaningful and accommodative, even by changing the system of the executive Presidency. In the event, all such things came to a naught.

Truth to tell, the scheme of political decentralization and devolution that was effected after the Rajiv Gandhi-J.R. Jayewardene accord on July 29, 1987, through the 13th constitutional amendment, itself does not give sufficient power to a Provincial Chief Minister.

A Vartharajaperumal, who as the leader of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) had become the Chief Minister of the North-Eastern Provincial Council in 1988, had said in an interview that a province was no better than a municipality in India.

But Chandrika has shown her genuine concern for the needed devolution and decentralization of political and economic powers in the island by arranging talks with the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam and promising continuance of talks with them, notwithstanding the widespread suspicions about the LTTE's involvement in Gamini Dissanayake's assassination in October 1994.

Indeed, Chandrika deserves encomiums for relaxing or removing altogether various restrictions hindering the normal life in the Jaffna peninsula. Truth to tell, the Jaffna populace felt overjoyous and tremendously obliged to Chandrika when the delegation of the Government of Sri Lanka reached there against the background of goodwill created by the Chandrika administration.

By being consistent about her promise of dismantling the executive, Gaullist and Bonapartist presidency of Sri Lanka, and converting it into the Westminster form of parliamentary democracy, she has continued to enjoy tremendous legitimacy and credibility. Indeed, she succeeded in strengthening her legitimacy and credibility further by seeing that the PA performed much better than

the UNP in comparison to the August parliamentary polls, notwithstanding the apparent sympathy wave in favour of Srma Dissanayake, the UNP candidate.

In the sphere of foreign affairs, too, Chandrika, has so far given a good account of herself. She has accepted India's importance in the region as also in the principle of regional cooperation. Needless to state, she has to walk a tightrope on this front lest she meets the fate of Premadasa or Dissanayake, or for that matter that of her own father or husband.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN TRAIL

The election campaign this time was short, intensive and full of innovative features. To the traditional election meetings were added wayside (pocket) meetings and group discussions. The poster campaign, prohibited under the election law, took new turns. Then there were motor cars, musical shows and press conferences.

The campaign started on July 16 with the Peoples' Alliance(PA), the contender for power, holding its inaugural public meeting at Attanagalle, the birth place of former Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the founder of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Attanagalle is the seat of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, widow of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, represented, since 1965. The PA candidate assembled in the morning at the Bandaranaike Samadhi at Horogolla and took a pledge to serve the country, people and the party. They also took a pledge to eschew violence, observe moral values and obtain from taking liquor.

In the evening, they held a public meeting at Attanagalle. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who had been selected to lead the PA election campaign, was the star speaker. She promised a new society, free of corruption and thuggery, promised to tone down the hardships caused by the economy to the poorer sections of the population and vowed to end the north-east war by finding out a political solution.

The United National Party (UNP) held its inaugural rally in Kandy two days later. The candidates paid homage to the Sacred Tooth Relic at Dalada Maligawa in the morning and held a public rally in the evening. President D. B. Wijetunga, the head of the UNP, appealed at that meeting to the 10.9 million voters in the country to give him mandate to continue his good work for another 6-year term. "Judge on our performance" was the theme of his speech.

UNP's campaign was spearheaded by a team of seasoned parliamentarians headed by President Wijetunga. The President addressed two meetings a day and he visited 21 of the 22 electoral districts. He did not visit Jaffna. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe addressed more meetings and he also covered the entire country except Jaffna. Anura Bandaranaike, who joined President Wijetunga's cabinet last year also ran a separate countrywide campaign. Mahaweli Minister Gamini Dissanayake spearheaded the campaign in the Central Hills, Tourism Minister S. Thondaman in the area where plantation Tamil workers lived in

appreciable numbers and Ports and Shipping Minister Ronnie de Mel in the South.

The PA campaign was mainly led by Chandrika Kumaratunga. She addressed 8-10 meetings a day and she attracted huge crowds. The PA also held smaller meetings where local leaders played an important role.

The UNP and the PA held numerous wayside and whistle-stop meetings. They sent amplifier-fitted vehicles to small hamlets which announced the meetings. When people gathered candidates and some people local level leaders addressed them. UNP and PA campaign organisers said those meetings were very effective in that they were able to explain their policies and programs and refute the charges levelled by others. Some of their meetings were turned into dialogues and discussions.

The PA speakers too used the conversational method. SLFP General Secretary Dharmasiri Senanayake excelled in that act. At a meeting at Kegalle he asked the employed hands. When several put up their hands he told them: "When we come to power we will give all of you financial assistance. But that financial assistance will be linked up with work and production".

As effective as these wayside meetings and discussions was the poster campaigns. The intention of the law was to make the campaign clean and less costly. Though the police took action to remove the posters from public places and the parapet walls of private compounds, they were not successful. Posters were being pasted in such numbers that they found that they just had no manpower to remove them.

The posters were all of high quality, thanks to the off-set press. In Colombo, Prime Minister Wickremasinghe, PA's Deputy Leader Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, PA candidate C. V. Gooneratne, UNP's Anura Bastian, PA's Kingsly Wickremaratne, MEP's Dinesh Gunawardene and Ceylon Workers' Congress candidate P. Devaraj and S. Yogarajan used the posters effectively. During the last week of the campaign the pictures of President Wijetunga's and Minister Thondaman's posters came up in plenty.

Colourful motorcades were conducted by UNP candidate Gamini Dissanayake, PA candidate Fowzie and CWC candidates Devaraj and Yogarajan.


The radio and television broadcasts arranged by the Election Commissioner and the television debates telecast by the private television company TNL attracted public attention. The Election Commissioner has been arranging political broadcasts in the radio and TV since 1982 Presidential elections. Under this scheme, all the contesting political parties and independent groups are allotted time slots in the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation and Rupavahini to explain

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- සුළුතරයක් හැටියට සිංහලයින් ජීවත්විය යුතුයි - වාසුදේව
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- සුද්ධය කෙළවර කරන එකම මග එව්වරුන් - වාසුදේව



මුස්ලිම් දෙමළ සමගිය

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- "බණ්ඩාරනායකගේ කාලයේ පටන් සෑම දේශපාලන නායකයෙක්ම දෙමළ සහ මුස්ලිම් නායකයන් මුළු කලා.
- "මුස්ලිම්වරු සහ දෙමළ අය ක්‍රියාවෙන් සහ සිතුවම්වලින් එක්වෙන්න ඔනේ. සිංහල අත්කවාදීන්ට දිය හැකි හෙත පහර දෙමළ මුස්ලිම් සමගියයි.
- "සිංහල අත්කවාදී කොටස්වලට දෙමළ මුස්ලිම් සමගිය දරා ගන්න බැරි වෙනවා. අපි හඳුනා ගන්න ඕනි කවුද අපේ යාපෝවෝ කවුද අපේ හතුරෝ කියලා. අපේ සහෝදරත්වය තුල ඇති මත බේද සටන් බවට පත් කර ගන්න හොඳ නැහැ. මිත්‍රත්වයක් ගොඩනගා අපේ අයිතිවාසිකම් දිනාගනිමු"

This full page advertisement in the Government owned "Silumina" on Sunday 14th August 1994 (two days before the election) allege that Chandrika (if elected) will divide the country into three parts: North for Tamils (Prabhakaran), east for Muslims (Ashroff) and the rest for her self, and the Sinhalese. The wordings are a lot of communal jargon and the punch line says "We shall not allow our motherland to be cut in to pieces." Thousands of our brave soldiers have sacrificed their lives to prevent the division of Sri Lanka

සිංහල, දෙමළ, මුස්ලිම්, බජරොග්, මැලේ, අප සියලු දෙනා අයිතිවන්නේ එකම මාතෘ භූමිය ලංකාවක් තුළ සතුටින් සමගියෙන් ඉන්නෙමු. අපේ අනාගත පැතුමද එයයි. මේ අපේ ජනමිත්‍ර භූමියයි. මේ අපේ මාතෘ භූමියයි. දිවි හිමියෙන් එය සුරකිමු.

රණ විරු ලේ පුදා දිවි පුදා සුරැකි ලංකාව බෙදන්නට ඉඩ නොදෙමු.



The election campaign, though intense, had shown the political maturity of the people of Sri Lanka. They have taught the ruling party that if it is to continue in power it will have to reform itself and work hard. They have taught the Opposition that if they are to effect a change they should prove that they are capable of providing an effective alternative.

THE ELECTION AND THE RESULT

The election for the Tenth Parliament was held from 7 A. M to 4 P. M on August 16. It was held in all the 22 electoral districts into which the country has been divided. Voting took place in the 8000 polling stations which were manned by government officials who were co-opted to the elections department to assist the conduct of the elections.

Sri Lanka's election laws have been tightened in recent times to ensure a free and fair elections. Voters are not permitted to use transports. Except the sick and the feeble others walk to the polling stations, mostly situated within walking distance. On August 16, voters queued up before 7 A.M. to cast their votes early. Elections Department provides each voter with a polling card which gives the information of the full name of the voter, his serial number, the address of the polling station where he or she should cast the vote and the house of polling. The voters normally carry the polling card to help identify them but it is not a mandatory requirement.

Election officials are all required to be dressed in white to avoid them wearing any party colour and each vote is paired with indelible ink over the nail of the left hand little finger to prevent them going again to impersonate. The voter is issued with the ballot paper where he or she marks first for the political party or independent group which he or she selects to cast the vote and then to the preference vote to three of the candidates contesting for the party or independent group for which he or she voted.

Sri Lanka's system of election is complex. It is the proportional representation system where the number of representatives to Parliament are allocated in proportion to the percentage of votes the parties and independent groups obtained. To make the election reflect the regional differences in the racial and religious composition of the population the districts have been chosen as the electoral units. Though Sri Lanka has 25 administrative units; the number of electoral districts have been reduced to 22. That was because in the northern province where there are 5 administrative districts, the number of electoral units have been reduced to 2. The administrative units of Jaffna and Kilinochchi have been combined and named Jaffna electoral district. That was because Kilinochchi has a very small population. Likewise sparsely populated administrative districts of Vavunary, Mannar and Mullaitivu have been combined into Vanni electoral

district. In the rest of the country administrative districts have been adopted as electoral districts.

Sri Lanka's Parliament has 225 seats of which 196 are filled through direct election. These members are elected through the election in the districts. The balance 29 seats are filled on the national performance of the parties, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained on the national scale.

In the electoral districts, the voters not only vote for the party or group they support but also for the candidates of the party whom the voter prefer. This gives the voters the right to choose the party as well as the members who showed represent that party or group. This they do by casting the preference votes. This causes the counting and determination of the results tedious and time consuming.

When polling concluded at 4 P.M, the presiding officers of the polling stations are required to seal the ballot box in the presence of the polling agents who are the appointees of each party and independent group. Then they are taken to the counting centre under armed guard. Polling agents are allowed to follow the vehicle carrying the ballot boxes from the polling stations while counting centres to ensure that no meddling takes place.

Counting is in three stages. First, the number of ballot paper in the boxes are checked with the number issued. Then the number of votes for each party or group is counted and declared. This gives the party position in each district and the number of representatives each party will get in each district. Then the preference vote is counted and the names of the representatives declared.

An Example:-

In the Colombo district the number of register votes were 1,235,959. Of them 958,568 voters cast their votes, a 77.56 percent turnout. The PA obtained 469,642 votes. Which was 50.94 percent of total polled. The UNP polled 385,100, which was 41.77 percent. The balance 8.29 percent was split among the other parties and groups. On the basis of this PA obtained 11 out of the 20 seats allocated to the Colombo district and the UNP 9. Then the PA preference votes list is considered and beginning with the highest top 11 in the list are declared elected.

At the election PA obtained a total of 3.89 million votes to UNP's 3.49 million votes. The percentage share of votes for PA was 48.94 while that of UNP was 44.04. None of the other 11 political parties which contested the election was able to gather even 2 percent of the votes. Sri Lanka Progressive Front(SLPF) which filed candidates for 19 electoral districts and got one representative polled only 90,078 votes and secured a votes share of 1.13. Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) which won 7 representatives contested 5 electoral districts and gathered

143,307 votes, being 1.8 percent. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) which contested 4 electoral districts and won five seats collected 13,246 votes, being 1.67 percent vote share. The Mahajana Elisath Peramuna (MEP) contested 12 electoral districts and polled 68,538 votes, a 0.86 percent share, and failed to get any representation.

The PA gathered more votes in 13 electoral districts and the UNP in only 4. The PA won in Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara, Matale, Galle, Hambantota, Kurunegala, Puttalam, Anuradhapura, Polobbaruwa, Moneragala and Ratnapura. The UNP won in Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Kegalle. The other 5 electoral districts and in the Eastern Province Trincomalle, Batticaloa and Digamadulla and the Northern Province Jaffna and Vanni. Here SLMC won 5 seats in the east and 2 seats in the north and obtained two seats in the national list.

The TULF won 4 seats in the east and obtained one in the national list. The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) contested on the UNP in the 4 hill districts. The CWC gathered 5 seats through election and 2 through national list.

The PA gathered 91 seats through election and 14 from the national list making a total of 105. The UNP won 81 through election and 13 from the national list making a total of 94. The PA has got the support of the SLMC with which it had entered into an electoral pact and that of P. Chandrasekaran, the leader of the Up-country People's Front, who won in the Nuwara Eliya district.

The trend was clear on Wednesday and that evening the PA submitted to President Wijetunga its claim to form the government. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had already conceded defeat and President asked PA deputy leader Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to be sworn in as Prime Minister on Friday morning, after the formal gazetting of the names of the new members was completed. On this occasion Chandrika said:

“Rev. Members of the clergy, fellow citizens of Sri Lanka, as we assumed duties today of the new government of the 10th Parliament of the Republic of Sri Lanka we wish to extend our gratitude to all those who placed their confidence and faith in our party the People's Alliance (PA). It is with humanity that we acknowledge the trust you have placed on us. We shall always remember that we are your servants and not your masters. We shall dedicate ourselves to build a truly democratic state in Sri Lanka, where every citizen could live without fear irrespective of his race, religion or political belief. We shall strive to build a land where we could all talk, work and live freely according to our political beliefs. We are also committed to build a stable, sustainable, and prosperous economy where the benefits would accrue not only to a handful of people but all sections

of the population. We shall also strive to end the terrible war that is raging in the Northern and Eastern parts of our country...

“We asked for a mandate from the people to end the war with political negotiations. We have received that mandate. We extend no a hand of friendship to the people of the north and east and we hope that their leaders would take it in the spirit that we have extended it. At this moment we would like to remind all those of you who voted for us that we have pledged to build a country where we could all live without fear of political violence of intimidation and victimisation...

“We know what many of our supporters have suffered in the past two decades due to political victimization loss of property, loss of life, loss of employment, humiliations and many such things. But we must break that vicious circle of violence and terror and we appeal to all of you especially our party supporters to refrain from any acts of violence. Let us start from now to build that new society we pledged to create, a society without violence where democratic ideals would prevail over the law of the jungle. We must remind you that we shall not hesitate to take action against anyone who indulges in acts of lawlessness, irrespective of political affiliations you have. We request the police to act impartially to prevent all acts of violence from people belonging to any party. We shall not punish police officers, who have acted fairly in performing their duties in this matter. At this moment we are aware of the great challenges that lie ahead for us. The tasks we know are difficult but we are confident that we have the ability, the courage and the dedication to face those challenges successfully...

“We have dreamt a dream for country - a difficult but beautiful dream. Let us together transform that dream into a reality. We invite all of you those who have voted for us and those who did not, to join with us to build that new nation for our children. We, on our part dedicate ourselves to serve every citizen of this country irrespective of their party affiliations to the best of our ability in the hope of bringing peace to our wounded nation, prosperity to a nation where the large part of the population is suffering from increasing poverty and oppression. Let us together build that nation and go forward without fear, in peace and unity. May the noble Triple Gem bless you and help you.”

ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE 'OPEN ECONOMY' SANS CONTROLS

As a result of the unplanned and haphazard manner the United National Party Government implemented its "Open Economy", the "debits" to the nation far exceeded the "credits".

These "debits" resulted in an irreparable damage to the social, cultural and traditional structure of the Sri Lankan Community.

- (i) In the field of tourism not only the unparalleled fame of Sri Lankan archaeology but even the charm of its mountains and beaches were pushed to insignificance by creating a "world record" in child Prostitution.

Some German and Scandinavian tour operators published advertisements in some magazines calling the attention of "Sex Tourist" openly. A double page advertisement in one German Magazine said:

"If you want a girl we can take you to Thailand. If you need a boy join our package tour to Sri Lanka. "

In Several reports by non-governmental organisations (NGOS) and sociologists, both foreign and Sri Lankan, it was estimated that there are more than 30,000 boy prostitutes in Sri Lanka.

- (ii) In 1980 only eight drug dealers were apprehended for dealing in narcotic trade. This number increased gradually every year and by 1992, reached a record figure of over 7,100.
- (iii) More jobs were created in the Middle East for Sri Lankans than in the "Free Trade Zones" in the Island. Number of Sri Lankan housemaids employed in the Middle East increased from an insignificant few hundreds in 1980 to reach the peak of 36,000 (official figure) by 1990. The number of Innocent women who were cheated by bogus employment agencies also ran to thousands. A front page report in the "Island" of September 16, 1994 (with photographs) is sufficient evidence to realise

how these anti-social “Sharks” calling themselves Employment Agents had duped thousand of poor job-seekers.

The report headlined “2000 job seekers duped by employment agency”, goes on to say -

A fraudulent job agency and the activities of its owner, who is alleged to have cheated over 2000 persons, on false promises of securing overseas jobs, on the payment of tidy sums of money, will be investigated by the Fraud Bureau with immediate effect.

Prof. G.L. Pieris, Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and External Trade, assured representatives of these aggrieved group that their joint complaint will be directed to the Fraud Bureau for investigation and report.

Over 2000 persons, gathered near the Ministry of Justice and wanted to voice their grievances to the Minister of Justice.

They had been cheated for over three years, by this agency, which had collected large sums of money from prospective job seekers on the promise of finding them employment overseas, representatives said.

It is alleged that the owner of this agency had collected over Rs.50 million from persons, who sought overseas jobs.

The four representatives of the aggrieved group told the Minister that when they asked the agency to return their money if they did not get a job, the refund was always postponed.

Kollupitiya police had been reluctant to entertain complaints from the aggrieved job seekers, the representatives who met the Minister asserted.

The four persons who met the Minister, at the Ministry of Justice were, Ven. Ankumbura Vijiranatha from Kandy, Poojitha Goonewardene from Kalutara, Sudath Jayasinghe from Mawanella and Joseph Patrick from Badulla.

The representatives said that persons from all over the country had been deceived by this agency.

Some of the aggrieved persons had initiated legal action in this regard, the representatives said.

When the job agent was summoned before Court, he had come and got permission of the Court to go abroad and earn the money to repay the job seekers. When the case was called, the job agent had not appeared before Court. His deposit of Rs.10 lakhs had been forfeited, official sources informed the Ministry, when inquired.

If the job agent absconded, assistance of Interpol will be sought to get him down to Colombo, official sources said.

The above is the damage done only by one employment agency. There are hundreds of such "bogus agencies".

In 1984 Madras Airport Bomb Blast over 50 people died including 30 Sri Lankan (27 women and 3 men) on transit to Lebanon.

On the report of this tragedy the Deputy High Commissioner for Sri Lanka brought to the notice of the Government how innocent women are exploited by unscrupulous racketeers calling themselves "employment agents".

However, no action has been taken against these criminals who are a creation of an unplanned free market economy. Exposing all these disasterous aspects the People Alliance promised to "change and not to change" the free market economic policy.

The change will be to give a "human face" to the free market economy.

How could this be done.

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party Lawyers Association commissioned a respected economist to propose a plan as to how this election pledge of "open economy with a human face" could be implemented.

Extracts from his report on how to introduce "a new middle path for Sri Lanka's Economy" will give some new hope to the nation.

Here are some extracts:

Does the People's Alliance stand for socialism, or for an open economy? There could be an alternative between socialism and an open economy.

There is no other country which has an open economy of the type practised by successive UNP governments since 1977. All other countries have adopted variations of the market economy - "the social market economy"

of the Germans; the open economies of East Asia (Taiwan, Korea, Hongkong and Japan) where the state plays an activist role in guiding the market economy. For example, in Japan there is "administrative guidance" exercised by the Government. There is also the "Socialist market economy" of China, which has made China the fastest growing economy in the world. What we had in Sri Lanka since 1977 was an open economy of a "laissez faire" type, which was a rehash of Adam Smith's ideas of the 18th century. It is totally out of date now, and how can such a system be expected to solve the problems of growth, with equity.

The growth, which we witnessed under the UNP, had been concentrated in the services sector, and in some areas of industry. Agriculture - both plantation and domestic - had been badly neglected, and run down. It was an unbalanced type of development, purely because there was no State guidance.

It is essential that a PA Government had an agricultural strategy. Agriculture accounts for 25% of GDP. There had been a decline and neglect of agriculture by the UNP Governments. All plantation crops have been in poor shape. Tea, rubber and coconut production is stagnant or on the decline. In coconut we have reached a situation, where Sri Lanka now has to import copra and coconut oil.

In rubber, Sri Lanka is now the 8th largest producer, we were No.3 about 25-30 years ago. In the case of all plantation crops, Sri Lanka's yields are much less than our competitors. The removal of fertiliser subsidies in 1990 has had an adverse effect on agricultural and plantation production.

It is strange that Sri Lanka was in such haste to remove fertilizer subsidies. Most of other countries in a similar situation, were able to negotiate with the World Bank, and maintain subsidies. Paddy production too has been in the doldrums. Sri Lanka still imports some rice, inspite of the claims by some UNP ministers 10-12 years ago, that Sri Lanka had started exporting rice.

It is imperative that a PA Government restores fertilizer subsidies, and provides greater support and assistance to the plantation and agricultural sector for greater production.

The policies of importing potatoes, onions, chillies should be reviewed, and a revitalised Marketing Department set up a cater to the needs of the rural farmers. The suicides of farmers in Polonnaruwa District, and problems of farmers in the Matale and Welimada districts are an indication that urgent corrective action for the farmer is necessary. The old laissez faire policies of the UNP are totally

inadequate. The UNP relied on "trickle down" theories of economies, which even President Clinton criticised, and described as inadequate.

The UNP Government also lacked an industrial policy. It talked much of an industrial base, but there was too heavy a concentration of the garments industry, which is heavily import dependent, and quota dependent. The quotas would be phased out over the next ten years as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements, and the country would then have to face increased competition from the older established exporters such as Hongkong, Taiwan, Korea, India, Pakistan and new dynamic exporters such as China, Indonesia, Bangladesh and shortly Vietnam.

The UNP Government quite oblivious to these impending developments and changes under the quota system of the Multi Fibre Arrangement, embarked on 200-garment project, without sufficient thought being given to the availability of quotas, to sustain the old and new factories.

The UNP governments had also failed to attract investments into the electronics industry. Electronics is a major export of East Asia and South East Asia, but had failed to make their presence felt in Sri Lanka. A PA Government would have to make all-out efforts to attract the right type of foreign investment and not attract too much of the "footloose" industries, such as garments.

The continued depreciation of the rupee against the foreign currencies has been a prime reason for the imported inflation Sri Lanka faces. The removal of subsidies has also caused price increases, since the cushion has been removed. The safety nets which SLFP led governments maintained, and which the UNP governments removed one by one, would have to be reintroduced in some forms, to rein in inflation. Until inflation is brought under control, no amount of development is possible, and more hardships would have to be borne by the people.

A PA Government would also have to examine the tariff structure carefully. It appears that the Government is trying to appease foreign suppliers and multinationals, by reducing import duty and turnover tax on some industrial products. The Government should encourage direct foreign investment on debt, but local industries should be protected and fostered, until they can stand up to foreign competition.

Tariffs can be used for this purpose, under the Uruguay Round agreements concluded recently, to which Sri Lanka is also a signatory. It is non-tariff barriers, such as quotas and licensing etc. which are discouraged and frowned upon. It was behind tariff walls that countries like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan developed their industries. It was only when these industries were mature enough, that tariffs began

to come down. There was no wholesale dismantling of import tariffs as happened in Sri Lanka recently. The Government should create a "level playing field" unlike the UNP regime which is alleged to have favoured the foreign suppliers, at the expense of local producers. Local industries need a certain degree of protectionism, for they operate as an infant industry in a limited economy.

The open economy of the UNP had also not developed greater transparency in the privatisation exercise to prevent malpractices. Privatisation should be permitted in certain sectors, but not sectors where there are viable state enterprises with sufficient infrastructure and skills of the people. This was an example of "market failures" and results from an abdication of the responsibility of the State. The private sector, though no doubt, "The engine of growth", has to be supported by the State to strengthen the Market economy. As Dr. Gamini Corea said recently, "infrastructure plus Skills Development". There is a serious lacuna to be filled in infrastructure development such as power, roadways, telecommunications, which the state must undertake. There is the need also to improve the social infrastructure, such as health and educational facilities, which have been neglected and run down in the past 17 years. The State should also provide the appropriate skills to our young people in the fields of computer literacy, finance, banking, technological innovations etc.

There is the question of privatisation. A P.A. Government should define its position on this question. According to a reply in parliament, upto October 1993, 38 State ventures (nine Govt. Departments and 29 Government enterprises) have either been wound up, or sold to foreign and local buyers. The manner of the privatisation exercise in Sri Lanka has caused a great deal of concern, with charges of "crony capitalism" and massive corruption. Some enterprises have been sold at much less than their actual valuations. There are important enterprises like the Insurance Corporation, banks, the (CWE) Ceylon Wholesale Establishment etc. They should not be privatised. The state ventures should be permitted to compete with the private sector, on an equal basis, i.e. on a level playing field. There should be no state or private monopolies. A more competitive environment should be encouraged and fostered by regulatory bodies, such as the Fair Trading Commission.

To sum up, what is required is, as Dr. Lal Jayawardena said in his Convocation address at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) in December 1993 on "Market friendly policies - an appraisal", to use the market in support of defined social priorities, as contrasted with an abdication to market forces".

This is the crux of the differences between the approach of a PA government and the UNP Government.

The laissez-faire policy of no-state controls is outdated, if one is to learn from the success stories of East Asia, or the "East Asian miracle" as a World Bank study described them recently.

The other lesson to be learnt from East Asia is the need for a close dialogue and rapport between the policy makers and planners and the private sector. This is the secret of Japan's success. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry is in such close contact with the private sector and labour, that it is in a good situation to provide guidance and assistance whenever required.

APPENDIX-I

At the 1977 General Election under the "First past the Post" system, the distribution of seats were as follows.

United National Party	140
Tamil United Front	18
Sri Lanka Freedom Party	08
Ceylon Workers Congress	01
Independents	01
	168

In 1994, under the proportional Voting System (The 1989 election is not taken into consideration here as it was "sham election held under unnatural conditions) the distribution of 225 seats (196 elected districtwise and 29 nominated from the National list) were as follows:

<u>Anuradhapura District</u>		<u>Badulla District</u>	
People's Alliance (PA)	05	Peoples Alliance	03
United National Party(UNP)	03	United National Party	05
<u>Batticaloa District</u>		<u>Colombo District</u>	
PA	00	PA	11
UNP	01	UNP	09
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)	03		
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress	01		
<u>Digamadulla District</u>		<u>Gampaha District</u>	
PA	01	PA	11
UNP	03	UNP	07
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)	02		

Galle District

PA	06
UNP	03

Kalutara District

PA	06
UNP	04

KEGALLE DISTRICT

PA	05
UNP	05

MATARA DISTRICT

PA	05
UNP	03

NUWARA-ELIYA DISTRICT

PA	02
UNP	05
Kandurata Peramuna	01

PUTTALAM DISTRICT

PA	04
UNP	03

TRINCOMALEE DISTRICT

PA	00
UNP	02
SLMC	01
TULF	01

Hambontota District

PA	04
UNP	02
Sri Lanka Progressive Front	01

Kandy District

PA	05
UNP	07

KURUNEGALA DISTRICT

PA	08
UNP	07

MONERAGALA DISTRICT

	03
	02

MONERAGALA DISTRICT

PA	03
UNP	02

RATNAPURA DISTRICT

PA	06
UNP	04

VANNI DISTRICT

PA	01
UNP	01
SLMC	01
DPLF	02

Total under proportional Voting System

PA		
from Not. list	91+14	Total 105
UNP		
from Not. list	81+13	Total 94
Others		
From Not. List	24+2	Total 26
		225

However if the election was held under the "First Past the Post" system, as in all other Democratic Parliaments in the Commonwealth and a large majority of Parliaments in the democratic world 1994 results District- wise in Sri Lanka would be as follows:

ANURADHAPURA DISTRICT

PA	06
UNP	01

BADULLA DISTRICT

PA	07
UNP	07

BATTICALOA DISTRICT

PA	00
UNP	00
Others	05

COLOMBO DISTRICT

PA	11
UNP	06
(This is on the basis UNP will get 02 and PA 01 in Colombo Central)	

DIGAMADULLA DISTRICT

PA	01
UNP	00
SLMC	03
TULF	01
(2nd Pote)	

GALLE DISTRICT

PA	07
UNP	00

HAMBANTOTA DISTRICT

PA	04
UNP	00

KALUTARA DISTRICT

PA	08
UNP	01

KANDY DISTRICT

PA	03
(including Hari- spattuwa Multi-Member seat)	
UNP	08

KURUNEGALA DISTRICT

PA	11
UNP	03

MATARA DISTRICT

PA	11
UNP	03

NUWARA-ELIYA DISTRICT

PA	01
(One from NE)	
UNP	05

PUTTALAM DISTRICT

PA	05
UNP	00

TRINCOMALEE DISTRICT

PA	01
UNP	00
SLMC	01
TULF	01

JAFFNA DISTRICT

PA	00
UNP	00
Others	10
Total:	PA-92
Its Ally (SLMC)-	4
	UNP-45
	Others-20

KEGALLE DISTRICT

PA	03
UNP	06

MATALE DISTRICT

PA	02
UNP	02

MONERAGALA DISTRICT

PA	03
UNP	00

POLONNARUWA DISTRICT

PA	03
UNP	00

RATNAPURA DISTRICT

PA	05
UNP	03

VANNI DISTRICT

PA	00
UNP	00
Other's	03

APPENDIX II

SOME SECTIONS OF THE P.A. MANIFESTO

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The PA has identified the Executive Presidential system as the main cause for the ills of the UNP regime. Hence, the first promise, the PA manifesto gives is the abolition of the Executive Presidential System which has been the bane of our country since 1978. This system will be abolished as a matter of the highest priority, and the supremacy of the peoples' political will restored by means of a return, without delay, to the system of cabinet and parliamentary government", the manifesto says.

The PA has decided that the proportional representation should continue but has decided that like in Germany one half of the seats in parliament should be filled through proportional representation and the other half on the basis of territorial constituencies.

The PA asked a mandate from the people to convert the new Parliament into a Constituent Assembly to enable a new constitution to be drafted. Among the things the new constitution will provide for is the holding of a re-election instead of the current system of the party concerned nominating its own nominee when a vacancy occurs in parliament.

The PA had proposed the setting up of a Constitutional Council with the responsibility of appointing the members of the Public Service Commission, Permanent Commission on Bribery and Corruption, Official Languages Commission, and the University Grants Commission. The Constitutional Council will consist of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, 2 retired Judges of the Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Chief Ministers' Conference, the Speaker of Parliament and representatives of political parties having seats in Parliament.

The appointment of Human Rights Commission, for the acceptance of the principle of Judicial review of legislation, the establishment of a 3 member Permanent Commission on Bribery and Corruption of whom two will be retired Supreme Court Judges, the restoration of the dignity and self-respect of the Public

Service. Elimination of waste extravagance and the limitation of the cabinet Ministers were also listed in the constitutional reforms envisaged.

The PA manifesto declares that an ethnic problem exists and it needs an urgent solution. The PA put forward two ideas for a solution: genuine and adequate devolution of power and the building of new administrative units; Prof. Peiris said these two ideas have been left out without elaboration to permit the filling of details during negotiations.

The PA has spelt out its economic policy as that of market economy with special subsidies program to safeguard the poorest section of society from hardships that they encounter in the initial stages of other free and competitive economy. Facilities will be provided for local and foreign investment in priority areas which need faster development. Public utilities essential for day to day life to be government- managed but public and private sector participation will be permitted/- for example a Transport Authority will be created to maintain an efficient transport service by the coordination of private and public sectors.

The agricultural policy is designed to boost agricultural production and provide adequate safeguards for farmers. Restoration of the fertilizer subsidy and the introduction of a new farmer pension scheme are its highlights.

On industrial policy the PA manifesto states:

WELFARE MEASURES

The PA has announced a series of welfare measures. The most important measures are :

- *All low income families will be given a special allowance, not exceeding Rs.2000 a month.
- *School leavers after the age of 18 will be provided an allowance of Rs.1500 per month pending employment.
- *Janasaviya recipients will be paid the Rs.25,000 saving now deposited in the banks.
- *Restoration of fertilizer subsidy.
- *Accumulated agricultural loans will be immediately cancelled.
- *Water tax will be abolished.

*Stable prices for vegetable products.

The PA has also proposed a National Programme for the Eradication of Poverty. The section reads:

The National Programme for the Eradication of Poverty

1. We will embark on a national programme for the eradication of poverty, which will be called "*The Prosperity Movement*."
2. The first phase of our Prosperity Movement will consist of the new subsidies scheme. In the second phase, we will introduce an economic development programme aimed at the improvement of income levels of low-income families.

The Prosperity Movement

1. Under the 'Prosperity Movement' economic development projects will be designed to suit the needs of low income-earning families.
2. Family-level economic development projects will be linked with rural, district and provincial development projects, all of which in turn will constitute the Prosperity Movement at the National level.
3. Each of these centres will employ a development officer and an extension officer, selected from among educated youth in the village.
4. Officers chosen to implement the programme will be specially trained in order to enable them to formulate development projects, to co-ordinate with state and other institutions and to implement the projects efficiently.
5. The main criterion in initiating a Family Development Project will be the economic development goal that each family can achieve, having regard to its circumstances, resources and capabilities. The relevant activity may be employment in the private sector, a self-employment in the private sector, a self-employment project or a group economic project. Wherever necessary, family members can also be directed to state employment.
6. Prosperity centres formed in the village will pay special attention to the progress of each family.
7. These centres will provide, in collaboration with relevant institutions and individuals, knowledge, skills, training, capital, banking and advisory services necessary to implement the development projects successfully.

8. The services necessary for the implementation of the development projects initiated by these 'Prosperity Centres' will be provided, in the form of mobile services, by banks, extension centres, state institutions, other financial and technical institutions, and private sector institutions.
9. In order to implement these projects effectively, the services and assistance of rural development banks, co-operative rural banks, SANASA, non-governmental organisations and the private sector will be harnessed to supplement state support. The assistance of foreign countries and international aid agencies will be sought towards this end.
10. We expect to provide part of the capital needed by these families through the 'Prosperity Bank' which will be set up specifically to support the National Prosperity Movement. Experience in other developing countries in the area of rural development banking will be drawn upon in establishing this 'Prosperity Bank'.
11. The 'Prosperity Centre' will function under the guidance of an Advisory Council whose members will be drawn from the clergy and the intelligentsia in the village.
12. People's participatory institutions will be evolved to supervise and monitor the progress of family development projects.
13. In the implementation of the Prosperity Programme, there will be no room for waste and for political ceremonies. It will be a development goal-oriented program, with collective participation by the people.
14. The co-ordination and monitoring of the Prosperity Programme at local, district and national levels will be ensured by a network of non-bureaucratic institutions. There will be a separate Ministry entrusted with responsibility for the National Prosperity Programme.

Creation of Employment

PA manifesto has a section on the Creation of Employment. It reads:

1. A PA government will launch a programme to create one million jobs within two years.
2. Additionally, 300,000 self-employment opportunities will be created in the first year. Our 'Prosperity Centres' will play an active role in this scheme.

3. To make the one million employment generation programme successful, following economic and developmental activities will be initiated:
- i. Rapid and systematic expansion of small, medium and large scale industries.
 - ii. Provision of credit and facilities for vocational and managerial skills training.
 - iii. We will invite local and foreign investors to start employment-oriented projects.
 - iv. We will obtain foreign capital investments and technology to develop and expand roads, electricity, telecommunication and irrigation facilities.
 - v. We will increase opportunities for employment abroad, ensuring the safety and self-respect of workers; Vocational training necessary for employment abroad will be provided.
 - vi. The harassment suffered by foreign job-seekers at the hand of job agents and other middlemen will be totally eradicated.
 - vii. Local and foreign trained doctors, engineers and diplomats from vocational fields will be assisted to start their own professional ventures. Short and long term credit facilities will be made available to them for this purposes.
 - viii. In the field of education, the PA Manifesto has undertaken to provide facilities for the teaching of Tamil for Sinhala for Tamil and Muslim students. It will also open higher education institutions to enable more students to persue university education.

On media policy the PA has this to say:

MEDIA POLICY

We will provide all necessary assistance for the establishment of an independent National Media Institute which will cater to the professional needs of journalists and media personal, including the maintenance of professional dignity.

The PA is firmly convinced that the freedom of the individual cannot be safeguarded without a viable system of checks and balances operating as a restraint

on governmental power; and that the checks and balances required for this purpose can be applied with any degree of effectiveness only if there is healthy and vigorous expression of public opinion.

The PA, therefore, attaches the greatest importance to strengthening the media and providing framework within which the media can function independently and without inhibition. This entails significant changes with regard to structures on ownership, policy objectives, the legislative instruments applicable, administrative policy in respect of such matters as facilities and the attitude of government to issues which are indispensable for a sound media policy.

Major constraints arising from provisions contained in the Constitution, the Public Security Ordinance, the Press Council Law, the Official Secrets Act and the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act, will be removed by amendment of this legislation. Journalists will no longer be punished by Committees of Parliament.

Action will be taken to broadbase the ownership of Associated Newspaper of Ceylon Ltd. in keeping with the intentions of Parliament, as set out in the original legislation. The shares of Lake House will be traded in the Stock Exchange, with arrangements to ensure that no single person, organisation or group will be able to own and/or control more than 20% of the shares. In the initial issue of shares, priority will be given to journalists and employees of Lake House, journalists organisations, associations that encourage freedom of expression, trade unions and professional organisations.

Government will not use its advertising to control influence or threaten any newspaper or media organisations. The PA will recognise the right for privately owned electronic media to have their own news services free from government control.

The current structure of taxes and duties on newsprint will be drastically revised, to provide relief.

There will be better salary structures, and opportunities for training for journalists. The payment to outstation correspondents will be increased considerably.

The PA is committed to assist the media in setting up an Independent National Media Institute to cater to the professional needs of journalists, including their training, skills development and the professional dignity.

THE ETHNIC ISSUE

The PA manifesto has given special consideration for the ethnic issue.

They consider it as their duty and responsibility to protect the rights of all other ethnic and religious communities, while protecting and safeguarding the rights of the majority Sinhalese Buddhist community. We affirm that human rights and economic and social rights should be equally enjoyed by all ethnic groups.

The PA believes that the ethnic question is one of the most complex problems of our country which needs an urgent solution. It is our conviction that without restoring peace through a political solution to the ethnic question, it would be impossible to achieve our goals of economic development, social progress and political stability. Having considered the magnitude of the loss of life and property and challenges to the progress of the entire country, the PA affirms its commitment to taking every step necessary to find a solution to the ethnic problem in order to ensure peace to all communities.

Our aim is to arrive at such a solution and then utilise all the resources spent on the war for the welfare of all communities of our country and to preserve law and order and political stability.

We believe in vigorous implementation of genuine and adequate devolution of power.

The PA is committed to building new administrative units, having regard to geographical, economic and social factors, in order to arrive at a durable solution to problems relating to the ethnic issue and the devolution of power.

When introducing constitutional amendments in respect of the establishment of new administrative units to which power is to be devolved, the PA will adopt necessary measures to consult the views of all ethnic communities with a view to reaching an acceptable solution.

APPENDIX - III

SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER CHANDRIKA BANDARANAIKE KUMARATUNGA OUTLINING THE GOVT'S ECONOMIC POLICY AT BMICH ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1994

The Government stands committed to building a strong national economy within a market framework. The principle engine of growth is expected to be the private sector. The role of the State is to provide an institutional framework that is wholly supportive of rapid private sector development. In order to do this effectively, the Government will pursue "Market Friendly" policies which support rather than supplant markets. Accordingly, Government intervention will be limited to areas to be strengthened or supplemented, so that they serve the welfare of the people.

A necessary condition for the success of these policies is the maintenance of a stable macro-economic and financial framework which is conducive to the reduction of inflation, the pursuit of rapid economic growth, the creation of productive employment opportunities and the equitable distribution of the fruit of development.

NO RESTRICTIONS

These policies will be pursued in a variety of mutually reinforcing ways. First, nothing will be done to weaken market signals. There are no plans for the nationalisation or expropriation of private property, whether domestic or foreign. All bilateral investment protection agreements and relevant international conventions will be honoured. No restrictions will be placed on the repatriation of dividends and capitals. The foreign exchange liberalisation measures, already implemented, will continue and will be improved upon. Private foreign investment, both direct and portfolio, will be strongly encouraged through the provision of appropriate incentives because domestic savings are inadequate to generate the investment needed for rapid development. The Board of Investment (BOI) will be restructured from an organisation granting ad hoc privileges to one genuinely promoting foreign investment in a transparent manner.

Second, there will be no adverse changes in Labour Policy relating to Foreign Investments. This is crucial to the Government's strategy for eliminating

the large backlog of unemployment. Consultative mechanism will be established at the work place under the aegis of the Board of Investment (BOI), whose objective will be to promote harmonious relationship between management and labour.

CREDIT AND FISCAL POLICIES

Third, the scope of the private sector will be expanded by encouraging and providing it with the required facilities to enter in to new areas of production in agriculture, industry, infrastructural development and in the services sector, with helpful and appropriate credit and fiscal policies. These facilities will be available to all on a level playing field which will make it unnecessary for the private sector to canvas for contracts and concessions. This will imply the strictest adherence to the Government's financial and other procurement procedures, which will be fair to all. Complete transparency of the process will ensure with a view to eliminating corruption and cronyism. We are compelled to review certain questionable and fraudulent transactions of the previous regime with a view to preventing similar abuses in the future. In this process, every endeavour will be made to honour our international obligations.

Fourth, the proposed National Development Council will be constituted with State, private sector and labour representatives and professionals. It will facilitate a productive dialogue between the private sector and the Government, aimed at strengthening the market mechanism in the National interest, as in East Asia, so that private sector opinions will be fully taken into account in the formulations of Government policy. The interaction between representatives of labour and the private sector, alongside those of the Government, in the Council, will promote mutual cooperation for enhancing productivity growth and economic efficiency.

ERADICATION OF POVERTY

Fifth, public intervention will be limited to the areas where markets fail to function effectively. These lie principally in the general areas of human development expenditure. For instance, in education, there is the need to improve the quality of education and technological skills in the order to reorient our youth to the needs of a modern economy, which would firmly situated on the foundations of the Sri Lankan identity built out of its social and cultural heritage. Similarly, there is a need for intervention in health, in protecting the environment, and in creating a viable social safety net to protect the poor, by means such as Prosperity (Samurdhi) Movement for the eradication of poverty as pledged in our manifesto. The pursuit of sustainable human development, to which we are committed, will not become possible, without adequate public intervention and investment in these areas. The creation of employment opportunities should be accompanied by

measures to improve the quality of life.

Sixth, public investment would be needed to build the infrastructure that is required as a necessary complement to rapid private sector growth. However, as these resource requirements for the provision of adequate infrastructures are so overwhelmingly large, a significant portion of infrastructure investment effort will have to be undertaken by the private sector. This would be expected to compliment public sector infrastructure expenditure in areas such as road and highways, power, telecommunications, and private infrastructure investment would occur under arrangements such as BOT (build, operate and transfer) and BOO (build, operate and own), which would be implemented within an evaluation and regulatory framework that would guarantee transparency and accountability. The present Secretariate for Infrastructure Development and Investment (SIDI) will be strengthened and will work in close cooperation with the Board of Investment (BOI).

SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM

The implementation of this strategy has both short-term and long-term dimensions. There is an immediate short-term need to address the claims of poverty alleviation by measures designed to reduce the cost of living. The commitments undertaken in our manifesto, such as the reduction of the price of bread, will be implemented in a manner wholly consistent with the dictates of fiscal prudence so as to contain inflation. This has become a difficult task in view of the fiscal profligacy inherited from the previous government. However, every effort will be made to contain the fiscal deficit at a tolerable level without resorting to inflationary borrowing from the Central Bank. Printing money will under no circumstances be countenanced. As it will both rapidly deplete our reserves and lead to high inflation, which will more than wipe out the cost of living benefits of particular price reductions. Indeed, safeguards will be introduced to insulate the Central Bank against any pressures to provide inflationary finance.

Given this constraint, the Government is faced with two options in the short term namely, raising additional revenue, reducing expenditure and targetting welfare measures to those who are most disadvantaged.

FISCAL REVENUE

As regards the first option, fiscal revenue would be augmented by eliminating the practice of granting arbitrary import duty waivers and by refraining from granting over-generous new tax exemptions in the future. Also the tax system would be reformed to improve compliance and efficiency. This would mean a progressive reduction in the levels of direct taxation on both corporate and personal income, as in East Asia, would lead to an expanded tax base and greater tax compliance. It would also mean a rationalisation of indirect taxation by placing

greater reliance on a Value Added Tax (VAT). There is no intention to introduce taxes that would be inimical to private sector expansion.

With regard to the second option, there are limits to reducing expenditure in the short run in view of commitments on wages, debt repayments and defence etc. However, some saving can be made by eliminating waste and corruption, restoring financial discipline, and reducing the personnel at the highest level. Further saving could be generated in the near term by solving the Northern conflict. Additional foreign resources could be expected in recognition of sound economic policies, good governance and restoration of peace.

All these measures will help raise the required budgetary resources for implementing the new poverty alleviation programmes in a non-inflationary manner.

ACCELERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH

The Longer Term dimensions of policy will be based upon a ten-year perspective, encompassing the period 1995 to 2005, which would be implemented through a succession of a three-year policy framework cycles. The ten-year perspective takes as its premise the vigorous development of national production in all sectors. The resolution of the northern conflict will result in the channelling of the savings (the peace dividend) along the matching foreign aid contributions into rehabilitation of damaged areas and retraining for demobilisation. There will be a further channelling in to productive investment in the private sector of the new capital inflows which will be generated by increased international confidence in Sri Lanka. This would accelerate economic growth to reach an annual rate of 8 per cent well before the year 2000, so that unemployment is virtually eliminated in 5 years from now, and per capita income doubles in ten.

INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

The eventual goal of policy would be to continue to reduce the overall fiscal deficit from a level of 8 per-cent of GDP in 1993 to a level of 3 to 4 per-cent of GDP well before the year 2000, which would both be consistent with a significant reduction in inflation, and be sufficient to absorb a reasonable amount of concessional aid. In order to accomplish this goal, budgetary revenue will as mentioned, be buoyed up by rapid economic growth and tax reform. A substantial current account surplus will be generated both by the significant reduction of military expenditure and by curtailing unnecessary and wasteful current expenditure both through the improved targetting of welfare programmes and reducing the role of the public sector in the economy. The long run objective would be to run an overall surplus in the budget so as to enable the retirement of the high stock of public debt outstanding.

The medium term goal of 8 per cent GDP growth annually would require a continuing emphasis on export-led growth, with encouragement being given to the private sector to diversify in to areas of higher value added production and exports. Any such transition would require maintenance of Sri Lanka's competitiveness in international markets. This would mean flexible, and market-oriented, exchange and interest rate policies. Sri Lanka will also undertake not to impose restrictions on trade and payment transactions.

EXPORT-ORIENTED SERVICES

An important new pole of growth in the Economy would be the development of an export-oriented services sector by exploiting the unique geographical opportunity conferred on Sri Lanka by its location at the hub of a potentially dynamic South Asian region. The vision that is compelling is for Sri Lanka to become the principal regional financial services and trans-shipment centre, with preferential access to the regional market being obtained either through an acceleration of the SAARC process of regional cooperation, or by suitable bilateral preferential arrangements, as for example with India.

The overall development strategy we are committed to means the pursuit of sustainable human development. While promoting rapid economic growth and employment, it also distributes its benefits equitably. It ensures that rapid development, far from destroying the environment, protects and indeed regenerates it. In investing in people, and developing their skills and aptitudes, it enhances their capability to pursue fruitful lives. It necessarily gives special protection to the poor, who will be mobilised to evolve viable livelihoods through the Prosperity (Samurdhi) Movement for eradicating poverty. In sum, it is a strategy which harnesses the market to social purpose.

Politically, this means a commitment to good governance. It not only involves political pluralism but, the maintenance of democratic institutions for the preservation of human rights. It also makes the politics the discharge of a public trust, where decision-making is transparent and free of corruption, and where everyone in public life is accountable for their actions. This is a beautiful but difficult dream, which we shall strive to realise.

APPENDIX IV

A LEADER FOR A NEW GENERATION BY AJITH SAMARANAYAKE (THE ISLAND, AUGUST 2, 1994)

The day Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga took the oath of office at the stately Janadhipathi Mandiraya as Prime Minister a besieged American President Bill Clinton was celebrating his 48th birthday. Chandrika herself has turned 49 in June this year. These two birth anniversaries in two seemingly unrelated countries were symbolic of a change at the heart of the political system of a generational changing of the guard, the arrival of a new bright eyed leadership on the centre stage.

This feeling was accentuated by the last salute the previous day by outgoing Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The departing Prime Minister who was driven away from Temple Trees after bowing to the verdict of the people was the youngest so far to assume that office. But generational continuity will be assured by Chandrika coming into occupation at Temple Trees.

After the dour, patriarchal leaderships of the last decades the country now has a fresh personal belonging to a new generation at the helm.

Chandrika Kumaratunga stands in the direct familial and political line of her illustrious parents-Prime Minister W.R. D. Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. It is not a family inheritance she has claimed but a political legacy which has enriched and deepened the political culture of Sri Lanka. SWRD, the Oxford-educated son of the Maha-Mudaliyar, who confessed on returning to Ceylon that he could not speak Sinhala, was nevertheless the man who made the people come into their own. A liberal in the sense of the word stepped in classical culture he was Sri Lanka philosopher-Prime Minister who would dip into a book or discuss a problem of political philosophy while studying a Cabinet paper or some such mundane document.

Chandrika was only 14 when her father was slain but she has obviously inherited her love of ideas from him. At a recent press conference a visiting foreign correspondent asked her to define socialism. The local news hounds, who have a lofty disdain for highbrow talk were amused but Chandrika was quite ready to discuss the theory of socialism with the curious scribe. For a politician, she is unnaturally serious even didactic.

Socialism, of course, she imbibed in Paris, that most resplendent of European cities famous for its cuisine and its fashions both sartorial as well as political. In the Left Bank cafes of Paris Existentialists engage in debate with Marxists while Dadaists rub shoulders with Nihilists. Those were stirring times. A whole pantheon of new messiahs had arrived and suddenly Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Rudi Deutschke and Tariq Ali were the rage every where. The Revolution preached for long by middle-aged socialists seemed to be round the corner but the students were carrying the flag and the boulevards of Paris were the battle ground of the new disorder.

If Chandrika came to love ideas as a result of her father, her initiation into political action came through her mother. Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike has sometimes been described as the only man in her Cabinet and not flippantly either and this was no mean tribute when that Cabinet consisted of giants such as Felix Dias Bandaranaike, Dr. N.M. Perera, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, Pieter Keuneman, T. B. Ilangeratne, Maithripala Senanayake and T.B. Subasinghe. Mrs. Bandaranaike was not one to flinch in her time faced up to American pressures over the nationalisation of the oil companies, pressures from the Catholic Church over the take-over of schools, the incipient rebellion in the North in the sixties when the Federal Party printed its own postage stamp and most importantly the coup d'état by top military officers against her first Government. Chandrika sounds like her mother when she speaks and can be counted on to act with firmness when necessary.

From her late husband Vijaya Kumaratunga she inherited a simple humanism, a love for the common man whom Vijaya epitomised in his film roles. Vijaya was the archetypal hero, the good-hearted man of the people and the people loved him for that. Vijaya in return loved the common man with an abundance of affection. He was the perfect foil for Chandrika for he had no intellectual pretension but knew from the bottom of his heart what was right and what was wrong. He sacrificed much and lost much as a result in his politics particularly over his advocacy of the rights of the Tamil people. And finally they killed him almost in her view on his own doorstep where a statue now stands in his memory.

That was the steeling of Chandrika. She had stood largely in the shadow of her mother and husband so far but as the widow of the man whom she had freely chosen on her own, defying the conventions of class and caste, she came into her own. The sight of the brave widow, her hands clenched in defiance over the bier of her husband whose face she could not see in death, stirred the popular memory.

She led the United Left Front at the Provincial Council elections in 1988 but death threats drove her to seek refuge in London, that home of famous exiles where Karl Marx had brooded over the problems of capitalism and where a whole crop of Third World leaders had been nurtured in the womb of the London School

of Economics. It was a time for reflection and study out of which has emerged a whole array of research work on political violence, land and food policies, the co-operative movement and political and social structures in Sri Lanka.

There is no doubt that Prime Minister Kumaratunge is entirely equipped for her work. The intellectual baggage she carries is formidable. In a political world where debate is either an exchange of platitudinous inanities or vulgar abuse she stands heads and shoulders over the pygmies. She is above the din of the political market place but now her challenge as Prime Minister would be to get down into dust and grime of the arena and come to grips with the real problems both of state craft as well as day-to-day administration which have so far only been distant text book theories.

Above all Chandrika Kumaratunga has a vision for Sri Lanka she has unwaveringly adhered to - a better life for the people through more equitable economic relationships, a principled settlement of the ethnic problem and the restoration of a democratic political culture where all political beliefs would be respected. She has faith in the intelligence of the people and does not believe in talking down to them. She talks straight from the shoulder eschewing bombastic rhetoric but she can be passionate when the occasion demands. She does not wear her sorrows on her face which is sometimes creased but when she smiles she wins hearts with her openness.

In exile in London her daughter Yosodhara, now 14, produced a scattering of poems during the time she was eight to twelve years old. They are described as the work of a girl 'only beginning to learn the English language after having an exclusively Sinhala education until the age of eight years.' The dedication is touching in its simplicity.

**'To my beloved thatthi with love
in the hope that the blood
which flowed so vainly from your beautiful
face would mingle with the earth
of my land, to give forth
the blossoms of Peace and Brotherhood
for which you fought so passionately.
And to my Ammi for
all that you have been to me**

Those are a child's words and now as she occupies the Prime Minister's chair and confronts the problems of a wounded and blood - spattered country, Chandrika Kumaratunge will have them as a comfort reminding her that she has achieved part of her mission for her slain father and husband and as a blazing motto inspiring her to fulfil the rest of her historic destiny.

APPENDIX - V

GENERAL ELECTION 1994 RESULTS

ANURADHAPURA DISTRICT

1. MIHINTALE

PA	17,881
UNP	13,672
SLPF	290
MEP	127
Valid votes	32,060
Rejected	1,673
Total polled	33,733
Registered	41,088

2. KALAWEWA

PA	37,744
UNP	25,091
SLPF	483
MEP	284
Valid votes	63,602
Rejected	3,160
Total polled	66,792
Registered	79,697

3. A'PURA EAST

PA	25,277
UNP	19,949
SLPF	849
MEP	285
Valid votes	46,360
Rejected	1,878
Total polled	48,238
Registered	62,048

4. KEKIRAWA

PA	20,987
UNP	18,886
SLPF	251
MEP	148
Valid votes	40,273
Rejected	1,976
Total polled	42,249
Registered	50,969

5. MEDAWACHCHIYA

PA	25,041
UNP	17,389
SLPF	336
MEP	213
Valid votes	42,979
Rejected	1,746
Total polled	44,725
Registered	55,792

6. A'PURA WEST

PA	24,548
UNP	24,306
SLPF	505
MEP	151
Valid votes	49,510
Rejected	2,415
Total polled	51,925
Registered	65,367

7. HORAWUPATANA

PA	22,835
UNP	17,966
SLPF	234
MEP	213
Valid votes	74,544
Rejected	2,938
Total polled	77,482
Registered	106,536

BADULLA DISTRICT

8. HAPUTALE

UNP	19,574
PA	14,491
Ind(2)	349
SLPF	311
MEP	92
Ind(1)	75
Valid votes	34,892
Rejected	3,780
Total polled	38,672
Registered	48,853

9. HALI-ELA

UNP	20,677
PA	15,341
SLPF	465
MEP	168
Ind(2)	167
Ind(1)	76
Valid votes	36,894
Rejected	3,419
Total polled	40,313
Registered	48,807

10. BANDARAWELA

UNP	21,713
PA	19,545
Ind(2)	466
SLPF	396
MEP	172
Ind(1)	112
Valid votes	42,404
Rejected	3,255
Total polled	45,669
Registered	56,426

11. BADULLA

UNP	14,147
PA	14,070
SLPF	340
MEP	259
Ind(2)	116
Ind(1)	30
Valid votes	28,961
Rejected	1,937
Total polled	30,898
Registered	40,039

12. WELIMADA

UNP	19,935
PA	18,611

13. WIYALUWA

UNP	14,340
PA	12,646

Ind(2)	992
SLPF	612
MEP	154
Ind(1)	65
Valid votes	40,569
Rejected	3,300
Total polled	43,869
Registered	53,643

SLPF	195
MEP	93
Ind(2)	87
Ind(1)	80
Valid votes	27,441
Rejected	2,744
Total polled	30,185
Registered	36,342

14. UVAPARANAGAMA

UNP	19,310
PA	16,792
SLPF	520
MEP	211
IND(2)	192
Ind(1)	77
Valid votes	37,102
Rejected	3,095
Total polled	40,197
Registered	47,127

15. PASSARA

UNP	21,180
PA	13,012
SLPF	2 4 3
IND(2)	1 5 1
Ind(1)	6 4
MEP	6 2
Valid votes	3 4 , 7 1 2
Rejected	3 , 7 3 1
Total polled	3 8 , 4 4 3
Registered	45,788

16. MAHIYANGANA

UNP	27,956
PA	16,702
SLPF	319
MEP	242
Ind(1)	86
Ind(2)	75
Valid votes	45,390
Rejected	3,083
Total polled	48,463
Registered	58,235

BATTICALOA DISTRICT

17. KALKUDAH

TULF	23,261
SLMC	11,179
UNP	6,891
TELO	3,557
PA	2,944

18. BATTICALOA

TULF	28,020
SLMC	19,368
UNP	13,622
PA	7,413
TELO	6,804

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EPRLF	687	EPRLF	2,089
Ind(2)	100	Ind(1)	514
Ind(1)	91	Ind(2)	347
Valid votes	48,710	Valid votes	78,157
Rejected	4,705	Rejected	5,805
Total polled	53,415	Total polled	83,962
Registered	73,640	Registered	123,893

19. PADDIRUPPU

TULF	23,688
PA	8,672
TELO	6,493
UNP	2,269
EPRLF	1,976
IND(1)	926
IND(2)	98
SLMC	75
Valid votes	44,201
Rejected	4,940
Polled	49,141
Registered	64,355

COLOMBO DISTRICT

20. HOMAGAMA

PA	40,034
UNP	29,566
MEP	3,409
SLPF	1,180
NSSP	169
TELO	106
DWC	49
IND.	31
Valid votes	74,544
Rejected	2,938
Total polled	77,482
Registered	106,536

21. COLOMBO EAST

PA	18,211
UNP	17,858
MEP	1,615
IND.	1,593
SLPF	493
TELO	87
NSSP	58
DWC	18
Valid votes	39,933
Rejected	1,618
Total polled	41,551
Registered	57,049

22. BORELLA

UNP	17,076
PA	16,746

23. MORATUWA

PA	41,670
UNP	30,360

MEP	1,345
SLPF	414
IND.	258
NSSP	93
TELO	36
DWC	32
Valid votes	36,018
Rejected	1,524
Total polled	37,542
Registered	52,007

24. KADUWELA

PA	46,899
UNP	30,668
MEP	4,327
SLPF	1,541
NSSP	183
TELO	94
IND.	57
DWC	23
Valid votes	83,972
Rejected	3,010
Total polled	86,802
Registered	113,173

26. RATMALANA

PA	25,967
UNP	15,860
MEP	1,061
SLPF	666
IND.	311
NSSP	115
TELO	50
DWC	09
Valid votes	44,039
Rejected	1,652
Total polled	45,691
Registered	59,749

MEP	1,543
SLPF	992
NSSP	155
IND.	96
TELO	60
DWC	34
Valid votes	74,910
Rejected	2,701
Total polled	77,611
Registered	97,931

25. MAHARAGAMA

PA	41,034
UNP	25,269
MEP	6,932
SLPF	1,142
NSSP	152
TELO	89
IND.	51
DWC	29
Valid votes	74,698
Rejected	2,082
Total polled	76,780
Registered	101,317

27. COLOMBO WEST

UNP	12983
PA	8,977
IND.	2,813
MEP	462
SLPF	90
NSSP	44
Valid votes	25,452
Rejected	821
Total polled	26,246
Registered	36,915

28. DEHIWALA

PA	20,992
UNP	16,942
MEP	1,145
IND.	813
SLPF	327
NSSP	71
TELO	44
DWC	11
Valid votes	40,225
Rejected	1,273
Total polled	41,508
Registered	55,301

30. AVISSAWELLA

UNP	28,768
PA	20,782
MEP	11,846
SLPF	476
NSSP	95
TELO	73
DWC	48
IND.	46
Valid votes	62,134
Rejected	2,882
Total polled	65,016
Registered	81,213

32. KOLONNAWA

PA	36,930
UNP	26,796
MEP	1,646
SLPF	935
IND.	138
NSSP	71
TELO	42
DWC	26
Valid votes	66,593
Rejected	2,775
Total polled	69,368
Registered	90,167

29. COLOMBO CENTRAL

UNP	50,136
PA	42,060
IND.	1,526
MEP	878
SLPF	502
NSSP	319
DWC	159
TELO	130
Valid votes	95,710
Rejected	5,995
Total polled	110,705
Registered	139,012

31. KESBEWA

PA	49,342
UNP	29,585
MEP	2,709
SLPF	1,418
NSSP	165
TELO	105
DWC	46
IND.	33
Valid votes	83,403
Rejected	2,932
Total polled	86,335
Registered	110,948

33. KOTTE

PA	28,106
UNP	21,215
MEP	1,975
SLPF	742
IND.	140
NSSP	104
TELO	39
DWC	18
Valid votes	52,339
Rejected	1,485
Total polled	53,824
Registered	71,213

DIGAMADULLA DISTRICT

34. AMPARA

PA	42,819
UNP	42,100
SLPF	465
TELO	151
IND	88
SLMC	72

Valid votes	85,760
Rejected	4,439
Total polled	90,199
Registered	112,046

35. KALMUNAI

SLMC	22,653
UNP	7,631
TULF	6,294
TELO	789
PA	584
IND	358
SLPF	26

Valid votes	38,335
Rejected	1,454
Total polled	39,789
Registered	50,248

36. SAMMANTHURAI

SLMC	21,997
UNP	9,874
TULF	4,355
TELO	969
PA	889
IND1	344
SLPF	44

Valid votes	38,472
Rejected	2,180
Polled	40,652
Registered	51,990

37. POTTUVIL

SLMC	28,851
UNP	16,717
TULF	13,532
PA	7,959
IND1	2,420
TELO	2,235
SLPF	108

Valid votes	71,822
Rejected	4,536
Total Polled	76,358
Registered	97,721

GAMPAHA DISTRICT

38. DOMPE

PA	35,849
UNP	26,552
SLPF	589

Valid votes	62,990
Rejected	2,331
Polled	65,321
Registered	80,415

39. WATTALA

PA	32,311
UNP	31,482
SLPF	593

Valid votes	64,386
Rejected	2,627
Polled	67,013
Registered	85,518

40. KATANA

PA	40,684
UNP	29,617
SLPF	633
Valid votes	70,934
Rejected	3,044
Polled	73,978
Registered	92,027

42. DIVULAPITIYA

PA	32,951
UNP	29,141
SLPF	523
Valid votes	62,615
Rejected	2,228
Polled	64,843
Registered	77,104

44. GAMPAHA

PA	47,822
UNP	27,133
SLPF	1,340
Valid votes	76,295
Rejected	2,456
Polled	78,751
Registered	100,416

46. MAHARA

PA	43,413
UNP	29,173
SLPF	1,149
Valid votes	73,735
Rejected	2,685
Polled	76,420
Registered	98,091

48. MINUWANGODA

PA	39,893
UNP	29,455

41. JA-ELA

PA	40,838
UNP	31,851
SLPF	970
Valid votes	73,659
Rejected	2,567
Polled	76,266
Registered	97,305

43. BIYAGAMA

PA	34,719
UNP	25,537
SLPF	1,048
Valid votes	61,304
Rejected	2,373
Polled	63,677
Registered	80,600

45. NEGOMBO

PA	28,830
UNP	28,624
SLPF	289
Valid votes	57,743
Rejected	2,566
Polled	60,309
Registered	80,599

47. KELANIYA

PA	32,961
UNP	23,504
SLPF	1,314
Valid votes	57,729
Rejected	2,271
Polled	60,050
Registered	78,191

49. MIRIGAMA

PA	37,512
UNP	30,492

SLPF	844
Valid votes	70,192
Rejected	2,288
Polled	72,480
Registered	89,192

SLPF	1,100
Valid votes	69,104
Rejected	2,739
Polled	71,843
Registered	89,455

50. ATTANAGALLE

PA	45,629
UNP	24,269
SLPF	849
Valid votes	70,747
Rejected	2,638
Polled	73,385
Registered	91,909

GALLE DISTRICT

51. BENTARA-ELPITIYA

PA	31,222
UNP	22,059
SLPF	940
MEP	202
BNP	24
Valid votes	54,447
Rejected	2,418
Polled	56,865
Registered	71,765

52. AKMEEMANA

PA	28,027
UNP	20,576
MEP	704
SLPF	645
BNP	23
Valid votes	49,975
Rejected	1,808
Polled	51,783
Registered	64,320

53. AMBALANGODA

PA	24,417
UNP	17,643
SLPF	780
MEP	172
BNP	20
Valid votes	43,032
Rejected	1,808
Polled	44,833
Registered	56,041

54. RATGAMA

PA	27,243
UNP	20,412
MEP	819
SLPF	340
BNP	24
Valid votes	48,910
Rejected	2,132
Polled	51,042
Registered	66,221

55. KARANDENIYA

PA	21,880
UNP	15,830
SLPF	805
MEP	105
BNP	25
Valid votes	38,645
Rejected	1,975
Polled	40,620
Registered	53,066

57. HABARADUWA

PA	29,716
UNP	18,528
SLPF	819
MEP	732
IND.	39
Valid votes	49,834
Rejected	1,962
Polled	51,796
Registered	66,342

59. GALLE

PA	23,347
UNP	19,885
SLPF	983
MEP	612
BNP	15
Valid votes	44,842
Rejected	1,418
Polled	46,260
Registered	62,011

56. BEDDEGAMA

PA	33,572
UNP	23,874
MEP	505
SLPF	389
BNP	79
Valid votes	58,419
Rejected	2,937
Polled	61,356
Registered	74,331

58. HINIDUMA

PA	33,648
UNP	26,099
MEP	601
SLPF	296
BNP(PFF)	42
Valid votes	60,686
Rejected	2,747
Polled	63,433
Registered	74,337

60. BALAPITIYA

PA	16,907
UNP	14,239
SLPF	421
MEP	99
PEF	12
Valid Votes	31,678
Rejected Votes	1,380
Total polled	33,058
Registered	43,988

HAMBANTOTA DISTRICT

61. TISSAMAHARAMA

PA	41,739
UNP	30,056
SLPF	5,151
MEP	554

62. TANGALLA

PA	33,090
UNP	22,882
SLPF	4,054
MEP	443

IND(1)	315
SMSBP	149
IND(2)	126
BNP	46
Valid votes	78,136
Rejected	4,116
Total polled	82,252
Registered	106,669

IND(1)	230
IND(2)	113
PPF	51
SMSBP	32
Valid votes	60,895
Rejected	3,239
Total polled	64,134
Registered	80,917

63. MULKIRIGALA

PA	28,181
UNP	22,078
SLPF	2,679
IND(1)	298
MEP	288
IND(2)	117
BNP	47
SMSBP	32
Valid votes	53,720
Rejected	3,763
Total polled	57,583
Registered	73,236

64. BELIATTA

PA	25,501
UNP	18,643
SLPF	3,169
MEP	680
IND(1)	154
IND(2)	112
SMSBP	49
BNP(PFF)	23
Valid votes	48,331
Rejected	2,333
Total polled	50,664
Registered	60,091

KALUTARA DISTRICT

65. BERUWELA

PA	33,686
UNP	29,063
SLPF	809
MEP	776
PFF	42
Valid votes	64,376
Rejected	2,805
Polled	67,181
Registered	33,894

66. PANADURA

PA	39,309
UNP	25,692
MEP	1,163
SLPF	970
BNP	41
Valid votes	67,175
Rejected	2,642
Polled	69,817
Registered	89,554

67. BANDARAGAMA

PA	37,374
UNP	28,531
SLPF	774
MEP	707

68. MATUGAMA

PA	30,514
UNP	26,520
SLPF	969
MEP	670

BNP	31	PFF	54
Valid votes	67,417	Valid votes	58,727
Rejected	3,059	Rejected	4,034
Polled	70,476	Polled	62,761
Registered	86,676	Registered	80,135

69. HORANA

PA	32,374
UNP	27,562
MEP	771
SLPF	515
BNP	50
Valid votes	61,272
Rejected	2,656
Polled	63,928
Registered	77,877

70. BULATHSINHALA

PA	24,364
UNP	23,755
MEP	305
SLPF	226
BNP	35
Valid votes	48,685
Rejected	3,121
Polled	51,806
Registered	63,131

71. AGALAWATTA

PA	31,009
UNP	27,007
SLPF	693
MEP	402
BNP	54
Valid votes	59,165
Rejected	3,817
Polled	62,983
Registered	78,540

72. KALUTARA

PA	34,349
UNP	27,482
SLPF	1,107
MEP	727
PFF	27
Valid votes	63,962
Rejected	3,029
Polled	66,721
Registered	86,437

KANDY DISTRICT

73. HARISPATTUWA

UNP	42,356
PA	41,035
SLPF	546
MEP	425
IND(1)	46
IND(2)	35
Valid votes	84,443
Rejected	4,352
Polled	88,795
Registered	109,246

74. PATHADUMBARA

UNP	25,471
PA	21,635
MEP	240
SLPF	186
IND(2)	21
IND(1)	20
Valid votes	43,754
Rejected	2,731
Total Polled	46,485
Registered	57,482

75. UDUNUWARA

PA	21,635
UNP	21,586
MEP	384
SLPF	311
IND(2)	17
IND(1)	13
Valid votes	43,946
Rejected	2,238
Total Polled	46,184
Registered	56,671

77. KUNDASALE

UNP	22,434
PA	20,461
MEP	402
SLPF	318
IND(1)	26
IND(2)	10
Valid votes	43,651
Rejected	2,434
Total polled	46,095
Registered	56,925

79. YATINUWARA

PA	23,096
UNP	21,602
SLPF	350
MEP	289
IND(1)	15
IND(2)	15
Valid votes	45,366
Rejected	2,122
Total Polled	47,488
Registered	58,455

81. GALAGEDERA

UNP	18,240
PA	14,762
MEP	205

76. GAMPOLA

UNP	27,942
PA	22,962
SLPF	174
MEP	156
IND(1)	30
IND(2)	16
Valid Votes	51,280
Rejected	3,117
Total Polled	54,397
Registered	66,812

78. UDUDUMBARA

UNP	18,116
PA	16,590
SLPF	93
MEP	75
IND(1)	25
IND(2)	17
Valid votes	34,916
Rejected	2,149
Total polled	37,065
Registered	42,700

80. KANDY

UNP	13,342
PA	10,591
MEP	355
SLPF	140
IND(1)	8
IND(2)	7
Valid votes	24,443
Rejected	843
Total polled	25,286
Registered	32,335

82. TELDENIYA

UNP	13,804
PA	12,457
MEP	99

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SLPF	144	IND(1)	68
IND(1)	14	IND(2)	15
IND(2)	10		
Valid votes	33,375	Valid votes	26,064
Rejected	1,648	Rejected	1,766
Total polled	35,023	Total polled	27,830
Registered	43,462	Registered	32,992

83. HEWAHETA

UNP	22,141
PA	15,365
MEP	107
SLPF	92
IND1	16
IND2	13
Valid votes	37,734
Rejected	2,611
Total polled	40,345
Registered	50,376

84. SENKADAGALA

UNP	21,005
PA	20,318
MEP	474
SLPF	286
IND1	17
IND2	14
Valid votes	42,114
Rejected	1,610
Total polled	43,724
Registered	55,740

85. NAWALAPITIYA

UNP	26,836
PA	21,402
SLPF	211
IND(1)	22
IND(2)	12
Valid votes	48,612
Rejected	3,148
Total Polled	51,760
Registered	62,996

KEGALLE DISTRICT

86. DEDIGAMA

UNP	28,357
PA	26,678
SLPF	434
Valid votes	55,469
Rejected	1,845
Total Polled	57,314
Registered	62,142

87 KEGALLE

PA	23,084
UNP	18,311
SLPF	543
Valid votes	41,938
Rejected	1,624
Total Polled	43,562
Registered	54,933

88. YATIYANTOTA

UNP	24,145
PA	19,340
SLPF	202
Valid votes	43,687
Rejected	2,604
Polled	46,291
Registered	57,328

89. RAMBUKKANA

UNP	19,346
PA	17,976
SLPF	469
Valid votes	37,791
Rejected	1,560
Polled	39,351
Registered	49,996

90. DARANIYAGALA

UNP	23,725
PA	16,305
SLPF	253
Valid votes	40,283
Rejected	2,125
Polled	42,408
Registered	52,714

91. RUWANWELLA

PA	21,536
UNP	22,082
SLPF	289
Valid votes	43,907
Rejected	2,910
Polled	45,817
Registered	56,451

92. GALIGAMUWA

PA	20,730
UNP	20,647
SLPF	300
Valid votes	41,677
Rejected	1,709
Polled	43,386
Registered	54,044

93. MAWANELLA

UNP	25,921
PA	21,812
SLPF	452
Valid votes	48,187
Rejected	2,010
Total polled	50,197
Registered	63,001

94. ARANAYAKE

UNP	17,392
PA	15,383
SLPF	304
Valid votes	33,079
Rejected	1,406
Total polled	34,485
Registered	42,338

KURUNEGALA DISTRICT

95.	DODANGASLANDA		96.	PANDUWASNUWARA	
	PA	18,300		PA	21,295
	UNP	17,193		UNP	20,011
	SLPF	466		SLPF	189
	MEP	125		MEP	137
	Valid votes	36,084		Valid votes	41,632
	Rejected	2,243		Rejected	43,379
	Polled	38,327		Polled	52,667
	Registered	49,109		Registered	1,747
97.	WARIYAPOLA		98.	MAWATHAGAWA	
	PA	23,974		PA	23,746
	UNP	18,802		UNP	21,805
	SLPF	241		SLPF	491
	MEP	125		MEP	204
	Valid votes	43,142		Valid votes	46,246
	Rejected	1,777		Rejected	1,752
	Polled	44,919		Polled	47,998
	Registered	53,579		Registered	60,627
99.	BLAGIRIYA		100.	KURUNEGALA	
	PA	25,709		PA	22,173
	UNP	23,502		UNPN	22,042
	SLPF	213		SLPF	334
	MEP	178		MEP	230
	Valid votes	49,602		Valid votes	44,779
	Rejected	1,441		Rejected	1,947
	Polled	51,043		Polled	46,726
	Registered	61,107		Registered	59,146
101.	KATUGAMPOLA		102.	YAPAHUWA	
	PA	30,192		PA	32,277
	UNP	23,922		UNPN	28,549
	SLPF	422		SLPF	583
	MEP	223		MEP	107
	Valid votes	54,779		Valid votes	59,518
	Rejected	2,235		Rejected	3,041
	Polled	57,014		Polled	62,557
	Registered	68,616		Registered	76,083

103.	KULLYAPITLYA	
UNP		27,173
PA		27,109
MEP		347
SLPF		272
	Valid votes	54,901
	Rejected	2,229
	Polled	57,130
	Registered	69,233

104.	POLGAHAWELA	
UNP		22,167
PA		20,829
MEP		274
SLPF		263
	Valid votes	43,533
	Rejected	1,745
	Polled	45,278
	Registered	55,872

105.	DMBADENIYA	
PA		28,551
UNP		26,223
SLPF		277
MEP		204
	Valid votes	55,255
	Rejected	2,013
	Polled	57,268
	Registered	69,064

106.	HIRIYALA	
UNP		26,181
PA		23,984
SLPF		311
MEP		191
	Valid Votesq	50,667
	Rejected	2,817
	Total Polled	53,484
	Registered	67,182

107.	GALGAMUWA	
PA		31,870
UNP		23,996
SLPF		496
MEP		218
	Valid votes	56,580
	Rejected	2,329
	Total polled	58,909
	Registered	69,872

108.	NIKAWERATIYA	
PA		28,351
UNP		22,471
SLPF		251
MEP		134
	Valid votes	51,207
	Rejected	2,365
	Total polled	53,572
	Registered	64,434

MATALE DISTRICT

109	MATALE	
UNP		22,446
PA		20,607
SLPF		338
IND		294
	Valid votes	43,685
	Rejected	2,630
	Polled	46,315
	Registered	58,635

110.	LAGGALA	
PA		20,648
UNP		17,970
IND		437
SLPF		153
	Valid votes	39,208
	Rejected	2,618
	Polled	41,826
	Registered	48,525

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111. RATTOTA

UNP	22,446
PA	22,856
IND	390
SLPF	266
Valid votes	49,795
Rejected	3,393
Polled	53,188
Registered	66,238

113 DENIYAYA

PA	30,743
UNP	23,930
SLPF	756
MEP	178
Valid votes	55,607
Rejected	3,330
Polled	58,937
Registered	71,106

115. HAKMANA

PA	30,834
UNP	20,603
SLPF	991
Valid votes	52,614
Rejected	2,965
Polled	55,579
Registered	70,889

117. AKURESSA

PA	32,837
UNP	21,999
SLPF	1,554
MEP	247
Valid votes	56,637
Rejected	2,674
Polled	59,311
Registered	74,552

112.DAMBULLA

PA	34,286
UNP	30,468
SLPF	600
INDI	597
Valid votes	65,951
Rejected	3,881
Polled	69,832
Registered	85,870

114.WELLGAMA

PA	34,760
UNP	19,013
SLPF	1,600
MEP	182
Valid votes	55,555
Rejected	
Polled	57,350
Registered	77,479

116.DEVIAUWARA

PA	28,131
UNP	19,335
SLPF	1,304
MEP	105
Valid votes	48,935
Rejected	1,341
Polled	50,776
Registered	66,923

118.KAMBURUPITIYA

PA	32,318
UNP	16,069
SLPF	1,038
MEP	232
Valid votes	49,717
Rejected	2,318
Polled	52,035
Registered	

119. MATARA

PA	32,629
UNP	18,915
SLPF	1,264
MEP	246
Valid votes	53,054
Rejected	1,632
Total polled	54,686
Registered	73,461

MONERAGALA DISTRICT

120. WELLAWAYA

PA	29,989
UNP	27,463
IND4	4,220
SLPF	1,000
IND5	66
IND	2
IND1	23
IND3	16
Valid votes	62,801
Rejected	6,766
Polled	69,587
Registered	84,310

121. BIBLLE

PA	18,546
UNP	18,526
IND4	1,104
SLPF	422
IND5	59
IND2	42
IND1	28
IND3	27
Valid votes	38,754
Rejected	4,140
Polled	42,894
Registered	50,852

122. MONERAGALA

PA	27,459
UNP	20,277
IND4	1,215
SLPF	431
IND5	81
IND2	40
IND1	37
IND3	21
Valid votes	49,561
Rejected	5,328
Polled	54,889
Registered	64,229

NUWARA-ELIYA DISTRICT

123. KOTMALE		124. HANGURANKETHA	
UNP	26,542	UNP	24,783
PA	16,112	PA	17,904
IND	1,610	SLPF	130
SLPF	194	IND	68
MEP	90	MEP	56
Valid votes	44,548	Valid Votes	42,941
Rejected	2,607	Rejected	2,526
Total Polled	47,155	Total Polled	45,467
Registered	56,977	Registered	54,001

125. NUWARA-ELIYA-MASKELIYA		126. WALAPANE	
UNP	94,993	UNP	26,534
PA	39,476	PA	21,453
IND	24,248	INDI	1,189
MEP	221	SLPF	107
		MEP	8
Valid votes	159,291	Valid votes	49,363
Rejected	13,388	Rejected	2,997
Total Polled	172,659	Total Polled	52,360
Registered	212,690	Registered	63,000

POLONNARUWA DISTRICT

127. MINNERIYA		128. MEDIRIGIRIYA	
PA	24,660	PA	22,287
UNP	20,379	UNP	22,261
SLPF	811	SLPF	308
Valid votes	45,850	Valid votes	44,856
Rejected	1,758	Rejected	1,626
Total Polled	47,608	Total Polled	46,482
Registered	57,393	Registered	55,264

129. POLONNARUWA	
PA	33,381
UNP	32,561
SLPF	700
Valid votes	66,673

Rejected	2,989
Total Polled	69,677
Registered	87,535

PUTTALAM DISTRICT

130. PUTTALAM

PA	26,645
UNP	23,166
SLPF	150
MEP	87
Valid votes	50,049
Rejected	2,944
Total Polled	52,992
Registered	73,757

131. NATTANDIYA

PA	26,286
UNP	21,120
SLPF	282
MEP	164
Valid votes	47,852
Rejected	1,804
Total Polled	49,656
Registered	64,449

132. WENNAPPUWA

PA	29,944
UNP	26,925
SLPF	338
MEP	203
Valid votes	57,410
Rejected	2,613
Total Polled	60,023
Registered	78,919

133. CHILAW

PA	31,999
UNP	29,076
SLPF	356
MEP	211
Valid votes	61,642
Rejected	2,723
Total polled	64,365
Registered	83,057

134. ANAMADUWA

PA	32,697
UNP	25,367
SLPF	439
MEP	128
Valid votes	58,631
Rejected	2,949
Total Polled	61,580
Registered	80,010

RATNAPURA DISTRICT

135. RATNAPURA

PA	35,045
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136. EHELIYAGODA

PA	30,714
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UNP	31,619	UNP	25,070
SLPF	303	MEP	538
MEP	243	SLPF	229
IND1	204	IND1	29
IND3	29	IND3	13
IND2	15	IND2	56,743
Valid votes	67,458	Valid votes	56,743
Rejected	3,291	Rejected	2,797
Total Polled	70,749	Total Polled	59,540
Registered	83,492	Registered	71,614

137. KOLONNA

PA	41,894
UNP	28,547
SLPF	654
IND (1)	324
MEP	239
IND (3)	35
IND (2)	26
Valid votes	71,719
Rejected	3,490
Total Polled	75,209
Registered	89,903

138. KALAWANA

PA	18,312
UNP	17,674
IND (1)	116
SLPF	75
MEP	55
IND (3)	16
IND (2)	11
Valid votes	36,259
Rejected	1,716
Total Polled	37,975
Registered	43,279

139 RAKWANA

UNP	31,183
PA	25,324
SLPF	237
IND1	171
MEP	101
IND3	17
IND2	15
Valid votes	57,048
Rejected	3,009
Total Polled	60,057
Registered	69,702

140. BALANGODA

UNP	29,959
PA	28,292
SLPF	373
IND1	204
MEP	133
IND3	22
IND2	14
Valid votes	58,997
Rejected	3,87
Total Polled	62,687
Registered	73,136

141. NIVITHIGALA

PA	27,903
UNP	27,819
IND (1)	222

142. PELMADULLA

UNP	25,008
PA	21,302
SLPF	232

SLPF	140	IND1	164
MEP	128	MEP	121
IND (3)	36	IND2	19
IND (2)	17	IND3	15
Valid votes	56,269	Valid votes	46,861
Rejected	2,812	Rejected	2,541
Total Polled	59,081	Total Polled	49,402
Registered	66,888	Registered	56,595

TRINCOMALEE DISTRICT

143. SERUWILA

PA	17,183
UNP	14,556
SLMC	1,870
TULF	1,765
SLPF	286
TELO	271
EPRLF	188
IND.	35
Valid votes	36,154
Rejected	2,311
Total Polled	38,465
Registered	54,632

144. TRINCOMALEE

TULF	18,548
SLMC	5,710
UNP	5,703
PA	5,156
TELO	273
EPRLF	408
IND.	352
SLPF	199
Valid votes	35,812
Rejected	2,110
Total Polled	40,922
Registered	67,509

145. MATUR

SLMC	18,677
UNP	13,773
TULF	6,817
PA	856
TELO	651
EPRLF	252
IND.	200
SLPF	86
Valid votes	41,312
Rejected	2,210
Total Polled	43,522
Registered	61,949

VANNI DISTRICT

146. VAVUNIYA		147. MULLAITIVU	
DPLF	7,080	SLMC	906
PA	4,869	UNP	799
UNP	4,497	PA	342
TULF	1,756	IND(2)	82
EPRLF	1,465	EPRLF	53
SLMC	1,412	DPLF	13
IND(1)	502	TULF	8
IND(2)	66	IND(2)	4
NSSP	26	NSSP	2
IND.	24	IND(3)	2
Valid votes	21,697	Valid votes	2,211
Rejected	1,766	Rejected	125
Total Polled	23,463	Total Polled	2,336
Registered	72,434	Registered	52,197

148. MANNAR

SLMC	5,785
DPLF	4,403
UMP	2,437
EPRLF	1,841
IND(2)	1,720
TULF	1,127
PA	207
IND(1)	92
IND(3)	49
NSSP	16
Valid votes	17,677
Rejected	1,106
Total Polled	18,783
Registered	54,066

JAFFNA DISTRICT

149. MANIPAY		150. UDUPIDY	
IND 2	10	IND 2	5
IND 1	8	EPRLF	1
EPRLF	0	SLMC	1
SLMC	0	IND 1	1

	Valid votes	18		Valid votes	8
	Total Polled	18		Total Polled	8
	Registered	58,312		Registered	52,153
151.	KOPAY		152.	NALLUR	
IND.2		40	IND.1		9
IND.1		17	IND.2		8
EPRLF		0	EPRLF		2
SLMC		0	SLMC		0
	Valid votes	57		Valid votes	19
	Total Polled	57		Total Polled	19
	Registered	56,496		Registered	63,378
153.	CHAVAKACHCHERI		154.	KEYTS	
SLMC		62	IND.2		9,978
IND.2		15	SLMC		719
IND.1		2	IND.1		235
EPRLF		0	EPRLF		251
	Valid votes	79		Valid votes	11,863
	Total Polled	79		Total Polled	11,863
	Registered	51,713		Registered	49,504
155.	KANKESANTURAI		156.	KILINCHCHI	
IND.2		93	SLMC		56
IND.1		15	IND.1		06
EPRLF		9	EPRLF		02
SLMC		4	IND.2		02
	Valid votes	1,201		Valid votes	66
	Total Polled	121		Total Polled	66
	Registered	60,417		Registered	55,995
157.	JAFFNA		158.	VADDUKODDY	
SLMC		1,151	IND.2		556
IND.2		240	IND.1		43
EPRLF		10	EPRLF		08
IND.1		07	SLMC		05
	Valid votes	1,208		Valid votes	964
	Total Polled	1,208		Total Polled	964
	Registered	50,045		Registered	58,949

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159. POINT-PEDRO

IND1	31
IND2	3
EPRLF	0
SLMC	0
Total valid Votes	34
Registered	40,336

**ANURADHAPURA DISTRICT
FINAL RESULTS**

	Votes	Seats
PA	180,454	5
UNP	142,084	3
SLPF	3,077	0
MEP	1,369	0
Valid votes	326,984	
Rejected	14,620	
Polled	341,604	
Registered	403,926	

**KANDY DISTRICT
FINAL RESULTS**

	Votes	Seats
UNP	301,824	7
PA	267,683	5
MEP	3,495	0
SLPF	3,072	0
IND.1	270	0
IND.2	208	0
Valid votes	576,552	
Rejected	31,019	
Polled	607,571	
Registered	726,192	

APPENDIX - VI

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (1) COLOMBO

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	COLOMBO-NORTH	54149	2259 6.38%	10744 30.36%	22389 63.26%	35392	647 1.80%	36039 66.56%
B	COLOMBO-CENTRAL	133920	4521 5.06%	26083 29.18%	58795 65.77%	89399	1572 1.73%	90971 67.93%
C	BORELLA	47917	1702 5.45%	13083 41.88%	16452 52.67%	31237	499 1.57%	31736 66.23%
D	COLOMBO-EAST	51225	2298 7.12%	13477 41.78%	16480 51.09%	32255	666 2.02%	32921 64.27%
E	COLOMBO-WEST	37220	1380 5.87%	7473 31.77%	14670 62.36%	23523	342 1.43%	23865 64.12%
F	DEHIWALA	52969	1707 4.66%	16599 45.31%	18326 50.03%	36632	520 1.40%	37152 70.14%
G	RATMALANA	55248	1783 4.63%	18308 47.55%	18409 47.82%	38500	584 1.49%	39084 70.74%
H	KOLONNAWA	75650	2411 4.69%	25050 48.78%	23895 46.53%	51356	849 1.63%	52205 69.01%
I	KOTTE	67194	2163 4.96%	22607 51.85%	18834 43.19%	43604	563 1.27%	44167 65.73%
J	KADUWELA	87693	2108 3.79%	30600 55.06%	22872 41.15%	55580	806 1.43%	56386 64.30%
K	AVISSAWELLA	68892	1199 2.44%	23721 48.20%	24292 49.36%	49212	570 1.14%	49782 72.26%
L	HOMAGAWA	86978	1730 3.45%	27570 55.02%	20810 41.53%	50110	679 1.34%	50789 58.39%
M	MAHARAGAMA	83598	2260 4.15%	31396 57.69%	20770 38.16%	54426	779 1.41%	55205 66.04%
N	KESBEWA	89277	2228 3.54%	35184 55.88%	25549 40.58%	62961	879 1.38%	63840 71.51%
O	MORATUWA	96841	3488 5.39%	29654 45.84%	31546 48.77%	64688	977 1.49%	65665 67.81%
P	POSTAL-COLOMBO		783 4.76%	8409 51.15%	7248 44.09%	16440	363 2.16	16803
TOTAL:-		1088780	34020 4.63%	339958 46.23%	361337 49.14%	735315	11295 1.51%	746610 68.57%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - 1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (2) GAMPALA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	WATTALA	68477	1901 3.86%	19361 39.35%	27945 56.79%	49207	666 1.34%	49873 72.83%
B	NEGOMBO	68250	1720 3.63%	16601 35.07%	29016 61.30%	47337	587 1.22%	47924 70.22%
C	KATANA	76452	2036 3.62%	25379 45.18%	28670 51.20%	56175	822 1.44%	56997 74.55%
D	DIVULAPITIYA	68377	1055 2.00%	25857 49.06%	25792 48.94%	52704	742 1.39%	53446 78.16%
E	MIRIGAMA	78953	1074 1.93%	27712 49.82%	26835 48.25%	55621	860 1.52%	56481 71.54%
F	MINUWANGODA	78056	1404 2.32%	29751 49.11%	29424 48.57%	60579	825 1.34%	61404 78.67%
G	ATTANAGALLA	79172	1475 2.48%	35758 60.12%	22242 37.40%	59475	735 1.22%	60210 76.05%
H	GAMPAHA	85424	1839 2.96%	34340 55.27%	25948 41.77%	62127	721 1.15%	62848 73.57%
I	JA-ELA	81566	1766 3.09%	25357 44.37%	30021 52.54%	57144	1052 1.81%	58196 71.35%
J	MAHARA	79936	2407 4.10%	30305 51.60%	26024 44.31%	58736	681 1.15%	59417 74.33%
K	DOMPE	72945	976 1.68%	30829 53.19%	26155 45.13%	57960	511 0.87%	58471 80.16%
L	BIYAGAMA	66166	1518 3.09%	23633 48.15%	23930 48.76%	49081	685 1.38%	49766 75.21%
M	KELANIYA	65961	2700 5.75%	22877 48.70%	21395 45.55%	46972	690 1.45%	47662 72.26%
N	POSTAL-GAMPAHA		596 3.97%	7793 51.97%	6605 44.05%	14994	477 3.08%	15471
TOTAL:-		969735	22467 3.09%	355553 48.83%	350092 48.08%	728112	10054 1.36%	738166 76.12%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (3) KALUTARA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	PANADURA	78330	3548 6.50%	28366 51.94%	22701 41.57%	54615	799 1.44%	55414 70.74%
B	BANDARAGAMA	73585	2261 4.09%	26897 48.71%	26066 47.20%	55224	871 1.55%	56095 76.23%
C	HORANA	69405	1339 2.71%	24116 48.89%	23868 48.39%	49323	632 1.27%	49955 71.98%
D	BULATHSINHALA	58030	743 1.96%	18491 48.74%	18705 49.30%	37939	880 2.27%	38819 66.89%
E	MATUGAMA	70457	836 2.16%	19908 51.49%	17917 46.34%	38661	716 1.82%	39377 55.89%
F	KALUTARA	75912	2559 5.38%	22425 47.18%	22551 47.44%	47535	1161 2.38%	48696 64.15%
G	BERUWALA	73408	952 2.19%	21920 50.51%	20529 47.30%	43401	700 1.59%	44101 60.08%
H	AGALAWATTA	70991	905 2.89%	15255 48.71%	15155 48.40%	31315	521 1.64%	31836 44.85%
I	POSTAL-KALUTARA		232 5.01%	2383 51.44%	2018 43.56%	4633	257 5.26%	4890
TOTAL:-		570118	13375 3.69%	179761 49.57%	169510 46.74%	362646	6537 1.77%	369183 64.76%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (4) MAHANUWARA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	GALAGEDERA	39671	330 1.18%	12549 44.90%	15071 53.92%	27950	263 0.93%	28213 71.12%
B	HARISPATTUWA	94109	719 1.26%	25594 44.89%	30708 53.85%	57021	962 1.66%	57983 61.61%
C	PATHA-DUMBARA	48741	557 1.52%	15087 41.28%	20902 57.19%	36546	611 1.64%	37157 76.23%
D	UDA-DUMBARA	37345	324 1.31%	12466 50.22%	12032 48.47%	24822	386 1.53%	25208 67.50%
E	TELDENIYA	27659	247 1.26%	9417 48.10%	9912 50.63%	19576	339 1.70%	19915 72%
F	KUNDASALE	48841	433 1.56%	12118 43.62%	15231 54.82%	27782	407 1.44%	28189 57.72%
G	HEWAHETA	42868	298 0.88%	14015 41.22%	19688 57.90%	34001	373 1.09%	34374 80.19%
H	SENKADAGALA	48208	834 2.58%	14690 45.41%	16825 52.01%	32349	395 1.21%	32744 67.92%
I	MAHANUWARA	28958	617 3.27%	6959 36.86%	11301 59.87%	18877	297 1.55%	19174 66.21%
J	YATINUWARA	52182	515 1.68%	15699 51.15%	14478 47.17%	30692	362 1.17%	31054 59.51%
K	UDUNUWARA	50223	345 1.15%	10420 35.56%	16582 61.53%	27317	550 2.12%	27867 55.63%
L	GAMPOLA	554245	418 0.95%	18976 42.94%	24800 56.12%	44194	517 1.16%	44711 80.67%
M	NAWALAPITIYA	54010	559 1.37%	16082 39.37%	24203 59.26%	40844	521 1.26%	41365 76.59%
N	POSTAL- MAHANUWARA		100 2.17%	2115 45.92%	2391 51.91%	4606	184 3.84%	4790
TOTAL:-		628240	6266 1.47%	186187 43.65%	234124 54.88%	426577	6167 1.43%	432744 68.88%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (5) MATALE

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	DAMBULLA	72515	137	3195	4276	7608	102	7710
			1.80%	42.00%	56.20%		1.32%	10.63%
B	LAGGALA	41110	216	8908	9055	18179	198	18377
			1.19%	49.00%	49.81%		1.08%	44.70%
C	MATALE	48841	437	6889	12544	19870	463	20333
			2.20%	34.67%	63.13%		2.28%	41.63%
D	RATTOTA	52472	320	6380	10599	17299	297	17596
			1.85%	36.88%	61.27%		1.69%	33.53%
E	POSTAL-MATALE		25	453	533	1011	50	1061
			2.47%	44.81%	52.72%		4.71%	
TOTAL:-		214938	1135	25825	37007	63967	1110	65077
			1.77%	40.37%	57.85%		1.71%	30.28%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (6) NUWARA-ELIYA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	N'ELIYA-MASKELIYA	101765	2290	22209	52653	77152	1771	78923
			2.97%	28.79%	68.25%		2.24%	77.55%
B	KOTMALE	39194	272	13549	17822	31643	401	32044
			0.86%	42.82%	56.32%		1.25%	81.76%
C	HANGURANKETHA	44596	370	14011	22748	37129	576	37705
			1.00%	37.74%	61.27%		1.53%	84.55%
D	WALAPANE	44214	404	14519	18099	33022	530	33552
			1.22%	43.97%	54.81%		1.58%	75.89%
E	POSTAL-NUWARAELIA		35	619	813	1467	42	1509
			2.39%	42.19%	55.42%		2.78%	
TOTAL:-		229769	3371	64907	112135	180413	3320	183733

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (7) GALLE

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	BALAPITIYA	41220	354 3.97%	3475 38.95%	5093 57.08%	8922	162 1.78%	9084 22.04%
B	AMBALANGODA	49885	234 3.36%	3444 49.48%	3288 47.16%	6960	150 2.11%	7110 14.25%
C	KARANDENIYA	47887	189 1.87%	5703 56.45%	4210 41.67%	10102	151 1.47%	10253 21.41%
D	BENTARA-ELPITIYA	65597	481 2.26%	12057 56.53%	8789 41.21%	21327	299 1.38%	21626 32.97%
E	HINIDUMA	65310	794 1.76%	22347 49.47%	22029 48.77%	45170	745 1.62%	45915 70.30%
F	BADDEGAMA	65351	941 1.95%	27061 55.95%	20368 42.11%	48370	793 1.61%	49163 75.23%
G	RATAGAMA	60877	1043 4.03%	13290 51.37%	11539 44.60%	25872	456 1.73%	26328 43.25%
H	GALLE	56083	869 2.32%	17432 46.45%	19227 51.23%	37528	633 1.66%	38161 68.04%
I	AKMEEMANA	57724	664 1.64%	22877 56.62%	16865 41.74%	40406	368 0.90%	40774 70.64%
J	HABARADUWA	61369	637 2.09%	18329 60.16%	11500 37.75%	30466	438 1.42#	30904 50.36%
K	POSTAL-GALLE		211 4.38%	2600 53.93%	2010 41.69%	4821	266 5.23%	5087
TOTAL:-		571303	6417 2.29%	148615 53.09%	124912 44.62%	279944	4461 1.57%	284405 49.78%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (8) MATARA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	DENIYAYA	58342	554 2.56%	10949 50.55%	10157 46.89%	21660	378 1.72%	22038 37.77%
B	HAKMANA	65407	41 1.43%	1494 52.20%	1327 46.37%	2862	51 1.75%	2913 4.45%
C	AKURESSA	67076	312 3.40%	3505 38.24%	5346 58.34%	9163	277 2.93%	9440 14.07%
D	KAMBURUPITIYA	63590	166 3.57%	3228 69.42%	1256 27.01%	4650	89 1.88%	4739 7.45%
E	DEVINUWARA	62490	188 1.94%	4403 45.55%	5076 52.51%	9667	104 1.06%	9771 15.64%
F	MATARA	64438	1098 3.61%	17718 58.24%	11606 38.15%	30422	497 1.61%	30919 47.98%
G	WELIGAMA	70591	532 1.99%	15802 59.22%	10351 38.79%	26685	540 1.98%	27225 38.57%
H	POSTAL-MATARA		31 4.87%	325 51.10%	280 44.03%	636	67 9.53%	703
TOTAL:-		451934	2922 2.76%	57424 54.30%	45399 42.93%	105745	2003 1.86%	107748 23.84%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (9) HAMBANTOTA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	MULKIRIGALA	66740	382 3.16%	5740 47.54%	5952 49.30%	12074	663 5.21%	12737 19.08%
B	BELIATTA	62773	326 2.54%	5733 44.61%	6793 52.86%	12852	491 3.68%	13343 21.26%
C	TANGALLA	70422	569 3.37%	8026 47.53%	8292 49.10%	16887	1007 5.63%	17894 25.41%
D	TISSAMAHA- RAMAYA	95245	1192 2.92%	19665 48.11%	20020 48.98%	40877	1667 3.92%	42544 44.67%
E	POSTAL- HAMBANTOTA		9 2.74%	179 54.41%	141 42.86%	329	27 7.58%	356
TOTAL:-		295180	2478 2.98%	39343 47.39%	41198 49.62%	83019	3855 4.44%	86874 29.43%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (10) JAFFNA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	KAYTS	49481	4503	3264	4628	12395	596	12991
			36.33%	26.33%	37.34%		4.59%	26.25%
B	VADDUKODDAI	58522	5252	6495	4309	16056	2397	18453
			32.71%	40.45%	26.84%		12.99%	31.53%
C	KANKESANTHURAI	60386	3840	3117	2364	9321	451	9772
			41.20%	33.44%	25.36%		4.62%	16.18%
D	MANIPAY	58320	5089	3491	4006	12586	891	13477
			40.43%	27.74%	31.83%		6.61%	23.11%
E	KOPAY	56450	4325	5833	2493	12651	733	13384
			34.19%	46.11%	19.71%		5.48%	23.71%
F	UDUPIDDY	52084	3120	3400	1662	8182	303	8485
			38.13%	41.55%	20.31%		3.57%	16.29%
G	POINT-PEDRO	40175	2910	3921	2620	9451	772	10223
			30.79%	41.49%	27.12%		7.55%	25.45%
H	CHAVAKACHCHERI	51595	4023	3704	2300	10027	1035	11062
			40.12%	36.94%	22.94%		9.36%	21.44%
I	NALLUR	61936	2924	3362	2000	8286	482	8768
			35.29%	40.57%	24.14%		5.50%	14.16%
J	JAFFNA	49229	3616	3546	3475	10637	479	11116
			33.99%	33.34%	32.67%		4.31%	22.58%
K	KILINCHCHI	53604	2596	4064	3793	10453	378	10831
			28.83%	38.88%	36.29%		3.49%	20.21%
L	POSTAL-JAFFNA		0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:-		591782	42198	44197	33650	120045	8517	128562
			35.15%	36.82%	28.03%		6.62%	21.72%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (11) VANNI

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	MANNAR	47060	1035	1431	4500	6966	149	7115
			14.86%	20.54%	64.60%		2.09%	15.12%
B	VAVUNIYA	54039	1346	1419	2982	6147	230	6377
			21.90%	29.59%	48.51%		3.61%	11.80%
C	MULLAITIVU	41624	1119	1639	3098	5856	329	6185
			19.11%	27.99%	52.90%		5.32%	14.86%
D	POSTAL-VANNI		0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:-		142723	3500	4889	10580	18969	708	19677
			18.45%	25.77%	55.78%		3.60%	13.79%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (12) BATTICOLOA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	KALKUDAH	59421	9135	8375	15289	32799	1079	33878
			27.85%	25.53%	46.61%		3.18%	57.01%
B	BATTICALOA	99717	14972	8547	29976	53495	1702	55197
			27.99%	15.98%	56.04%		3.08%	55.35%
C	PADDIRUPPU	56447	13977	4031	16227	34235	2373	36608
			40.83%	11.77%	47.40%		6.48%	64.85%
D	POSTAL-BATTICOLOA		159	65	165	389	9	398
			40.87%	16.71%	42.42%		2.26%	
TOTAL:-		215585	38243	21018	61657	120918	5163	126081
			31.63%	17.38%	50.99%		4.09%	58.48%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (13) DIGAMADULLA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	AMPARA	94068	839 1.23%	32915 48.40%	34251 50.37%	68005	831 1.21%	68836 73.18%
B	SAMMANATHURAI	44790	2378 7.16%	12983 39.07%	17866 53.77%	33227	857 2.51%	34084 76.10%
C	KALMUNAI	44077	1766 5.84%	9708 32.12%	18746 62.03%	30220	573 1.86%	30793 69.86%
D	POTTUVIL	82833	5345 9.24%	27239 47.09%	25262 43.67%	57846	1524 2.57%	59370 71.67%
E	POSTAL- DIGAMADULLA		24 3.93%	2932 47.79%	295 48.28%	611	17 2.71%	628
TOTAL:-		265768	10352 5.45%	83137 43.78%	96420 50.77%	189909	3802 1.96%	193711 72.89%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (14) TRINCOMALEE

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	SERUWILA	47693	789 3.05%	12733 49.27%	12319 47.67%	25841	404 1.54%	26245 55.03%
B	TRINCOMALEE	56026	8378 37.64%	5767 25.91%	8112 36.45%	22257	565 2.48%	22822 40.73%
C	MUTUR	48570	4909 15.21%	11087 34.35%	16283 50.44%	32276	352 1.80%	32631 67.18%
D	POSTAL- TRINCOMALEE		27 10.98%	92 37.40%	127 51.63%	246	5 1.99%	251
TOTAL:-		152289	14103 17.49%	29679 36.81%	36841 45.70%	80623	1326 1.62%	81949 53.81%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
 Electoral District: (15) KURUNEGALA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	GALGAMUWA	60948	975 3.56%	13705 50.08%	12687 46.36%	27367	366 1.32%	27733 45.50%
B	NIKAWERATIYA	56592	464 2.11%	9539 43.38%	11988 54.51%	21991	235 1.06%	22226 39.27%
C	YAPAHUWA	66736	793 4.96%	7950 49.71%	7250 45.33%	15993	207 1.28%	16200 24.27%
D	HIRIYALA	59781	436 2.10%	8193 39.42%	12154 58.48%	20783	214 1.02%	20997 35.12%
E	WARIYAPOLA	48131	247 1.20%	10208 49.54%	10150 49.26%	20605	181 0.87%	20786 43.19%
F	PANDUWAS- NUWARA	48087	430 1.77%	12131 49.91%	11747 48.33%	24308	259 1.05%	24567 51.09%
G	BINGIRIYA	55318	418 1.08%	19275 49.90%	18932 49.01%	38625	336 0.86%	38961 70.43%
H	KATUGAMPOLA	61644	515 1.76%	13662 46.60%	15140 51.64%	29317	389 1.31%	29706 48.19%
I	KULIYAPITIYA	62275	495 1.37%	17660 48.76%	18063 49.87%	36218	338 0.92%	36556 58.70%
J	DAMBADENIYA	63877	531 1.38%	16301 42.49%	21532 56.13%	38364	430 1.11%	38794 60.73%
K	POLGAHAWELA	51363	528 1.74%	15872 52.36%	13915 45.90%	30315	375 1.22%	30690 59.75%
L	KURUNEGALA	53193	541 2.08%	11851 45.60%	13598 52.32%	25990	300 1.14%	26290 49.42%
M	MAWATHAGAMA	52815	557 1.45%	17465 45.42%	20429 53.13%	38451	380 0.98%	38831 73.52%
N	DODANGASLANDA	44229	787 3.88%	8411 41.48%	11077 54.63%	20275	271 1.32%	20546 46.45%
O	POSTAL- KURUNEGALA		0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:-		784989	7717 1.99%	182223 46.89%	198662 51.12%	388602	4281 1.09%	392883 50.05%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (16) PUTTALAM

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	PUTTALAM	57106	815	12613	24362	37790	632	38422
			2.16%	33.18%	64.47%		1.64%	67.28%
B	ANAMADUWA	67553	662	18875	21252	40789	393	41182
			1.62%	46.27%	52.10%		0.95%	60.96%
C	CHILAW	70574	748	23485	27932	52165	731	52896
			1.43%	45.02%	53.55%		1.38%	74.95%
D	NATTANDIYA	57526	851	18585	22194	41630	388	42018
			2.04%	44.64%	53.31%		0.92%	73.04%
E	WENNANDIYA	66244	941	20234	28407	49582	736	50318
			1.90%	40.81%	57.29%		1.46%	75.96%
F	POSTAL-PUTTALAM		76	1031	1192	2299	85	2384
			3.31%	44.85%	51.85%		3.57%	
TOTAL:-		319003	4093	94823	125339	224255	2965	227220
			1.83%	42.28%	55.89%		1.30%	71.23%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (17) ANURADHAPURA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	MEDAWACHCHIYA	47805	371	12542	8367	21280	459	21739
			1.74%	58.74%	39.32%		2.11%	45.47%
B	HORAWUPOTANA	42773	112	7038	4023	11173	244	11417
			1.00%	62.99%	36.01%		2.14%	26.69%
C	ANURADHAPURA-EAST	50340	617	11516	10310	22443	371	22814
			2.75%	51.31%	45.94%		1.63%	45.32%
D	ANURADHAPURA-WEST	52547	457	15492	14857	30806	428	31234
			1.48%	50.29%	48.23%		1.37%	59.44%
E	KALAWEWA	65945	611	14637	8947	24195	365	24560
			2.53%	60.50%	36.98%		1.49%	37.24%
F	MIHINTALE	33651	138	4018	4027	8183	211	8394
			1.69%	49.10%	49.21%		2.51%	24.94%
G	KEKIRAWA	41013	191	7203	5683	13077	129	13206
			1.46%	55.08%	43.46%		0.98%	32.20%
H	POTAL-ANURADHAPURA		32	708	737	1477	0	1477
			2.17%	47.94%	49.90%		0.00%	
TOTAL:-		334074	2529	73154	56951	132634	2207	134841
			1.91%	55.15%	42.94%		1.64%	40.36%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (18) POLONNARUWA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	MINNERIAY	50128	125 2.67%	2123 45.35%	2433 51.98%	4681	44 0.93%	4725 9.43%
B	MEDIRIGIRIYA	48728	161 1.57%	3497 34.12%	6592 64.31%	10250	448 4.19%	10698 21.95%
C	POLONNARUWA	64885	651 2.02%	14320 44.54%	17179 53.43%	32150	634 1.93%	32784 59.53%
D	POSTAL-POLONNARUWA		20 4.54%	233 52.83%	188 42.63%	441	31 6.57%	472
TOTAL:-		163741	957 2.01%	20173 42.45%	26392 55.54%	47522	1157 2.38%	48679 29.73%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (19) BADULLA

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	MAHIYANGANA	46724	499 1.98%	7682 30.52%	16990 67.50%	25171	435 1.70%	25606 54.80%
B	WIYALUWA	30460	214 1.76%	5575 45.75%	6397 52.49%	12186	285 2.29%	12471 40.94%
C	PASSARA	31509	248 2.30%	3500 32.40%	7056 65.31%	10804	425 3.78%	11229 35.64%
D	BADULLA	31924	464 5.40%	3160 36.78%	4968 57.82%	8592	185 2.11%	8777 27.49%
E	HALI-ELA	35367	543 3.17%	6585 38.43%	10005 58.40%	17133	466 2.65%	17599 49.76%
F	UVA-PARANAGAMA	38520	52 1.22%	956 22.43%	3255 76.35%	4263	130 2.96%	4393 11.40%
G	WELIMADA	41846	232 2.05%	3580 31.67%	7491 66.27%	11303	232 2.01%	11535 27.57%
H	BANDARAWELA	42467	776 2.97%	11182 42.76%	14191 54.27%	26149	717 2.67%	26866 63.26%
I	HAPUTALE	30645	412 2.19%	8003 42.48%	10426 55.34%	18841	401 2.08%	19242 62.79%
J	POSTAL-BADULLA		0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:-		329462	3440 2.56%	50223 37.36%	80779 60.08%	134442	3276 2.38%	137718 41.80%

**PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (20) MONERAGALA**

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	BIBILE	43093	371 2.48%	5507 36.79%	9091 60.73%	14969	507 3.28%	15476 35.91%
B	MONERAGALA	51823	110 3.38%	1366 41.94%	1781 54.68%	3257	116 3.44%	3373 6.51%
C	WELLAWAYA	67011	212 2.56%	2188 26.38%	5895 71.07%	8295	191 2.25%	8486 12.66%
D	POSTAL- MONERAGALA		4 2.34%	62 36.6%	105 61.40%	171	37 17.79%	208
TOTAL:-		161927	697 2.61%	9123 34.18%	16872 63.21%	26692	851 3.09%	27543 17.01%

**PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (21) RATNAPURA**

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	EHELIYAGODA	61203	2037 4.53%	18647 41.47%	24281 54.00%	44965	533 1.17%	45498 74.34%
B	RATNAPURA	70048	1460 2.65%	27658 50.15%	26029 47.20%	55147	608 1.09%	55755 79.60%
C	PELMADULLA	43820	651 1.82%	16719 46.78%	18370 51.40%	35740	400 1.11%	36140 82.47%
D	BALANGODA	59661	771 1.62%	22074 46.33%	24804 52.05%	47647	516 1.07%	48163 80.73%
E	RAKWANA	58565	608 1.32%	18744 40.75%	26643 57.93%	45995	538 1.16%	46533 79.46%
F	NIVITIGALA	54001	876 1.93%	21298 46.94%	23198 51.13%	45372	467 1.02%	45839 84.92%
G	KALAWANA	36544	1180 4.14%	12994 45.61%	14316 50.25%	28490	369 1.28%	28859 78.97%
H	KOLONNA	73382	829 1.96%	20184 47.81%	21204 50.23%	42217	615 1.44%	42832 58.37%
I	POSTAL- RATNAPURA		104 3.02%	1561 45.33%	1779 51.66%	3444	67 1.91%	3511
TOTAL		457224	8516 2.44%	159879 45.81%	180622 51.75%	349017	4113 1.16%	353130 77.23%

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION -1988
FINAL DISTRICT RESULTS - BY POLLING DIVISION
Electoral District: (22) KEGALLE

Poll No.	Polling Division	Registered votes	S.L.M.P.	S.L.F.P.	U.N.P.	Valid Votes	Rejected Votes	Total polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	DEDIGAMA	61669	587	15046	20951	36584	396	36980
			1.60%	41.13%	57.27%		1.07%	59.97%
B	GALIGAMUWA	48269	580	14160	16732	31472	570	32042
			1.84%	44.99%	53.16%		1.78%	66.38%
C	KEGALLE	48217	694	15226	15167	31087	474	31561
			2.23%	48.98%	48.79%		1.50%	65.46%
D	RAMBUKKANA	43847	535	12490	16033	29058	411	29469
			1.84%	42.98%	55.18%		1.39%	67.21%
E	MAWANELLA	55270	535	14094	22423	37052	452	37504
			1.44%	38.04%	60.52%		1.21%	67.86%
F	ARANAYAKE	37459	335	9605	14894	24834	369	25203
			1.35%	38.68%	59.97%		1.46%	67.28%
G	YATIYANTOTA	48662	1253	13452	21614	36319	516	36835
			3.45%	37.04%	59.51%		1.40%	75.70%
H	RUWANWELLA	50045	1674	13249	21282	36205	542	36747
			4.62%	36.59%	58.78%		1.47%	73.43%
I	DERANIYAGALA	43740	595	11008	17649	29252	438	29690
			2.03%	37.63%	60.33%		1.48%	67.88%
J	POSTAL-KEGALLE		135	1439	1975	3549	109	3658
			3.80%	40.55%	55.65%		2.98%	
TOTAL:-		437178	6923	119767	168720	295412	4277	299689
			2.34%	40.54%	57.11%		1.43%	68.55%

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